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Abstract 
 
 The injunction to ‘love our neighbor’ is a constitutive element of any Christian 
ethic. It is frequently found embedded within the triadic formulation of ‘love of God, love 
of neighbor, and love of self.’  Because this injunction must always be contextualized 
within each historical period it was important to explore how one should love the 
neighbor in our contemporary context. The dissertation begins by exploring the 
contemporary conditions of pluralism and interdependence. In this context we realize 
that love of neighbor must manifest in an encounter with the other. The project shows 
some current models of encountering the other. In showing the inadequacies of each 
model I also introduce the work of Johann B. Metz and Enrique Dussel. I then construct 
a process entitled Agapic Solidarity which seeks to use some aspects of the political 
theology of Metz and the liberation philosophy of Dussel to formulate an authentic 
encounter with the other. This process honors both elements; the condition of pluralism 
and the acknowledgement of interdependence. In doing this we begin the process of 
loving the neighbor which is so central to any Christian ethic. In the conclusion of the 
dissertation I show some possible applications of the process. The final component is a 
case study of the undocumented migrant in the United States of America as a 
demonstration of the process in action. In this way, it shows how the ethical demand 
can be enacted and embodied within a particular, concrete ethical issue.  
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INTRODUCTION  
OLD TEXT, NEW CONTEXT 
 
Old Text: Love of Neighbor 
The duty to love one's neighbor has been a foundational element of 
Christian moral discourse throughout its history. The Synoptics are united in their 
claim that the love command forms the second half of Jesus’ answer to the 
question posed by the scribe in Mark, “Which commandment is the first of all?”  
(Mark 12:28c). Each Gospel provides a slightly different account of the question, 
its source, and the initial part of Jesus’ response (citing the Decalogue): “The first 
is, ‘Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God . . . is one; you shall love the Lord your God 
with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your 
strength.’”  But all three Synoptic Gospels report Jesus stating the second 
command as, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Mark 12:31, Matthew 
22:39, Luke 10: 27b).  John’s version of the love command is equally strong, 
identifying love as the defining mark of discipleship: “I give you a new 
commandment, that you love one another.  Just as I have loved you, you also 
should love one another.  By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if 
you have love for one another” (John13:34-35).   
Each generation, then, must find its own way to rearticulate and respond 
to this aspect of the great commandment dating from the beginnings of the 
Christian movement. Pope Benedict XVI and Karl Rahner, for example, speak of 
the Christian claim that “love of God is love of neighbor” and “love of neighbor is 
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love of God.”1  Our millennium is frequently described as the “era of 
globalization,”2 which the United Nations Division of Poverty and Development 
says, “generally refers to an increasing interaction across national boundaries 
that affect many aspects of life: economic, social, cultural and political.”3  This 
dissertation will argue that Christians in this globalized context must respond to 
the following question: What does ‘love of neighbor’ require of followers of Jesus 
in an era of globalization characterized by accelerating cultural diversity, 
intercultural contact, and social stratification?   
In the pages that follow I will argue that twenty-first-century Christian 
disciples will define their response to the love command of Jesus in the context 
of virtually unavoidable encounters with those they regard as the Other.  I define 
the Other as that which is beyond Being.4 This understanding has its roots in the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas but finds its most precise, political expression in the 
                                            
1 Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 14, 15, 16, 18; Karl Rahner, “Reflections of the 
Unity of the Love of Neighbour and the Love of God,” in Theological investigations, Vol. 6: 
Concerning Vatican Council II (Baltimore, MD: Helicon, 1969). 
2 United Nations Human Development Report 1999, Globalization with a Human Face 
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 1; Available from: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_1999_EN.pdf. 
3 United Nations Poverty and Development Division. Economic and social survey of Asia 
and the Pacific, 1999. (New York: The United Nations: 1999) [updated 1999 Dec 20; cited 2006 
June 1]. Available from: http://www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/survey1999/svy4a.html 
4 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, Trans. Aquilina Martinez, Christine 
Markovsky, (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1985), 41-43): “If Being (esse) is the foundation of all 
systems, and of the system of systems that is the daily world, there is also reality beyond Being, 
just as there is also cosmos beyond the world. Being is like the horizon toward which and from 
which the phenomena of the world manifest themselves. It is the ontological foundation and 
identity; it is the light that illuminates the totality of the world. But beyond Being, transcending it, 
there is still reality. If reality is the order of the cosmic constitutions of things that are resistant, 
subsistent, “of themselves,” it is evident that there is reality beyond Being. How many cosmoses 
have never been incorporated into our world! Did not the reality of the primate come millions of 
years ago and then later the appearance of the world, of Being…The other is the precise notion 
by which I shall denominate exteriority as such—historical, not only cosmic or physic-livin, 
exteriority (4.1). The other is the alterity of all possible systems, beyond “ the same,” which totality 
always is.” 
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work of Enrique Dussel.5 I will attempt to show that the Other teaches us how to 
love them (and that we in turn teach them the same) if we can only find ways of 
relating built on effective mutual understanding, ways of surviving and thriving in 
a sometimes hostile environment that fulfill the “duty of solidarity” (John Paul II, 
Sollicitudo rei socialis, #23). The dissertation will argue that an abstract a priori 
concept of Christian love is not tenable apart from a genuine and authentic 
encounter with a particular Other. It will present a model, which I call Agapic 
Solidarity, outlining certain criteria for this encounter, and proposing guidelines 
and techniques for how such encounters might take place. It will examine how 
this model advances the conversation in Christian ethics around the cultural 
dimensions of love of neighbor, with particular attention to contributions from 
political theology (represented by Johann Baptist Metz) and Latin American 
liberation philosophy (represented by Enrique Dussel), and it will indicate 
possible directions for future developments in this arena. 
                                            
5 Ibid. 43-44. “Others reveal themselves as others (3.4.8.1) in all the acuteness of their 
exteriority when they burst in upon us as something extremely distinct, as nonhabitual, 
nonroutine, as the extraordinary, the enormous (“apart from the norm”)—the poor, the oppressed. 
They are the ones who, by the side of the road, outside the system, show their suffering, 
challenging faces: “We’re hungry! We have a right to eat!” That right, outside the system, is not a 
right that is justified by the proyecto or the laws of the system. Their absolute right, because they 
are sacred and free, is founded in their own exteriority, in the real constitution of their human 
dignity. When the poor advance in the world, they shake the very pillars of the system that 
exploits them. The face (pnim in Hebrew, prosopon in Greek), the person is provocation and 
judgment by its mere self-revelation…The other is a person as an imploring, revealing, and 
provoking face (2.4.5.1). The face of the other, primarily as poor and oppressed, reveals a people 
before it reveals an individual person. The brown face of the Latin American mestizo wrinkled with 
the furrows of centuries of work, the ebony face of the African slave, the olive face of the Hindu, 
the yellow face of the Chinese coolie is the irruption of the history of a people before it is the 
biography of Tupac Amaru, Lumumba, Nehru, and Mao Tse-tung. To describe the experience of 
proximity as individual experience, or the metaphysical experience of face-to-face as lived 
experience, between two persons, is simply to forget that personal mystery is always risked in the 
exteriority of the popular history of a people (3.1.3-4). The individualization of this collective 
personal experience is a European deformation derived from the bourgeois revolution. Each face, 
unique, inscrutable mystery of decisions not yet made, is the face of a sex, a generation, a social 
class, a nation, a cultural group, a historical epoch…The other person—metaphysical alterity, 
exteriority on the anthropological level—is primarily social and historico-popular.” 
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The Paradoxical Challenge of Pluralism and Particularity 
Globalization both problematizes and enriches the myriad dimensions of 
human encounter but here I will focus only on pluralism and particularity.   
Anselm Min argues that globalization creates a dialectic of differentiation 
and interdependence in societies where pluralism is found.  
The globalization of the world brings together different groups into 
common space and produces a twofold dialectic, the dialectic of 
differentiation, in which we are made increasingly aware of differences in 
nationality, culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, class, language; and the 
dialectic of interdependence, in which we are compelled to find a way of 
living together in spite of our differences.6 
Metz reminds us, however, that while, “We live, one might say, in a world of 
undeniable plurality,” on the other hand, “pluralism is not simply the answer, but 
first of all the question and the problem.”7 
Many regard pluralism with great concern, particularly in regards to ethics, 
where different approaches to reality are sometimes seen as antithetical to the 
creation of a cohesive moral order on which coherent norms for human 
flourishing might be based. They argue that pluralism cannot be reconciled with 
universal or normative claims of any sort.8 Yet others celebrate the emergence of 
                                            
6 Anselm Min, The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after 
Postmodernism. (New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 2.  
7 John Baptist Metz, Ed. John K. Downey, Love’s Strategy: The Political Theology of 
Johann Baptist Metz, “In the Pluralism of Religions and Cultural Worlds” (Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1999), 169. 
8 Jeffrey Stout, Ethics after Babel: The Languages of Moral Discourses and Their 
Discontents, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 1. “When authors like Stanley Hauerwas, Alisdair 
MacIntyre and Basil Mitchell begin their books by proclaiming that modern moral discourse has 
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pluralistic societies as an ‘awakening’ to various voices which had been 
previously silenced.9 These writers argue that genuine pluralism brings clarity 
rather than confusion to international movements for universal norms on human 
rights and authentic standards for public truth. What is not in dispute is that we 
are living in a world where human relationships must come to terms with a 
plurality of perspectives.  
                                                                                                                                  
suffered a great catastrophe, leaving us in conceptual disarray, they cannot help echoing Babel. 
They are saying that pluralism is just another name for confusion.” [italics added] 
9 To use but one example of this assertion we can look at the work of Walter D. Mignolo. 
Instead I situate my argument within the decolonial paradigm of knowledge and understanding 
enacted by Waman Pumade Ayala (see chapter 3), as well as other intellectuals after him 
belonging to the sphere of society that anthropologist Eric Wolf identified as “people without 
history.” From the sixteenth-century Spanish missionary Bartolome de Las Casas to G.W.F. 
Hegel in the nineteenth century, and from Karl Marx to the twentieth-century British historian A.J. 
Toynbee, all we can read (or see in maps) about the place of the Americas in the world order is 
historically located from a European perspective that passes as universal. Certainly, every one 
one of these authors acknowledged that there was a world, and people, outside of Europe. 
Indeed both people and continents outside of Europe were overly present as “objects” but they 
were absent as subjects and, in a way, out of history. They were, in other words, subjects whose 
perspectives did not count. Eric Wolf’s famous book title, People without History became a 
metaphor to describe this epistemic power differential. By “people without history,” Wolf did not 
mean that there were people in the world who did not have memories and records of their past, 
which would be an absolutely absurd claim. He meant that, according to the regional concept of 
history as defined in the Western world from Ancient Greece to twentieth-century France, every 
society that did not have alphabetic writing or wrote in a language other than the six imperial 
languages of modern Europe did not have History. In this view, History is a privilege of European 
modernity and in order to have History you have to let yourself be colonized, which means 
allowing yourself, willingly or not, to be subsumed by a perspective of history, life, knowledge, 
economy, subjectivity, family, religion, etc. that is modeled on the history of modern Europe, and 
that has now been adopted, with little difference, as the official model of the US. Perspectives 
from coloniality, however, emerge out of the conditions of the “colonial wound,” the feeling of 
inferiority imposed on human beings who do not fit the predetermined model in Euro-American 
narratives. To excavate coloniality, then, one must always include and analyze the project of 
modernity, although the reverse is not true, because coloniality points to the absences that the 
narrative of modernity produces. Thus I choose to describe the modern world order that has 
emerged in the last five hundred years since the “discovery of America” as the modern/colonial 
world, to indicate that coloniality is constitutive of modernity and cannot exist without it. Indeed, 
the “idea” of Latin America cannot be dealt with in isolation without producing turmoil in the world 
system. It cannot be separated from the “ideas” of Europe and of the US as America that 
dominates even today. The “Americas” are the consequence of early European commercial 
expansion and the motor of capitalism, as we know it today. The “discovery” of America and the 
genocide of Indians and African slaves are the very foundation of “modernity,” more so than the 
French or Industrial Revolutions. Better yet, they constitute the darker and hidden face of 
modernity, “coloniality.”  Thus, to excavate the “idea of Latin America” is, really, to understand 
how the West was born and how the modern world order was founded” (The Idea of Latin 
America, Preface xii-xiii).  
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For some commentators, particularity forms the other side of the coin of 
globalization. In the introduction to her seminal work, Situating the Self: Gender, 
Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, Seyla Benhabib 
acknowledges “the fractured spirit of our times”10 in which “the cultural and 
political ideas of modernity, . . . [including] what Richard Rorty has called the 
‘metanarratives of liberal democracies, have become suspect.’”11 She argues, 
This current mood of skepticism…toward continuing the “project of 
modernity” is based upon an understandable disillusionment with a form of 
life that still perpetrates war, armament, environmental destruction and 
economic exploitation at the cost of satisfying human needs with human 
dignity, a form of life that still relegates many woman, non-Christian, and 
non-white peoples to second-class moral and political status, a form of life 
that saps the bases of solidaristic coexistence in the name of profit and 
competition.12 
This perspective echoes the concerns of Walter D. Mignolo and others, 
who assert the centrality of particularity. Situated in the larger context of our 
conversation about the love command, Behnabib’s insistence on the radically 
”fractured spirit of our time” poses a serious challenge to the Christian ethic of 
love of neighbor. Stated negatively, her point is that we cannot love our neighbor 
if we do not acknowledge the uniqueness of his or her experience. Lack of 
attention to the particularity of the Other leaves us unable to connect with him or 
                                            
10 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge Press, 1992), 1. 
11 Ibid. 1. 
12 Ibid. 2. 
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her as our neighbor. On the positive side, however, an honest acknowledgment 
of the irreducible importance of the particularity of the Other creates the potential 
for a new appreciation of how much our worldview is shaped by power 
discourses which are, for the most part, ‘invisible’ to our ordinary vision,13 and 
which stand in the way of an authentic encounter with the Other as our neighbor. 
 
Towards a New Approach: Models and Methods 
In light of the preceding critique, the question driving this dissertation can 
be restated as follows: What does ‘love of neighbor’ require of followers of Jesus 
who seek to connect deeply with the neighbor while not sacrificing the ineffable 
particularity of the self or the Other, given that we live in an era of globalization 
characterized by accelerating cultural diversity, intercultural contact, and social 
stratification?14 Such a deeper understanding of how our moral ‘sensibilities’ 
have been shaped by prevailing systems and organizational patterns that have 
attained a kind of absolute quality in our particular socio-cultural context 
enhances the contemporary Christian disciple’s appreciation of the profound 
challenge posed by Jesus in the love command.15 Critical self-knowledge pushes 
                                            
13 There are many scholars who articulate this issue. In the project I will use Emmanuel 
Levinas, among others, to alert us to some of the obstacles to fully seeing the Other. 
14 “This is the essence of the reign of God: to be together with God, face-to-face with God 
in community…The “face” indicates what appears of the other, his or her corporeality, his or her 
“fleshly” reality. “Flesh” in the Bible (basar) denotes the whole human being (without distinction of 
body and soul) who is born, who is hungry, who dies, who rises (see 3.4 and 6.3). “The word 
became flesh” (John1:14) not “became soul” or “became body” only, but “became a human 
being.” This “face-to face,” this “person-to-person,” constitutes the practical relationship of 
proximity, of nearness, between persons. The experience of the nearness of persons as persons 
is what constitutes the other as one’s “neighbor” (someone neighboring,” our “nar one,” a “some-
one”), rather than as merely a thing an instrument, a mediation” (Dussel: Ethics and Community, 
9). 
15 “This system is closed in upon itself. It has replaced the universal human project with 
its own particular historical project. Its laws become natural, its virtues perfect, and the blood of 
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us to ask whether our practice of love of neighbor amounts to anything more than 
the conventional behavior of ‘good people,’ as defined by prevailing moral codes.  
In what follows, however, I will suggest that human encounters grounded in a 
deep appreciation for the particularity of the Other provide the hermeneutical key 
to a kind of human encounter with the potential to radically transform the 
participants from Others into neighbors. 
Building on this insight, the dissertation will present a practical model for 
love of neighbor in a globalized context. The model is designed to foster an 
approach to human encounter that simultaneously promotes deep connection 
while preserving the irreducible particularity and otherness of the participants. 
Utilizing a model-based approach to the literature review, I will argue that Agapic 
Solidarity represents an advance for the practical dimensions of the encounter 
with the Other that incorporates and surpasses important contributions from 
current models. 
The dissertation will describe three schools or models for the encounter 
with the Other, showing how each fails to do justice to the radical demands 
posed by the love command. My typology will organize the contributions of 
various authors under what I will call the Conflict Model, the Dialogue Model, and 
the Mestizo Model.  
The approaches that fit the Conflict Model tend to view encounters with 
the Other in conflictual terms. They believe that such encounters inevitably 
culminate in the destruction of the self or the Other (the Neighbor), rarely 
                                                                                                                                  
those who offer any resistance—the blood of the prophets and heroes—is spilled by the system 
as if it were the blood of the wicked, the totally subversive” (Ethics and Community, 31). 
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acknowledging the benefits of mixing groups or blurring boundaries, and they 
thus characterize such attempts at unity as dangerous compromises and as 
inherently flawed. This approach tends to view communities and cultures as 
ahistorical, self-referential realities, celebrating a mythical past or future when 
one’s own group was (or will be) ‘pure’ or free of ‘contamination’ by others.  
Pluralism is generally regarded as a degenerative process best avoided in favor 
of a binary logic, in which successful encounters are characterized by the 
subsuming of one community to the socio-cultural logics of another. This model 
sees little virtue in particularity, attributing supreme and teleological importance 
to unity. The result is an approach to love of neighbor that requires little or no 
compromise by one (usually the dominant) group, while demanding the 
capitulation of the other.   
Approaches that fit under what I will call the Dialogue Model begin with a 
more dynamic, porous understanding of identity, cultures, and communities. 
They therefore have a less conflicted view of difference in relationships, 
tolerating a degree of tension between communities, while highlighting what 
unifies and is common to the participants. While a vast improvement over the 
more rigid approach to difference of the Conflict Model, the Dialogue Model lacks 
the critical and necessary self-reflective dimension that prevents the radical 
demand of agapic love of neighbor from taking root. While there is a focus on the 
quality of the relationship with the neighbor in this model, love of neighbor tends 
to be distorted by a practical focus on reshaping the Other in one’s own image.16 
                                            
16 Virgilio Elizondo speaks of encountering this model in The Future is Mestizo: Life 
Where Cultures Meet. Growing up in Texas he found that he was a ‘member’ of two communities, 
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This approach to the love command ultimately sacrifices the particularity of the 
Other for what at first blush looks like a ‘larger’ or ‘deeper’ union, but in reality 
only ‘covers over’ the unsettling difference of the Other. In this model the 
‘pluralism’ of the Other is tolerated and occasionally celebrated, but never given 
the authority to challenge the power structures that marginalize difference.17 
What is lacking in the Dialogue Model is a thorough grasp of the implications of 
particularity, most notably autonomy of the other, and this failure impacts all 
aspects of the conversation.18  
                                                                                                                                  
the Mexican community and the American community. Elizondo always saw himself as bi-cultural 
and yet noticed that each of the respective communities held their encounter with each other in a 
very different manner. “Yet this certitude of being Mexican began to be questioned whenever we 
visited our relative in Mexico. Even though they loved us and we loved to visit them, in many 
ways they would let us know that we were pochos—Mexicans from the U.S.A. To this day, it is 
not uncommon to hear someone from Mexico say about a Mexican-American’s Spanish, “For a 
norteamericano, your Spanish is not so bad.” Yet it is not uncommon for an Anglo-American from 
the U.S. to say about a Mexican-American speaking perfect English, “For a Mexican-American 
your English is pretty good.” Whether in Mexico or the U.S., we are always the distant and 
different “other.” The core of our existence is to be “other” or to “not be” in relation to those who 
are. Yet being called pocho in Mexico was not insulting, for we were fully accepted. There was 
always rejoicing when our families visited San Antonio or when we visited them in Mexico. Pocho 
was simply a reality. Even though the U.S. was our home, it was in Mexico that we felt more at 
home. The label marked distance and difference but not separation or rejection…I lived on the 
border between two nationalities. I was an insider-outsider to both. I was “Mexican” in the U.S. 
and gringo/pocho in Mexico.  There was a painful side to it, for it is difficult to always be different, 
but there was also an enjoyable side to it; I had a lot more options and could move easily in and 
out of two worlds. For as much as I loved the Mexican side of me, I never really disliked or hated 
the Anglo side, which I was making my own in the schools.  Yet it was painful and 
incomprehensible because there were so many Anglo racists. Since I loved and admired Mexico 
so much the only conclusion I could logically come to was that the racists were ignorant. Much 
later on, I would discover that it was not just ignorance, but the Anglo drive to dominate, 
subjugate, and exploit. And even when some Anglos wanted to be of help, it was by helping the 
other become like themselves (Elizondo, 21) [italics added]. 
17 Walter Mignolo speaks to the difference between Interculturidad and Multiculturalism. 
Multiculturalism is much more reflective of the Dialogue Model. “What is the difference? 
“Multicultural means that the hegemonic principles of knowledge, education, the concept of the 
state and government, political economy, morality, etc., are controlled by the state, and below the 
control of the state people have “freedom” to go with their “cultures” as far as they do not 
challenge “the epistemic principles” grounding politics, economy and ethics as managed by the 
state” (The Idea of Latin America, 118). 
18 “The question is not inclusion but inter-culturality, a shared project based on different 
“origins” confronting the colonial would and overcoming the imperial/national pride and interest. In 
the words of another indigenous movement, the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, it means 
dwelling in a “world where many worlds co-exist” (Ibid.124). 
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Our third approach, which I will call the Mestizo Model, finds its origins in 
the perspective of the Other. It is typically articulated by bridge figures, who 
inhabit both the world of the Same and the world of the Other.19 The model is 
characterized by a deep appreciation of communities as ‘works in progress’, and 
tends to be critical of approaches that characterize important concepts, sources 
of knowledge, or paradigms as having only one origin in space or time. The 
Mestizo Model insists that such monocultural approaches unintentionally occlude 
the contributions and perspectives of the neighbor. It insists that pluralism and 
particularity have always been a feature of human experience, a reality that 
certain communities have only recently come to appreciate.  
Each of the models mentioned above, however, ultimately falls short of 
truly engaging the Other in all of his or her uniqueness. In light of these lacunae, 
the dissertation seeks to introduce a model by means of which a more authentic 
encounter might occur. The focus of this model will be on the initial encounter 
through which one begins to learn how to love their neighbor. It operates under 
the assumption that love for the Other (neighbor) depends on an encounter that 
allows us to see and appreciate the Other in his or her uniqueness. This is why 
Enrique Dussel characterizes love of neighbor as an “epiphany” through which 
the Other disrupts our horizons.20 Like Dussel, my own understanding of the 
                                            
19 This ‘space’ is best understood through the work of Homi K. Bhabha. “These ‘in-
between’ spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of self-hood—singular or 
communal—that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and 
contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself…This interstitial passage between 
fixed identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference 
without an assumed or imposed hierarchy” (The Location of Culture, 2, 5). 
20 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, Trans. Aquilino Martinez and Christine 
Morkovsky (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1985), 16.  See page 58 for the following quotation: 
“Now we arrive at the central core of this chapter, at the essential moment of metaphysics, 
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Other, and specifically of our encounter with the Other, is deeply informed by the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas argues that, as self-encapsulated beings we 
must experience a reality that is “Other than Being21 in order to learn how to 
reach out in love.  Levinas provides a helpful way of understanding the type of 
encounter that leads to love of neighbor, and his work is deeply inspiring; but it 
also has flaws. Thus, I seek to go beyond Levinas in formulating a more 
adequate way to respond to ethical demands regarding the Other that are placed 
upon us by the love command, considered in a globalized context.  
 
 
 
Agapic Solidarity: Love in Three Moments 
The model I will propose is called Agapic Solidarity. It builds on aspects 
of the political theology of Johann Baptist Metz, the liberation ethics of Enrique 
Dussel, and the understanding of the Other of Emmanuel Levinas. It differs from 
                                                                                                                                  
understanding that metaphysics is the passage from ontology to transontological, to the one who 
is situated beyond Being, in reality (2.4.3 and 3.4.7), the other. Ontology is phenomenology; it is a 
logos or a thinking about what appears (the phenomenon, the being) from the foundation (Being). 
Beyond phenomenology the road of ephiphany opens: revelation (or apocalyptic) of the other 
through the other’s face, which is not merely a phenomenon or manifestation, a presence, but an 
epiphenomenon, vicarious, trace or vestige of the absent, of the mysterious, of one beyond the 
present…Liberation is not a phenomenal, intrasystemic action, liberation is praxis that subverts 
the phenomenological order and pierces it to let in a metaphysical transcendence, which is the 
plenary critique of the established, fixed, normalized, crystalized, dead.”   
21 Emmanuel Levinas, Of God who Comes to Mind, Trans. Bettina Bergo Meridian. 
Crossing Aesthetics Series (Stanford University Press, 1986), 71. “Biological human fraternity, 
considered with the sober coldness of Cain, is not a sufficient reason that I be responsible for a 
separated being. The sober, Cain-like coldness consists in reflecting on responsibility from the 
standpoint of freedom or according to a contract. Yet responsibility for the other comes from what 
is prior to freedom. It does not come from the time made up of presences, nor from the presence 
sunken into the past and representable, the time of beginnings or assumptions. Responsibility 
does not let me constitute myself into an I think, as substantial as a stone or, like a heart of stone 
into an in-and for-oneself. It goes to the point of substitution for the other, up to the condition—or 
the noncondition—of a hostage. This is a responsibility that does not leave me time: it leaves me 
without a present for recollection or a return into the self.”  
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Levinas in two major ways, however, by addressing the Other in more explicitly 
political terms (with Dussel), and seeking a more concrete understanding the 
Other in their particularity.   
Agapic Solidarity is focused on achieving encounters characterized by 
respectful and necessary distinctions between the parties, on the one hand, while 
creating profound connections, on the other. The approach consists of three 
distinct but deeply interrelated moments or stages, which I will call Disruption, 
Agapic Discipleship, and Emancipatory Praxis. The second moment of Agapic 
Discipleship may be further broken down into three sub-moments, which I call 
Remembrance, Recitation, and Resurrection. Each moment is an integral part of 
a larger process.  
The first moment in Agapic Solidarity, then, is Disruption. Since an 
authentic encounter with the Other can only come from beyond our horizon of 
meaning, Disruption is experienced as a shattering of previously held cognitive 
categories. This moment of “epiphany,”22 as Dussel calls it, contains elements of 
both continuity and discontinuity with previously held worldviews.23 The key is 
that, while interruptions allow us to ‘return to what we were doing,’ Disruption is 
much more radical in its demand for our attention and change.  
The second moment of Agapic Discipleship may be seen as comprised of 
three discreet sub-moments or stages: Remembrance, Recitation, and 
                                            
22 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, 16. “Phenomenology, as its name implies, concerns 
itself with what appears and how it appears from the horizon of the world, the system, Being. 
Epiphany, on the other hand, is the revelation of the oppressed, the poor—never a mere 
appearance or a mere phenomenon, but always maintaining a metaphysical exteriority. Those 
who reveal themselves transcend the system and continually question the given. Epiphany is the 
beginning of real liberation.” 
23 To more fully grasp the implications of the moment of Disruption it may be helpful to 
think in terms of Paul Ricoeur’s First and Second Naivete.  
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Resurrection. The key issue is that love of neighbor will have to be characterized 
by radical openness to the Other as neighbor who will tutor us in this mysterious 
praxis that we call agape. The first step in the process will be Remembrance, 
where we learn the history and enter into the memories held by the Other. We 
will have to accept that while this history may not be “our history,” a certain 
understanding is necessary for an authentic encounter with the neighbor. And 
here we may begin to realize that our previous interactions with our neighbor 
have been distorted by the fact that we were not yet ’awakened’ to the Other.   
Recitation is the next step, in which we become more conscious of the 
lived reality of our neighbor, including central figures, symbols, cultural patterns, 
language systems etc. Growing familiarity is an essential step in promoting 
agapic love, which must make ‘sense’ to its subject, creating a kind of ‘corporeal 
connection’ between members of an as yet unrealized body of fellowship, as 
understood by the early Christians.24 It is only in this becoming one that we are 
finally able to speak of a true connection with the Other.  Even as we become 
one, however, we must also re-assert the principle of distinction, acknowledging 
that no matter how close we get to our neighbor, we will never fully inhabit his or 
her world. Thus, it is in the third and final sub-moment of Resurrection that we 
come to realize that it is only God who has the power to make the neighbor and 
me into one. No amount of Agapic Discipleship will create a final or absolute 
                                            
24 “Sharing bread, holding all things in common, and selling one’s possessions all indicate 
the radical nature of love that is respectful of the loved person(s). The first Christians’ love was 
not platonic—a supraemotional, immaterial love. It was a concrete, real, efficacious, bodily love. 
Their love was attested to by deeds (praxeis), not words only. It was not only in “the prayers” that 
“they devoted themselves to…the communal life.” They also “took their meals in common…” 
Their love imbued their existence. In it their whole “bodiliness” was committed” (Dussel, Ethics 
and Community, 12) [Italics added]. 
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union with the neighbor; rather than seeing this as a shortcoming on our part, it is 
an invitation to open our eyes to the Imago Dei encountered in the face of the 
neighbor. It is the neighbor who finally reveals the Ultimate Mystery of God to us.  
Here we begin to live a resurrected life in a new world that we create together,25 
mutually interrogating and challenging one another, each operating as true 
students to their neighbor. 
The third and final moment of Agapic Solidarity brings us to what I call 
Emancipatory Praxis. Here we return to our communities of origin, sharing the 
new and abundant life we have been granted through our encounter with the 
Other. In this moment we must be cautious of not speaking for Others. They can 
speak for themselves. We share with our communities the details of our 
encounter with the Other whom we now know as our neighbor. We witness to the 
transforming power of love, including all that we have learned in our getting to 
know one another, and both we and our communities are changed. Some are 
moved to better emulate the praxis of Jesus Christ, who Justo Gonzalez among 
others aptly described as a “man for others,”26 and we continue to disrupt our 
communities with invitations to a life of Agapic Solidarity. 
 
 Dissertation Overview 
                                            
25 See footnote 15 and the definition given of inter-culturality. 
26 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1971), 382.  Gonzalez, L. Justo, Mañana: Christian Theology from a Hispanic 
Perspective,  (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990), 151. “ As we read the story of Jesus in the 
Gospels, the first thing that strikes you is that he is entirely for other…Nor was this the easy self-
deprecation whereby we often hide cowardice behind humility. His was a strong assertative “for-
otherness.” He was for other not only when he healed the sick, forgave those who condemned 
him, and died on the cross but also when he cleansed the Temple, spoke the harsh truth to the 
Pharisees, and called Herod a fox.”  
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Having outlined the questions, challenges, methods, and models driving 
this dissertation, I will now conclude with a brief overview of its contents.   
Chapter One reviews selected literature on three influential models for the 
encounter with the Other. The chapter begins with a brief summary of current 
dilemmas regarding pluralism and particularity, then utilizes the aforementioned 
Conflict, Dialogue, and Mestizo models of encounter with the Other to organize 
the literature. While a comprehensive review of all the major contributions would 
exceed available space, two authors are chosen to represent each of the models. 
I examine how each model and its respective authors fails to deal sufficiently with 
the paradoxical demands of pluralism and particularity on the one hand, and the 
need to establish an authentic connection on the Other.  
Chapter Two introduces the central concepts that are part of this project. It 
will introduce the work of Emmanuel Levinas, and particularly his understanding 
of the Other. Following the introduction there will be a critical appraisal of his 
work. I will introduce some conceptual lacunae found in his theory and seek to 
resolve them by introducing a solution. The solution which is proposed will be to 
speak of dimensions of human experience in general and four dimensions in 
particular.  
Chapter Three provides a critical introduction to the particular 
contributions of Johann Baptist Metz and Enrique Dussel that are helpful for an 
authentic encounter with the Other. Again, the key issue here is how to do justice 
to both pluralism and particularity, while honoring the importance of love as 
union, which is so central to Christian tradition. The chapter concludes with a 
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brief examination of how, while helpful, their work is insufficient for a proper 
conceptualization of love of neighbor in a globalized context.  
Chapter Four outlines the essential elements of Agapic Solidarity. The 
chapter identifies and explores its three sub-moments or steps —Disruption, 
Agapic Discipleship, and Emancipatory Praxis— and examines how the process 
of Agapic Solidarity can be a corrective to some of the shortcomings in the works 
analyzed in chapters One and Two. 
The Appendix engages initial questions and concerns that arise in 
connection with Agapic Solidarity. I offer tentative responses, conscious that 
more complete answers will only come from the process itself, including further 
reflection on the results—an entirely appropriate outcome since Agapic Solidarity 
is a praxis-based approach and any assertions we make must have a provisional 
quality.  
The Conclusion returns to the central question driving the dissertation: 
What does ‘love of neighbor’ require of Christians seeking a profound connection 
with the Other, while honoring their ineffable particularity, given a globalized 
context of accelerating cultural diversity, intercultural contact, and social 
stratification? The chapter summarizes the central claims of the dissertation and 
its supporting arguments, and suggests possible future developments, 
particularly how the model of Agapic Solidarity might be used in a variety of 
educational, political, and cultural settings. 
The final part of project is a case study of undocumented migrants from 
Latin America to the United States.  While the study is not part of the argument of 
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the dissertation, it serves as a rehearsal for how the process of Agapic Solidarity 
might be used in bringing the love command to bear on a current ethical issue of 
great concern within the United States. I will conclude by suggesting how the 
lessons of Agapic Solidarity might be extrapolated to other settings, situation, 
and issues. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LOVE IN THE HERE AND NOW 
 
All societies face recurring threats to their existence, to which they 
eventually succumb. Yet some societies, even when so threatened, are 
also capable of postponing their demise by halting and reversing the 
process of decline and renewing their vitality and identity.1 
 
If this book has a totem, it is, of course, John Stuart Mill, and we should 
not be surprised to find that he himself has pithily expressed the 
cosmopolitan ideal: “To human beings, who, as hitherto educated, can 
scarcely cultivate even a good quality without running it into a fault, it is 
indispensable to be perpetually comparing their own notions and customs 
with the experience and example of persons in different circumstances 
from themselves; and there is no nation which does not need to borrow 
from others, not merely particular acts or practices, but essential points of 
character in which its own type is inferior.”2 
 
What makes all these fluid and extraordinarily rich actualities difficult to 
accept is that most people resist the underlying notion: that human identity 
is not only not natural and stable, but constructed and occasionally even 
                                            
1 P. Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), xvii. 
2 Anthony Kwame Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005), 271.  
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invented outright. Part of the resistance and hostility generated by books 
like Orientalism, or after it, The Invention of Tradition, and Black Athena, is 
that they seem to undermine the naïve belief in a certain positivity and 
unchanging historicity of a culture, a self, a national identity.3  
 
While Huntington, Appiah, and Said in the above quotations differ in how 
they understand the implications and strategies of dealing with the Other in their 
midst, they nonetheless seem to inhabit a similar worldview. All three take as a 
given that we encounter communities, identities, and persons unlike us. All three 
address both the contemporary reality of pluralism and the equally powerful 
reality of particularity. It is the dialectic of differentiation and interdependence.4 
But for the Christian that is not only a call to engage the Other in our midst but to 
love him or her.5  
For Huntington love of neighbor seems to be impossible because he 
perceives all such encounters or interactions as threats to the original community 
that will lead to a ‘decline’ in the essential nature and ‘vitality’ of the original 
community.  
For Appiah the love of neighbor is not only necessary but, in direct 
contrast to Huntington, actually increases the vitality of the original community. A 
community which does not regularly engage with its neighbor ultimately is 
diminished and atrophies. However it is important to note that the motivation for 
                                            
3 W. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 332.   
4 Anselm Min, The Solidarity of Other in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after 
Postmodernism (New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 2. 
5 See footnote #1 Introduction. 
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engaging the Other is for the well-being of ourselves and not necessarily the 
Other. We see a subtle form of enlightened self-interest operating in his position. 
Said’s position is more radical still. He questions the entire assumption 
that there can be any explicit sense of a fully self-encapsulated identity, or 
community which then exercises agency in engaging the Other. He identifies a 
much more dynamic and systemic understanding of these interactions, which 
would have us reconfigure much of our understanding of encountering the Other.  
Rather than merely viewing these authors as individual responses to 
encountering the Other or the Neighbor, I suggest in this chapter that together 
they form a ‘school’ or reflect a ‘type.’ This chapter will consist of three sections. 
The first section is a very brief review of our contemporary milieu, which I 
suggest produces a ‘twofold dialectic;’ the dialectic of differentiation and the 
dialectic of interdependence.6 In this section I will make extensive use of the 
work of Anselm Min. The work of Min has two elements which are germane to 
this project; he articulates the contemporary milieu in very precise and 
illuminating terms. Later in this project I will also use his understanding and 
critique of Levinas to move that aspect of the project forward. The second section 
reviews how some have chosen to engage this twofold dialectic of engaging the 
Other in our midst. This section will introduce the concept of models which allows 
us to group responses to the Other by noting certain pattern. This review of 
literature will allow us to more accurately assess the various responses to the 
Other. This section also identifies who the authors view as the Other and why the 
various responses are inadequate in dealing effectively with the Other given the 
                                            
6 Min, 2. 
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contemporary conditions of differentiation and interdependence. The final section 
will rehearse and more precisely restate the concern of this project.  
 
Differentiation and Interdependence in a New Key 
In his work, Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern 
Theology after Postmodernism, Anselm Min asserts the conditions under which 
all theological discourse must now occur.7 These include ethical discourse, and 
for purposes of this project, how the love command must be embodied and 
practiced in the contemporary globalized world. Min highlights two of the most 
salient features of our contemporary situation: 
The globalization of the world brings together different groups into 
common space and produces a twofold dialectic, the dialectic of 
differentiation, in which we are made increasingly aware of differences in 
nationality, culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, class, language; and the 
dialectic of interdependence, in which we are compelled to find a way of 
living together in spite of our differences.8  
Though in constructing his case for this twofold understanding of our 
contemporary world he marshals much evidence,9 I suggest that each side of the 
dialectic needs further development. In the dialectic of differentiation he fails to 
develop fully the implications of this differentiation. My response to this 
                                            
7 Ibid. 1. “The central challenge of the globalizing world is how to manage and transform 
this twofold, antithetical dialectic of simultaneous differentiation and interdependence into a 
solidarity of others, the mutual solidarity of those who are different. The task of contemporary 
Christian theology is to interpret this demand of the new kairos in light of biblical and theological 
traditions and provide a conceptually coherent, systematic mediation between the context of 
globalization and the demand of its inherited faith.”  
8 Min, 2. 
9 Ibid. 222-26. 
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shortcoming will be to emphasize what I call the potency of particularity. In the 
dialectic of interdependence he fails to contend properly with the implications of 
historical development which has created certain patterns of dependence and 
interdependence. My response to this shortcoming is to reassert the need to 
envision all language of interdependence from a much more explicit post-
colonialist, liberationist perspective.  
From Differentiation to Particularity 
To speak of our increasing awareness of difference in nationality, culture 
etc. is to speak only in descriptive terms and consequently to fail to elaborate its 
implications.  These implications are what I call the potency of particularity or 
how the communities which compose our identity create our worldview. This 
formation of identity has implications for whom we identify as our community, and 
also whom we identify as the Other. It is insufficient to speak only of our 
difference, which is obvious; what needs to be highlighted is how our differences 
construct a partial worldview by which we come to encounter the Other. Our 
awareness of difference also shapes our moral and ethical sensibilities. This is 
what Enrique Dussel means when he speaks of the ‘system.’ 
Any system of prevailing practices (from Egypt or Babylon to Rome, the 
several Christendoms, or capitalist society) determines its established 
practices to be good. Its project (its end, its telos, its beatitude, as the 
Latin theologians termed it) is confused with the “perfect human good” as 
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such.  Thus the norms that demand the execution of this project are 
“natural law.”10 
We can speak of these various communities as systems of meaning which 
can become self-encapsulated and self-referential totalities. Unless we 
consciously resist the partial vision offered by this differentiated existence we can 
mistake our vision for universal and normative reality. 
 
From Interdependence to the Colonial Wound 
Min accurately identifies the incredible level of interdependence 
characteristic of our globalized world,11 but at times fails to understand or at least 
be more explicit how the current relationships are outcomes of historical patterns 
of domination. This is particularly disturbing when he speaks of a lack of cultural 
patterns among the ‘poor nations’ that he says might preclude them from being 
able to engage in patterns of solidarity. 12 This fly’s in the face of enormous 
historical data that indicates that much of why the ‘poor nations’ are poor can be 
traced to patterns of development which find their origins in the ‘rich nations, and 
even more particularly periods when these rich nations failed to practice 
solidarity.’13 Dussel is one author who is deeply suspicious of any language of 
solidarity and the need for recognizing interdependence that does not take into 
                                            
10 Enrique Dussel, Ethics and Community (New York: Orbis Books, 1988) Theology and 
Liberation Series, Ed. Leonardo Boff, Segrio Torres, Gustavo Gutierrez, Jose Comblin, et. al, 31-
32. 
11 Min, 222-30.  
12 Ibid. 226.  
13 There are many authors who deal with the question of how we have arrived at our 
contemporary globalized world. Some prominent authors that address this question are Walter 
Mignolo, Arundathi Roy, Noam Chomsky, Enrique Dussel, Samir Amin, Tarique Ali, Gregory 
Grandin, Juan Gonzalez, Eduardo Galleano, and Howard Zinn. 
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historical patterns of development. This perspective is brought forth most 
powerfully by the post-colonialist critique. 
For Dussel, globalization spells the material, discursive, cultural and 
philosophical exclusion of the majority of the world’s richest peoples 
(mostly located south of the equator), just as the rhetoric of inclusion and 
interconnectivity announces their purported participation and 
coresponsibility for a globalized planet. Globalization, in short, means for 
Dussel what Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann have called the 
“20:80 society,” in which only 20 percent of the world will suffice to 
produce what is needed, and the remaining 80 percent will be entirely 
superfluous, supplemental, a burden, a perpetual lumpen proletariat. To 
this it should be added that of this 20 percent, only the top 5 percent will 
enjoy the riches produced by the world society.14 
To speak of interdependence and of sacrificing in the name of honoring 
this interdependence without taking into account the actual cost borne by certain 
communities on the planet is disingenuous and ultimately destructive.  
Even as I find these shortcomings particular disturbing in the work of Min, I 
find particularly compelling Min’s ‘central challenge’ to Christian theology15 that 
we must contend with pluralism in this world.16  Yet as Johann Baptist Metz 
reminds us, to speak of pluralism is not to speak of an answer ‘but first of all ‘the 
                                            
14 Eduardo Mendieta, Thinking from the Underside of History: Enrique Dussel’s 
Philosophy of Liberation (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), Ed. Linda Martin Alcoff and 
Eduardo Mendieta, 127. 
15 Min 1. 
16 Ibid. 1.  
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question and the problem.’17 The following section will look at some of the current 
responses given to this question and problem.  
 
The Typology or Model Method 
In using the model method of organizing the responses to the Other, or 
the problem of pluralism, I am hearkening back to a manner of organizing 
information made famous in theology by Helmut Richard Niebuhr. Creating a 
typology allows me to categorize vast amounts of information in a systemic 
fashion.18 But using such a Typological or Model method for surveying the 
literature has its limits,19 and so it is best to understand ‘models’ as existing 
within a spectrum of responses. Even though we will not seek to find in any 
author a perfect reflection of any particular model, the model method can 
nonetheless be fruitful.  
 
The Three Models: Coflict, Dialogue, and Mestizaje 
The three models used to review the current responses to encounter with 
the other are: the Conflict Model, the Dialogue Model, and finally the Mestizo 
Model. In the presentation of each model we will examine two authors who may 
                                            
17 Johann B. Metz, Love’s Strategy: The Political Theology of Johann Baptist, “In the 
Pluralism of Religions and Cultural Worlds” (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1999) Ed. 
John K. Downey, 169. 
18 H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (San Francisco: Haper Collins Publishers, 
2001), xxxviii. “Typology is the effort to order these many elements into families in such a way 
that some of the characteristic combinations of principles maybe understood.” 
19 Ibid. xxxviii. “ The method is helpful but has definite limitations which need to be kept in 
mind. First of all, a type is a mental construct to which no individual wholly conforms. It must be 
used, therefore, only as a statement of necessary connection, so that the rational is given 
precedence over the empirical. Second, these mental constructs, if they are to be useful toward 
understanding, must be of one sort—that is to say: among the many variable factors to which 
may be discerned in any concrete, historical event, only one set can be chosen at a time to 
furnish material for the mental model.  
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be viewed as exemplars of each position. No author perfectly reflects a model; 
rather, we might say that an author tends to view the encounter with the other in 
one of these three modes. Accordingly each author will have a distinct 
understanding of who they are and therefore who is the other in their midst. In 
the conclusion of the chapter I will demonstrate why each model fails to do 
justice to this encounter with the other. 
The Conflict Model 
The three characteristics of the Conflict Model are: imagining an original 
community which is ‘pristine;’ understanding all encounters as occurring within a 
binary and dichotomous dynamic; and understanding all communities, both our 
own and the others’, as best viewed as ‘self-encapsulated’ entities. The two 
representatives of this conflict model type are Samuel Huntington and Dinesh 
D’Sousa. Though the visions of these two scholars are not identical, they share 
some striking similarities.  
Samuel Huntington: Encounter as “Clash”  
Samuel Huntington continues to be one of the seminal authors in our 
contemporary understanding of what it means to encounter the other. Huntington 
addresses many issues but the two that are most germane to this discussion are 
his understanding of the Civilizational ‘other’ and, in a later work, of the Hispanic 
‘other.’  
Early on in a work entitled Clash of Civilizations originally published in 
Foreign Affairs and later enlarged into a book he defines the term civilization and 
gives it an unparalleled degree of importance in the human experience.  
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What do we mean when we talk of civilization? A civilization is a cultural 
entity…Arabs, Chinese, and Westerners, however, are not part of any 
broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus 
the highest cultural grouping of people and broadest level of cultural 
identity people have short of that which distinguishes human from other 
species.20 
Note that for Huntington, with the exception of specie affiliation, our 
civilizational identity is the core of who we are. It is the most totalizing community 
of which any human is a part. Civilizations are, for Huntington, the ultimate us 
and other. 
A civilizational approach, for instance holds that: The world is in some 
sense two, but the central distinction is between the West as the hitherto 
dominant civilization and all other, which, however, have little if anything in 
common among them. The world, in short, is divided between a Western 
one and a non-Western many.21 [italics added] 
This quotation clearly demonstrates the Conflict Model characteristic of 
viewing people in binary and dichotomous terms. This complete exclusivity given 
to each of the two parties, the Western and the non-Western, also indicates the 
understanding of each civilization as somehow existing in a self-encapsulated 
reality. The problem with this reading is that it discounts the fundamental reality 
that both communities had deep and rich interactions for centuries.22 Huntington 
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further asserts that the central mode in which these two communities encounter 
each other is conflict.23 Because of this binary thinking everyone must choose 
between ‘the civilized’ Same, and ‘the uncivilized’ Other.  The two communities 
which most possess the qualities of Western civilization are Europe and the 
United States of America. Taking the side of the latter, he speaks of the special 
role and responsibility that the United States has in being a bulwark against the 
encroaching Other.  
Americans cannot avoid the issue: Are we a Western people or are we 
something else? The futures of the United States and of the West depend 
upon Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. 
Domestically this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of 
multiculturalism. Internationally it means rejecting the elusive and illusory 
calls to identify the United States with Asia.24 
For Huntington, we in the United States must affirm our European and 
Western civilizational roots; if we do not make this affirmation, the entire edifice 
which is the Western “world” will become extinct. 
Rejection of the Creed and of Western civilization means the end of the 
United States of America as we have known it. It also means effectively 
the end of Western civilization.25 
                                                                                                                                  
World Systems Analysis: An Introduction, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). The work of 
Robert Pasnau is also helpful in making these important historical connections. 
23 Ibid. 36. “The great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict 
will be cultural…The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” 
24 Ibid. 307.  
25 Ibid. 306-307. 
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Note that his work here exhibits some of the key elements of the Conflict 
Model. For Huntington, there did exist a moment in history when ‘Western 
Civilization’ was a community of unique singularity. By allowing any type of 
‘multiculturalism’ or ‘internationalism’ to become part of this ‘edifice’ we are 
effectively causing ‘the end of Western Civilization.’ 
In a later work entitled Who Are We? The Challenges to American’s 
National Identity, Huntington speaks of another ‘threat’ to Western Civilization 
and the Western Creed besides multiculturalism and identifying the United States 
with Asia. This new threat is that of ‘the Hispanization trends in American 
society.’ This threat he identifies primarily, but not exclusively, in the recent wave 
of immigrants from Latin America in general and more specifically from Mexico.26 
In the construction of his position Huntington makes an important distinction 
between certain communities, which came from Europe to the Eastern area of 
the United States, those he terms ‘settlers’, and all subsequent arrivals, which he 
terms ‘immigrants.’27 By highlighting this distinction he creates a chasm that he 
claims is unbridgeable. He claims that ‘the experiences and lessons of past 
immigration have little relevance to understanding its [the current Mexican 
immigration] dynamics and consequences.’28This lack of translatability is due to 
six factors that I will address in turn: Contiguity, Numbers, Illegality, Regional 
Concentration, Persistence, and finally Historical Presence. 29 
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27 Ibid. 38-44. 
28 Ibid. 222. 
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Contiguity:  
Contiguity contrasts the traditional immigrants (people ‘crossing several 
thousand miles of ocean’) with the new immigrants (people crossing over ‘a line 
in the ground and a shallow river’).30 Yet this line, this contiguous border, notably 
and uniquely connects one of the richest countries in the hemisphere with one of 
the most poor.31  
Numbers: 
Numbers concern Huntington because the “Hispanic domination of the 
immigrant flow has no precedent in our history”32 He notes that “Mexican 
immigration constituted 27.6 percent of the total foreign-born population in 2000. 
The next largest contingents, Chinese and Filipinos, amounted to only 4.9 
percent and 4.3 percent of the foreign-born.”33 The vastness of numbers involved 
denotes a marked shift in this area.  
Illegality: 
Noting that part of the American Creed is a deep respect for the Law, it is 
particularly troubling for Huntington that the “Substantial illegal entry into the 
United States is a post 1965 and Mexican phenomenon.”34 He also notes that all 
attempts at curbing this reality have failed. Thus, “In 2003 illegal Mexicans in the 
United States were twenty-five times as numerous as the next largest contingent, 
                                            
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. “The income gap between the United States and Mexico is the largest between 
two contiguous countries in the world.” This quotation, cited by Huntington, originates from an 
article entitled “Can We Still Afford to be a Nation of Immigrants?” written by David M. Kennedy in 
the Atlantic Monthly. 
32 Ibid. 225. This quotation cited by Huntington originally appeared in an essay entitled 
“Will Americanization Work in America?” by Mark Krikorian and is found in the magazine 
Freedom Review.  
33 Ibid. 224.  
34 Ibid. 225.  
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from El Salvador,”35 and concludes that consequently “Illegal immigration is, 
overwhelmingly, Mexican immigration.”36 
Regional Concentration: 
Unlike the previous waves of immigrants, which simultaneously 
assimilated and dispersed, the current wave of immigrants seems to be much 
more geographically concentrated.  
As we have seen, the Founding Fathers thought dispersion essential to 
assimilation, and historically that has been the pattern and continues to be 
for most contemporary non-Hispanic immigrants.37 [italics added] 
For Hispanics, and specifically Mexican immigrants, dispersion is much 
less evident.38 This regional concentration is a problem because, “It is a sobering 
fact that the more highly concentrated immigrants are, the slower and less 
complete is their assimilation.”39 
Persistence: 
The persistence of this wave of immigration has three particularly long 
term and detrimental consequences. The first is that once begun, migration 
‘induces its own flow.’ This means that the immigrants that are already here 
facilitate the arrival of others. This ‘chain migration’ prompts the second and third 
consequences. The second consequence is that the longer an immigration 
                                            
35 Ibid. 225.  
36 Ibid. 225.  
37 Ibid. 226.  
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pattern is in place the more difficult it is to stop. The political will necessary to 
stop the flow of illegal immigrantion becomes much more difficult to mobilize, 
particularly when the ‘newer’ immigrants create political blocs which thwart 
control of immigration. The final consequence is that because of the high level 
and persistence of new immigrants the process of assimilation is retarded and 
even sometimes fully obstructed. Immigrants feel little need to learn the language 
or customs of their new land when they are constantly reminded and renewed in 
their old linguistic and cultural practices and patterns. 
Historical Presence: 
The final factor which makes this new wave of illegal immigration a 
phenomenon which cannot be understood using any previous experience is that 
of the unique historical circumstances that surround the relations between the 
United States and Mexico. 
Mexico is the only country that the United States has invaded, occupied its 
capital, placing the Marines in the “halls of Montezuma,” and then 
annexed half its territory.40 
For Huntington, the vast difference between ‘traditional’ immigrants and 
the ‘new’ immigrants are an unprecedented problem which cannot be solved by 
strategies previously employed. These factors combine to make the new wave of 
Hispanic immigrants in general and Mexican immigrants in particular a unique 
threat to the national identity of the United States of America.  
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The fundamental threat posed by the Hispanzation of the United States is 
the inability and lack of desire of these new immigrants to properly assimilate into 
the United States. 
The criteria that can be used to gauge assimilation of an individual, a 
group, or a generation included language, education, occupation, and 
income citizenship, intermarriage, and identity. With respect to almost all 
of these indices, Mexican assimilation lags behind that of contemporary 
non-Mexican immigrants and that of immigrants in the previous waves.41 
Here we see that Huntington once again demonstrates some of the 
features found within the Conflict Model, specifically that all mixing is seen as a 
loss of some essential or pure identity. He does a remarkable reading of history 
which seems to discount how some of the earlier immigrants into the Mexican 
Northeast also failed to ‘assimilate’ into the culture of Mexico. Rather than 
viewing the mixing of these two cultures he can only speak of the demise of the 
United States in its totality. He also speaks of the existence of the various 
communities, including settler and immigrant, as somehow having a ‘self-
encapsulated’ existence prior to their ‘encounter with the Other. This can only 
make sense if Huntington ‘brackets off’ certain historical perspectives. To the 
Indigenous people living in the geographical space of what is now the United 
States of America the distinction between immigrant and settler would be lost.  
In the two issues that Huntington addresses, the relation between the 
Western and non-Western civilization and the United States and the Hispanic 
Immigrant, we see exhibited the fundamental features of the Conflict Model. We 
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see how Huntington views the original ‘settlers’ as somehow existing in a pristine 
form. In this way all ‘mixing’ becomes a dilution of some ‘original’ cultural purity. 
We see how inaccurate this explanation is given that all of the communities of 
which he speaks are already a mixture of various other communities. We also 
see how he casts these interactions in binary and dichotomous terms; it has to 
be either America or Hispanic etc. Finally he treats all parties as existing within a 
self-encapsulated reality.  
The next person we will introduce who represents the Conflict Model is 
author Dinesh D’Souza. While having many similarities to Huntington, there are 
some clear distinctions. Wha is important is to view him as an exemplar of the 
Conflict Model. 
Dinesh D’Souza: The Other as Enemy—Foreign and Domestic 
In The Enemy at Home: The Cultural Left and Its Responsibility for 9/11, 
Dinesh D’Souza makes a claim that he admits will be ‘startling at the outset’:42 
that there is a causal relation between the views and practices which are part of 
the ‘cultural left’ and the attacks which occurred in the United States on 
September 11th 2001.  
The cultural left in this country (such people as Hillary Clinton, Ted 
Kennedy, Nancy Pelosi, Barbara Boxer, George Soros, Michael Moore, 
Bill Moyers, and Noam Chomsky) is responsible for causing 9/11…In 
faulting the cultural left, I am not making the absurd accusation that this 
group blew up the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. I am saying that 
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the cultural left and its allies in Congress, the media, Hollywood, the 
nonprofit sector and the universities are the primary cause of the volcano 
of anger towards America that is erupting from the Islamic world. The 
Muslims who carried out the 9/11 attacks were the product of this visceral 
rage—some of it based on legitimate concerns, some of it based on 
wrongful prejudice—but all fueled and encouraged by the cultural left. 
Thus without the cultural left, 9/11 would not have happened.43 
He speaks of how the left-liberal values espoused by some within 
the United States have subverted traditional values here at home and 
abroad. These traditional values can best be understood as those which 
are espoused by many who identify as Western-Christian communities. 
For D’Souza the attacks of 9/11 were specifically a response to the 
perceived moral depravity of ‘The West.’ While echoing similar concerns 
with that of Huntington he also wishes to distinguish himself by not viewing 
this conflict as merely a simple ‘clash of civilization’ but something more 
nuanced. For D’Souza the other is not merely Islam or the Non-Western 
people but communities closer to home. 
There is no “clash of civilizations” between the Islam and the West. But 
there are two clashes of civilization that are shaping the world today. The 
first clash is between liberal and conservative values within America. The 
second is a clash between traditional Islam and radical Islam, a clash 
within Islamic society. So whether they realize it or not, American 
conservatives are fighting a war on two fronts. The first is a war against 
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Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism. The second is a political struggle 
against the left and its pernicious political and moral influence in America 
and around the globe.  My conclusion is that the two wars are intimately 
connected. In fact, we cannot win the first war without also winning the 
second war.44 
Like Huntington, D’Souza views the encounter with the other still within a 
‘clash’ framework, even if he means a slightly different ‘other.’ Note that for him 
somehow the war (of values and traditions) must be either totally won or totally 
lost. D’Souza also speaks against mulitculturalism, one of the touted values of 
the ‘cultural left,’ noting that the acceptance of the multicultural perspective 
merits careful scrutiny. He seeks to defend Western Civilization and, more 
specifically, America by speaking for that which is unique about ‘us’ and against 
those who would endanger the greatness that comes from this uniqueness.   
“What I would say is that you should fix your eyes every day on the 
greatness of Athens as she really is, and should fall in love with her.” Even 
as he presents a somewhat idealized view of Athens, Pericles is saying 
that ultimately we fight for our country not in the name of some abstract 
theory, not even in the name of founding myths and constitutions, but in 
the name of the kind of society that we live in, and the kind of life that it 
makes possible for us. America today is in the position of the ancient 
Athenians, facing in the militants of the Islamic world a new kind of Sparta. 
What is needed, therefore, is an examination of the source of the conflict, 
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of the nature of the enemy. But what is needed, most of all, is an 
understanding of the moral basis of Western civilization, of what makes 
the American experiment historically unique, and of what makes American 
life as it is lived today the best life that our world has to offer. Only then 
can we know what is at stake in this war and what we possess that is 
worth fighting for.45 
We can see some features of the Conflict Model imbedded in the work of 
D’Souza. He views America as a self-encapsulated entity, particularly in his 
understanding of the ‘American life as it is lived today’ as existing within a 
historical vacuum. He does not take into account that the “American life as it is 
lived today” has some deep historical roots in the Middle East.46 Note also his 
perception that even ‘liberal’ American values that may have been founded within 
the American experiment may ultimately diminish the pristine goodness of 
America.  
Critique of Conflict Model 
I will elaborate upon many of the critiques of the Conflict Model in the 
discussion of the other models. Here I will only briefly summarize the 
shortcomings of this model. In critiquing the Conflict Model I wish only to focus on 
why this paradigm is insufficient in doing justice to an encounter with the other. I 
do not wish to argue the actual merits of each author’s political, cultural, or 
economic position. There are several problems with the Conflict Model, most 
fundamentally its inability to deal with the reality of how human culture is actually 
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created. I believe, like Seyla Benhabib, that “Cultures are formed through 
complex dialogues with other cultures”47 Like Virgilio Elizondo who is an example 
of the Mestizo Model, I believe that it is naïve to view any culture, particularly any 
modern culture, as not being a ‘mix’ of many other cultures,48 and therefore also 
naïve to speak of a culture or community of any kind as having existed in a pure 
state prior to any encounter with another culture. This understanding of cultures 
or communities as self-encapsulated entities belies the complex working of 
human history.49The Conflict Model does an inadequate job of understanding 
what actually is involved in the constituting of a culture or community. Finally, I 
believe that viewing the encounter through a binary pattern creates unnecessary 
patterns of conflict. This is not to say that there will be no power struggles or 
conflicts but simply to state that we need not begin with that as the working 
paradigm precisely because it lacks the precision necessary to make an 
encounter with the other most authentic.50 
The Dialogue Model 
                                            
47 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), ix. 
48 There are many who have dealt with this issue. However I have found Enrique 
Dussel’s work particularly helpful in understanding this process. Philosophy of Liberation, 1.2.4 
Imperialist Recolonization. Also important in reconfiguring this discourse is the work of Robert 
Pasnau, The Islamic Scholar Who Gave Us Modern Philosophy, Humanities, 
November/December 2011/ Volume 32, Number 6. His work is especially important because of 
the need for many within the Conflict Model to speak of Western Civilization (or ‘The West’) as an 
entity which seems to have fallen from the sky in a fully developed state.  
49 Virgilio Elizondo, Galilean Journey: The Mexican-American Promise (New York: Orbis 
Press, 2002), ix.  “Every modern human culture that we know is a composite. It is mestizo, made 
up of disparate elements, which nonetheless form an integrated whole.” 
50 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) 25-26, “Rather than the 
manufactured clash of civilizations, we need to concentrate on the slow working together of 
cultures that overlap, borrow, from each other, and live together in far more interesting ways than 
any abridged or inauthentic mode of understanding can allow.” 
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The three features which comprise the Dialogue Model are: a much more 
nuanced and accurate way of viewing culture, communities and identity; a vision 
of relations between culture that is not binary or dichotomous; and a serious 
engagement with the critique made by the other. The two representative 
examples of this model are Seyla Benhabib, and Kwame Anthony Appiah.  
Seyla Benhabib: Encountering the Other from within the Horizon of Modernity 
In the introduction to Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and 
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, Seyla Benhabib begins by 
acknowledging the ‘fractured spirit of our times.’51She specifically notes that “the 
cultural and political ideas of modernity, and among them what Richard Rorty has 
called ‘the metanarratives of liberal democracies, have become suspect.’”52She 
realizes that this suspicion is well grounded in the lived experiences of those 
whom Franz Fanon has called ‘the wretched of the earth.’ Benhabib shows 
profound sympathy for the other within modernity. 
This current mood of skepticism…toward continuing the “project of 
modernity” is based upon an understandable disillusionment with a form of 
life that still perpetrated war, armament, environmental destruction and 
economic exploitation at the cost of satisfying basic human needs with 
human dignity, a form of life that still relegates many women, non-
Christian, and non-white peoples to second class moral and political 
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status, a form of life that saps the bases of solidaristic coexistence in the 
name of profit and competition.53 
Clearly, we are dealing here with a different paradigm of encounter with 
the Other than the Conflict Model. Benhabib demonstrates the deep sensitivity 
that is much more reflective of the Dialogue Model. She seems to take seriously 
the critique and the experience of how the other has experienced this ‘project of 
modernity.’ In exhibiting this understanding she is allowing herself to enter into 
dialogue from a place of mutual respect that does not preclude conflict, and in 
fact presupposes it, but that clearly also envisions moving beyond it. She seems, 
however, to believe that this dialogue can only occur within the previous 
framework that was created by Western modernity. 
It is my conviction, however, that the project of modernity can only be 
reformed from within the intellectual, moral and political resources made 
possible and available to us by the development of modernity on a global 
scale since the sixteenth century. Among the legacies of modernity which 
today need reconstructing but not wholesale dismantling are moral and 
political universalism, committed to the now seemingly “old fashioned” and 
suspect ideals of universal respect for each person by virtue of their 
humanity; the moral autonomy of the individual; economic and social 
justice and equality participation; and the most extensive civil and political 
liberties compatible with principles of justice; and the formation of 
solidaristic human associations.54 
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Benhabib is willing to do serious reform within this tradition. In actively 
seeking the ‘formation of solidaristic human associations,’ Benhabib counters the 
position that all civilizations or cultures have to be framed within a ‘clash’ 
paradigm. In this way she differentiates herself from the binary and dichotomous 
vision of the Conflict Model. Her optimism stems in part from her ability to see 
cultures, communities, and identities as not existing in a reified or self-referential 
state.  
But movements for maintaining the purity of distinctiveness of cultures 
seem to me irreconcilable with both democratic and more basic 
epistemological considerations. Philosophically, I do not believe in the 
purity of cultures, or even in the possibility of identifying them as 
meaningfully discreet wholes. I think of cultures as complex human 
practices of signification and representation, of organizing and attribution, 
which are internally riven by conflicting narratives. Cultures are formed 
through complex dialogues with other cultures.55 [italics added] 
In this passage she is countering some people’s tendency to view the 
encounter with the other as somehow occurring between two ‘pure’ entities. She 
finds the position of the ‘multiculturalist,’ which is critiqued by both Huntington 
and D’Souza, as equally untenable but on slightly different grounds. Benhabib is 
critical of those she terms ‘hard’ multiculturalists, asserting that they have an 
essentialist view of culture. This view of culture claims an ontological coherence 
within each culture that she feels is false. She asserts that those who adopt the 
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Conflict Model, in this case both Huntington and D’Souza, suffer from this same 
false consciousness. Their claim to want to protect their culture (e.g. The West, 
America etc.) likewise rests on this false epistemological principle. Benhabib 
considers the entire debate on how to engage the cultural ‘other’ to be truncated 
precisely ‘because both opponents and proponents of multiculturalism, despite 
disclaimers to the contrary, continue to defend a faulty understanding of cultures 
as unified, holistic and self-consistent wholes.’56 For someone involved in the 
Dialogue Model, the desire to maintain cultural or civilizational purity is a moot 
point precisely because it bespeaks a desire to return to a utopian paradise that 
never existed. What is necessary instead is a capacity to engage in dialogue with 
the other, for through such dialogue all parties are enriched and empowered.  
While accepting that all cultures are a work in progress, Huntington and 
D’Souza are conscious that the dialogue in the Dialogue Model must contend 
with the problem of making universal/normative claims while at the same time 
showing respect for the particularity of each community or culture. This is how 
they view the encounter with the Other; not in conflict but in dialogue.  
A global civilization that is shared by world citizens will need to be 
nourished by local attachments; rich cultural debate; contestations 
about identity of the “we”; and a sense of democratic 
experimentation with institutional design and redesign...This is the 
future challenge of synthesizing democratic equality and cultural 
diversity.57 
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For Benhabib this synthesizing of cultural diversity must occur from within 
Modernity. For the Dialogue Model, the encounter between the communities 
occurs within an already existing ‘democratic experiment’ that must undergo 
‘design and redesign,’ but always within an already pre-existing framework. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah: Rooted Cosmopolitanism and the Creation of the Other    
Anthony Appiah frames the encounter with the other in what he terms 
Rooted Cosmopolitanism. The central assertion of the Cosmopolitan is that what 
makes us truly human is our capacity to create our lives through the choices we 
make. This is the a priori condition which must be cultivated before any genuine 
encounter can occur. This is also a prerequisite for all human flourishing. 
So Mill wrote in the book’s celebrated third chapter, “On individuality, as 
One of the Elements of Wellbeing,” and it is a powerful proposal. For it 
seems to suggest that individuality could be taken as prior to even the 
book’s titular subject, liberty itself. Our capacity to use all of our faculties in 
our individual ways was, as least in part, what made liberty valuable to 
us…Individuality is not so much a state to be achieved as a mode of life to 
be pursued. Mill says that it is important that one choose one’s own plan 
of life, and liberty consists, at least in part, in providing the conditions 
under which a choice among acceptable options is possible.58 
Appiah is immediately aware of the dangers in making individual 
autonomy a precondition for an encounter with the other. He is aware that many 
cultures have a vastly different anthropology which does not automatically cede 
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such authority to the individual.59 He cites a variety of authors that are deeply 
suspcicious of anything that ‘elevates a controversial and questionable ideal of 
life uncritically and unduly.’60 Many of the authors he cites note correctly that 
“many cultures don’t place such values on the individual’s freedom to choose his 
ends.”61 In many cultures the individual’s interest is subordinated to that of the 
community. His response to this concern is expressed in his term of soul-making. 
In this process of soul-making the autonomy of the individual and the honoring of 
collective identity are not understood as being in opposition.62 In addressing the 
question posed by the authors who are suspicious of a highly autonomous and 
individualistic anthropology Appiah exhibits the quality of sensitivity to critiques 
made by the other that is typically found in the Dialogue Model.  
He demonstrates another characteristic of the Dialogue Model in his 
critique of those who have a crude understanding of culture or collective identity 
formation.63 He does this by showing how those who are ‘unsubtle in their 
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understanding of the process by which identities, both individual and collective 
develop’ become prey to a faulty binary thinking on this issue. He also exhibits a 
much more nuanced way of viewing the creation of cultures and the absolute 
necessity for there to be an ongoing dialogue among all cultures to avoid human 
fallibility.64 In citing John Stuart Mill’s observation that ‘there is no nation which 
does not need to borrow from others’ he is directly refuting the premise of much 
of the Conflict Model. Not only is mixing good, it is absolutely essential for health 
of community.  
Critique of Dialogue Model 
There is much to praise in the Critique Model, including its sophisticated 
and much more accurate view of how cultures and collective identities come into 
existence. Much can also be said positively about how it does not fall prey to a 
faulty logic which sees all interactions in exclusively conflictual terms. Finally one 
can honor how its sincere engagement with the critiques made by the other 
shows a far superior example of love of neighbor than does the Conflict Model.  
Its fundamental weakness lies in not taking its own position far enough. It still 
wishes to maintain a certain ‘final authority’ on discourse which is problematic. 
This is particularly true in two areas. The first is its understanding of the relation 
between the individual and the community. There is a view which is held by 
many, particularly those within the margins, that does not frame the discourse of 
                                            
64 Ibid. 271. “If this book has a totem, it is, of course, John Stuart Mill, and we should not 
be surprised to find that he himself has pithily expressed the cosmopolitan ideal: “To human 
beings, who, as hitherto educated, can scarcely cultivate even a good quality without running it 
into fault, it is indispensable to be perpetually comparing their own notions and customs with the 
experience and example of persons in different circumstances from themselves: and there is no 
nation which does not need to borrow from others, not merely particular arts or practices, but 
essential points of characters in which its own type is inferior” [italics added]. 
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individual and community in the same manner. In this view it is not a matter of 
individuals choosing to respect, protect, or ‘join’ a communal identity, but rather 
the recognition that community exists prior to individual’s agency. This view 
understands that respect of an individual makes no sense apart from recognition 
of this understanding of an a priori communal ontology.65 The implications of this 
radically different anthropology are difficult to assess. However it is essential that 
this difference be honored and grasped before any authentic dialogue can occur. 
If not, all encounters and dialogues will lack authenticity precisely because they 
will be filtered through the lenses of an understanding which seeks to 
particularize the universal. By viewing all understandings of individual and 
community within these pre-conceived categories it makes no room for an-
Other’s way of inhabiting the world. 
The second flaw can best be understood as a fundamental need to 
reframe the issue. The parameters of modern discourse are already situated 
within a logic of domination. There are many voices that have attempted to show 
this hidden ‘history.’66 The epistemological implications of this colonization 
                                            
65 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, Trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine 
Morovsky, (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1985), 44. “The face of the other, primarily the 
poor and oppressed, reveals a people before it reveals an individual person. The brown face of 
the Latin American mestizo wrinkled with the furrows of centuries of work, the ebony face of the 
African slave, the olive face of the Hindu, the yellow face of the Chinese coolie is the irruption of 
the history of a people before it is the biography of Tupac Amaru, Lumumba, Nehru, and Mao 
Tse-tung. To describe the experience of proximity as individual experience, or the metaphysical 
experience of face-to-face as lived experience, between two persons, is simply to forget that 
personal mystery is always risked in the exteriority of the popular history of a people (3.1.3-4). 
The individualization of this collective personal experience is a European deformation derived 
from the bourgeois revolution. Each face, unique, inscrutable mystery of decisions not yet made, 
is the face of a sex, a generation, a social class, a nation, a cultural group, a historical 
epoch…The other person—metaphysical alterity, exteriority on the anthropological level—is 
primarily social and historico-popular.” 
66 In a written correspondence between Enrique Dussel and Karl Otto Apel and Paul 
Ricoeur, Dussel seeks to explain how certain ‘histories’ remain hidden within dominant 
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process continue to be important. The center’s discourses, even those interested 
in dialogue, will be blinded by its own ‘logic.’ This blindness will disallow a certain 
depth, and authenticity of dialogue to occur. A powerful example of this logic can 
be found in the continued understanding of the language of ‘discovery’ in relation 
to entire arenas of human experience.67 Part of the fundamental flaw is that the 
                                                                                                                                  
discourses. “This hermeneutics of incommunicable histories leaves the dominator from the 
metropolitan center in total innocence with respect to all the cruelties committed in the periphery 
during the whole of modernity. A French person will recognize that French colonists in Algeria 
have something to do with France; but just as well the Boers of South African with Holland, the 
conquistadors of Mexico and Peru with Spain, those of Brazil with Portugal, the Dutch merchants 
in Indonesia with the Low Countries, those of Haiti and Martinique (of Franz Fanon) with France, 
and the Company of the East Indies with England. Not to acknowledge that modernity begins with 
the expansion and “centrality” of Europe in the history that is thus inaugurated as “worldly”—
before civilizations were regional, provincial—is to forget the violence of the European 
colonization.” 
67 Walter D. Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, Series: Blackwell Manifestos, (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 3-5. “Discovery” and “invention” are not just different interpretations 
of the same event; they belong to two different paradigms. The line that distinguishes the two 
paradigms is the line of the shift in the geo-politics of knowledge; changing the terms and not only 
the content of the conversation. The first presupposes the triumphant European and imperial 
perspective on world history, an achievement that was described as “modernity,” while the 
second reflects the critical perspective of those who have been placed behind, who are expected 
to follow the ascending progress of history to which they have a feeling of not belonging. 
Colonization of being is nothing else than producing the idea that certain people do not belong to 
history—that they are non-beings. Thus, lurking beneath the European story of discovery are 
histories, experiences, and silenced conceptual narratives of those who are disqualified as 
human beings, as historical actors, and as capable of thinking and understanding. In the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries the “wretched of the earth” (as Franz Fanon labeled the colonized 
beings) were Indians and African slaves. That is why missionaries and men of letters appointed 
themselves to write the histories they thought Incas and Aztecs did not have, and to write the 
grammar of Kechua/Kichua and Nahuatl with Latin as the model. Africans were simply left out of 
the picture of conversion and taken as pure labor force. Toward the end of the seventeenth 
century, a new social group surfaced, and when they surfaced they were already outside of 
history: the Creoles of Spain and Portuguese descent. Although their marginalization was far from 
the extremes to which Indians and Africans were subjected, the Creoles, between the limits of 
humanity (Indians and Africans) and humanity proper (European), were left out of history. The 
geo-political configuration of scales that measured the nature of human beings in terms of an idea 
of history that Western Christians assumed to be the total and true one for every inhabitant on the 
planet led to the establishment of a colonial matrix of power, to leave certain people out of history 
in order to justify violence in the name of Christianization, civilization, and, more recently, 
development and market democracy. Such a geo-political configuration created a divide between 
a minority of people who dwell in and embrace Christian, civilizing, or developing missions and a 
majority who are the outcasts and become the targets of those missions. Max Weber has been 
credited, after Hegel, with having conceptualized “modernity” as the direction of history that had 
Europe as a model and a goal. More recently, since the late 1980s, Peruvian sociologist Anibal 
Quijano unveiled “coloniality” as the darker side of modernity and as the historical perspective of 
the wretched, the outcasts from history told from the perspective of modernity. From the 
perspective of modernity, coloniality is difficult to see or recognize, and even a bothersome 
49 
 
Dialogue Model begins from the perspective of the ‘center’ and not the other. 
This cannot be said about the final Model. 
The Mestizo Model 
The three features which are found in the Mesizo Model are that: it begins 
from within the perspective of the other; it accepts the porous quality of culture 
but is much more explicit about the power dynamics involved in this ‘mixing’ of 
cultures; and it takes as its starting point the anthropology of the marginalized, 
viewing human experience as best understood through the lens of a socio-
political anthropology.68 The two representatives of this model are Virgilio 
Elizondo and Edward Said.  
Virgilio Elizondo: The Mestizo Other Speaks 
Virgilio Elizondo has written extensively on the subject of encountering the 
other using the lens of Mestizaje.69For Elizondo all cultures are ultimately a 
product of this process. To try to impede this process is actually detrimental and 
ultimately will lead to the extinction of that which one wishes to preserve.70 He 
                                                                                                                                  
concept. For the second set of actors, the wretched, modernity is unavoidable although coloniality 
offers a shifting perspective of knowledge and history. For the first actors, modernity is one-sided 
and of single density. For the second, modernity is double-sided and of double density. To 
understand the coexistence of these two major paradigms is to understand how the shift in the 
geo-graphy and the geo-politics of knowledge is taking place. My argument is straightforwardly 
located in the second paradigm, in the double density of modernity/coloniality.”  
68 See footnote 53. 
69 Virgilio Elizondo, The Future is Mestizo: Life Where Cultures Meet, (Colorado: 
University Press of Colorado, 2000), 17: “Mestizaje: the process through which two totally 
different peoples mix biologically and culturally so that a new people begins to emerge, e.g., 
Europeans and Asians gave birth to Eurasians; Iberians and Indians gave birth to the Mexican 
and Latin American people.”  
70 Virgilio Elizondo, Galilean Journey: The Mexican-American Promise, (New York: Orbis 
Press, 2002), ix: “Every modern human culture that we know is a composite. It is mestizo, made 
up of disparate elements, which nonetheless form an integrated whole…A human grouping—like 
any other living organism—cannot survive except by confronting the unknown, the unexpected. It 
must re-form its identity at the threshold of every new encounter. It is engaged in a ceaseless 
effort of absorption, assimilation, and transmutation—of symbols, images, modes of existence. To 
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writes extensively of his embodying and engaging in this process.71He is 
conscious of being an ‘outsider’ to both of the cultures which he inhabited: the 
Anglo culture of the United States and the Mexican culture of the Southwest 
borderlands, specifically Texas. He points out that his experiences of being an 
outsider, while in some ways common to that of others, also had some very 
sharp distinctions. It was in his early visits to Mexico from his place of origin, 
Texas, that he encountered the reality that, for the Mexicans, he would always be 
a Pocho. A Pocho is someone whose origins are in Mexico but who was born in 
the United States.72 Yet he also highlights that unlike his experience in the United 
States of being an outsider, here “The label marked distance and difference but 
not separation or rejection.”73 He later comes to realize that this difference in 
response to the distinction is conditioned by many factors.74 
Elizondo demonstrates many of the characteristics found in the Mestizo 
Model. When he speaks of his experience of the ‘ignorance’ of the Anglos or their 
‘drive to dominate, subjugate, and exploit’75 he is clearly speaking from the 
perspective of the Other, the marginalized, or the ‘wretched’ (Fanon). He is much 
                                                                                                                                  
try to arrest this movement at any given point—whether from nostalgia over the past or the dream 
of a sirenic utopia—is to condemn it to sclerosis and death.”  
71 The Future is Mestizo, 15-27. 
72  Ibid. 20 “To this day it is not uncommon to hear someone from Mexico say about a 
Mexica-American’s Spanish ‘For a norteamericano, your Spanish is not bad.’ 
73 Ibid. 20. 
74 Ibid. 21. “I lived on the border between two natinoalities. I was an insider-outsider to 
both. I was “Mexican” in the U.S. and gringo/pocho in Mexico. There was a painful side to it, for it 
is difficult to always be different, but there was also an enjoyable side to it: I had a lot more 
options and could move easily in and out of two worlds. For as much as I loved the Mexican side 
of me, I never really disliked or hated the Anglo side, which I was making my own in the schools.  
Yet it was painful and incomprehensible because there were so many Anglo racists. Since I loved 
and admired Mexico so much the only conclusion I would logically come to was that the racists 
were ignorant. Much later on, I would discover that it was not just ignorance, but the Anglo drive 
to dominate, subjugate, and exploit. And even when some wanted to be of help, it was helping 
the other become like themselves.” 
75 Ibid. 21. 
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more explicit about the differential power dynamic in the mixing of the cultures. 
He speaks of Mestizaje or the mixing of cultures as much more fluid and 
dynamic. Finally it is important to note that when he speaks of his identity he 
speaks in terms of the communities of his origins, specifically Mexican and 
American. He does not negate his ‘individuality’ but he would find it difficult to 
speak of his existence outside of these ‘collective’ identities.  
 
 
Edward Said: Beyond the Oriental Other 
While Edward Said does not use the term Mestizaje, he does articulate a 
vision of all human societies as being a ‘slow working together of cultures that 
overlap, borrow from each other, and live together’76 He, like Elizondo, is 
conscious of his interest in the question of encountering the other as originating 
from a profoundly personal/existential experience.77  But even in this 
understanding of a personal, intimate experience he experiences himself as 
living also much more broadly as “an Oriental.” By viewing an aspect of his 
personal reality through the ‘lens’ of a community he is reflecting the 
                                            
76 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), xxix. 
77 Ibid. 25-26. “Much of my personal investment in this study derives from my awareness 
of being an “Oriental” as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of my education, in those 
colonies, (Palestine and Egypt) and in the United States, has been Western, and yet that deeply 
early awareness has persisted. In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to 
inventory the traces upon me, the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so 
powerful a factor in the life of all Orientals. This is why for me the Islamic Orient has had to be the 
center of attention…I have felt it important to be conscious of trying to produce one. Along the 
way, as severely and as rationally as I have been able, I have tried to maintain a critical 
consciousness as well as employing those instruments of historical, humanistic, and cultural 
research of which my education has made me the fortunate beneficiary. In none of that, however, 
have I ever lost hold of the cultural reality of, the personal involvement in having been constituted 
as, “an Oriental.” 
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anthropology of the margins.78 For Said the ultimate encounter with the other 
would entail relating in a manner which is ‘nonrepressive and nonmanipulative’79 
He is aware that in order for this to occur we would have to ‘rethink the whole 
complex problem of knowledge and power’80 in relation to the ‘study of other 
cultures and peoples.’81 He even asserts that this is one of the ‘most important 
tasks of all.’82 He reflects the Mestizo Model in being cognizant of how all 
encounters occur within already existing power relations.83 He, like Elizondo, is 
conscious of this in part because he speaks from the perspective of someone 
who has been the victim of Modernity. But like Elizondo he is also a ‘bridge 
figure’ who has a ‘double vision,’ seeing the world both through the eyes of one 
particular community, because he was trained in the educational systems of that 
community, but also through the eyes of his collective identity as other, outside of 
that community.  
Critique of the Mestizo Model 
                                            
78 See footnote 53. 
79 Orientalism, 24. 
80 Ibid. 24. 
81 Ibid, 24. 
82 Ibid, 24. 
83 Ibid. 11. “I doubt that it is controversial, for example, to say that an Englishman in India 
or Egypt in the later nineteenth century took an interest in those countries that was never far from 
their status in his mind as British colonies. To say this may seem quite different from saying that 
all academic knowledge about India and Egypt is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated 
by, the gross political fact—and yet that is what I am saying in this study of Orientalism. For if it is 
true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its 
author’s involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it must be also be true 
that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main 
circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Other as a European or an 
American, as an individual second. And to be a European or an American in such a situation is by 
no means an inert fact. It meant and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a 
part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of 
Homer.” 
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Because I find the Mestizo Model to be the model most capable of 
allowing for an authentic encounter with the other, I find that its flaws are much 
more of degree rather than underlying concept. So, for example, while it does 
take seriously the power dynamics found in all encounters, it frequently fails to 
elucidate them. I think that the Mestizo Model speaks of a kind of mixing that 
does not take fully into account the powerful and brutal nature of this Mestizaje.84 
It is precisely in articulating and enumerating the details of mixing that we come 
to realize the long lasting and deep impact which this previous ‘encounter’ has 
engendered among the Other (and ourselves). We cannot call authentic any 
encounter that ‘glosses’ over the details of what occurred. In the mixing process 
we have to be rooted in a historical narrative which will give a ‘preference’ to 
certain voices in any encounter.  The Mestizo Model also at times suffers from an 
‘essentialist’ perspective similar to that which is found in the Conflict Model. It 
tends to view the cultures or communities that are part of the Mestizaje process 
in self-encapsulated wholes.85 In this way it does not deal with sufficient subtlety 
                                            
84 To give but one example of this new understanding of Mestizaje we can read the 
writings of Gloria Anzaldua. In her seminal work, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, she 
describes the ‘mestizaje’ process of the Anglos and the Mexicans in powerful terms. “The Gringo, 
locked into the fiction of white superiority, seized complete political power, stripping Indians and 
Mexicans of their land while their feet were still rooted in it. Con el destierro y el exilio fuimos 
desunados, destroncados, destripados—we were jerked out by the roots, truncated, 
disemboweled, dispossessed, and separated from our identity and our history. Many, under 
threat of Anglo terrorism, abandoned homes and ranches and went to Mexico. Some stayed and 
protested. But as the courts, law enforcement officials, and government officials not only ignored 
their pleas but penalized them for their efforts, tejanos had no other recourse but armed 
rebellion.” Pp. 29-30. 
85 The critique which Anzaldua lays upon the Mexican culture demonstrates how even the 
marginalized other in one set of circumstances can quickly become the power center which seeks 
to marginalize other visions and voices. “Culture forms our beliefs. We perceive the version of 
reality that it communicates. Dominant paradigms, predefined concepts that exist as 
unquestionable, unchallengable, are transmitted through the culture. Culture is made by those in 
power—men. Males make the rules and laws; women transmit them. How many times have I 
heard mothers and mothers-in-law tell their sons to beat their wives for not obeying them, for 
being hociconas (big mouths), for being callejeras (going to visit and gossp with neighbors), for 
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with the question of communal anthropology that is so important for encounter 
with the other.  
 
An Authentic Encounter with the Particular Other 
The fundamental challenge is how to fuse the two sides of the dialectic, 
that of differentiation or potency of particularity and interdependence. I assert 
they can only be rightly understood from within a liberationist and post-colonial 
perspective. In saying this I see a twofold challenge stemming from each side of 
the twofold dialectic. On the side of the potency of particularity we are challenged 
to have an encounter with the Other that truly respects, honors, and maintains 
the integrity of the Other as other. In this way we acknowledge that an aspect of 
Christian love is seeing the Neighbor as not being a part of us. On the side of 
interdependence we are challenged to have an encounter with the Other that 
truly respects, honors, and maintains the integrity of the experience of 
interdependence from the perspective of the Other, as a part of us.  
With these challenges presented and acknowledged we can begin to 
construct a process which seeks to encounter the Other in their otherness while 
concurrently seeking some foundational unity with the Other. This process I call 
Agapic Solidarity. However, before I introduce the process I must first accomplish 
two tasks; the first is to introduce a common vocabulary from which to have this 
conversation. I do this by introducing the work of Emmanuel Levinas. The second 
                                                                                                                                  
expecting their husbands to help them with the rearing of children and the housework, for wanting 
to be something other than housewives?” p. 38. 
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is to present the authors who are most seminal in the creation of this process: 
Johann Baptist Metz and Enrique Dussel. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL OTHER 
 
Introduction  
 
 In the previous chapter we saw that two of the more salient features of our 
current globalized world are differentiation, what I termed the potency of 
particularity, and interdependence. Given this twofold dialectic, I suggest that the 
central manner in which the love command can be embodied today is in an 
authentic encounter with the Other. An encounter can only be considered 
authentic when two features are evident in the encounter: the honoring of the 
power of the particularity of the Other, and an honest appraisal of how 
interdependence has worked within the relationship between ourselves and the 
Other.  
In being conscious of the potency of particularity in the encounter we 
affirm the uniqueness of the Other. What is equally important, however, is that by 
affirming the power of particularity we are also surrendering a certain 
‘epistemological privilege.’1 This privilege is corrosive to our encounter with the 
                                            
1 D. Walter Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, Blackwell Manifestos Series, (Malden, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 153. “Control of money and control of meaning and being are 
parallel processes. Out of the top ten universities in the world, seven are in the U.S. and three in 
Europe. If control of meaning and knowledge is concentrated in the ten top universities thate 
produce the leaders of tomorrow’s world, control of money is concentrated in the same geo-
historical locations. Almost 48 percent of major corporations and banks are located in the U.S. 
and Europe. Ten percent in Japan and the remaining 40 percent are scattered all over the world. 
If the geo-politics of economy is concentrated in three locales, with Japan having significantly less 
economic power, and the control of knowledge is located in Europe and the US, then talking 
about “deterritorialization” and a “floating” empire only masks the fact that the geo-politics of 
knowledge and economy remains anchored firmly in the West. Note, I use the term “geo-politics 
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Other because its power creates an obstacle in our ability to see the Other. 
Ironically one area in which this epistemological privilege has been most 
corrosive is in our understanding of the actual structure and content of 
interdependence between ourselves and the Other.  
This chapter has three sections. The first section introduces the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas. This section allows us to gain a common vocabulary to 
speak of the issue of engaging the Other. It includes some of the key conceptual 
categories found within the work of Levinas, which are necessary tools for 
becoming conversant in this discourse. The second section critiques how 
Levinas conceptualizes the Other. It particularly attends to how Levinas’ 
conceptualization of the Other is inadequate in dealing with the question of 
historical particularity. The final section proposes one manner in which to 
address the fundamental shortcomings of how Levinas conceptualizes the Other 
by introducing four dimensions of the human experience.   
 
The Levinisian Other: Other than All Being 
Few modern philosophers have written with such passion and precision on 
the topic of the Other as Emmanuel Levinas. His understanding of the Other, and 
specifically the infinite otherness of the Other, which cannot be sublated by any 
                                                                                                                                  
of economy” and not “political economy” because this term can only tell part of the story, the story 
of Western capitalism as seen by its own agents and intellectuals. Alongside the economic and 
epistemic hegemony is the simultaneous control of authority, state, and army. Out of around two 
hundred countries in the world today, most of them weakened by globalization, those of the G8 
(mainly the US and the Atlantic axis of European imperial countries of the past five hundred 
years) become stronger every day.” 
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Totality, are particularly noteworthy. 2 The three aspects of Levinas’ theory that I 
will explore as germane to this project are: Who is the Other? Where is the Other 
to be found? And, What does the Other ask of Us? In other words the question of 
Identity, Proximity, and Response.  
Identity  
For Levinas, the Other is she or he who exists outside all of my Totalities. 
Whatever manner or category I use to identify my sense of ‘being in the world,’ 
the Other will always be “other than being.’ The Other ‘overflows absolutely every 
idea I can have of him [sic]3 and of myself. To understand the Other as used in 
this project and in the work of Levinas it is important to contrast it with the idea of 
the “I” as used in traditional philosophy and theology, particularly with the cogito 
ergo sum of Rene Descartes. This concept found in much of Western 
philosophical tradition has allowed all alterity and otherness to be submerged 
and subsumed into the Same, what Levinas terms the Ego.4 This Ego which then 
claims to ‘think’ about the Other is incapable of fully grasping the otherness of the 
Other precisely because it is trapped within its own logic or Reason.5 The 
                                            
2 Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes To Mind, Trans. Bettina Bergo, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), Emmanuel Levinas, The Trace of the Other, in Deconstruction 
in Context: Literature and Philosophy, Ed. Mark C. Taylor, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986).  
3 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Trans. Alsphonso 
Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 87.  
4 Of God Who Comes To Mind, 12. “Nothing, in effect, is absolutely other in the being 
served by knowledge wherein variety turns into monotony…The unknown is immediately made 
familiar and the new customary. Nothing is new under the sun…Everything is absorbed, sucked 
down and walled up in the Same.” 
5 Of God Who Comes To Mind, 17. “ Reason is identity that posits itself as I [comme moi]. 
It is an identity that identifies itself—that returns to itself—through the force of its form. It is that 
which is produced precisely as self-consciousness: an act of identification or identification in act. 
A force that returns to itself according to an itinerary traced only through the world and the history 
of humanity. The rationality of reason would thus leave nothing in the form of consciousness 
outside itself.” 
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reasonable and conscious person then chooses to engage or encounter the 
Other but never surrenders a kind of self-referential autonomy.6 For Levinas, 
then, the Other is that which exists prior to all self-referential entities. ‘It does not 
come from the time made up of presences, nor from the presences sunken into 
the past and representable, the time of beginnings or assumptions.’7 It is ‘a 
transcendence that is no longer absorbed by my knowledge.’8 It is that which 
overflows from the totality of Being, it is ‘other than Being.’ It is the transcendent 
reality that relativizes all other Horizons. It is because of the total Otherness of 
the Other that in a binary dualism we cannot even speak of the Other as in 
opposition to the Same or the Totality. “If the same would establish its identity by 
simple opposition to the other, it would already be part of a totality encompassing 
the same and the other.”9 Because the Other is ultimately beyond all horizons 
and systems of meaning which the “I” can create, the Other is always mystery.  
Because of the flexibility allowed by this understanding of the Other, we 
can see how various authors, by identifying themselves within a certain horizon, 
precluded themselves from seeing the Other. This would be true whether the 
fundamental “I” with which you identified was a country, a historical period, or any 
other conceptual framework. 
                                            
6 Totality and Infinity, 14. “The living being per se, is not without consciousness, but has a 
consciousness without problems, that is, without exteriority, an interior world whose center it 
occupies, a consciousness not concerned with situating itself in relation to an exteriority, which 
does not comprehend itself as part of a whole (for it precedes all comprehension), consciousness 
without consciousness to which the term unconscious (which hides no fewer contradictions) or 
instincts correspond…The identity of the living being throughout history contains nothing 
mysterious: the living being is essentially the Same, the Same determining ever Other, without 
the Other ever determining the Same.” 
7 Of God Who Comes To Mind, 71.  
8 Ibid. 133.  
9 Totality and Infinity, 38.  
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Proximity 
While we can never have full knowledge of the Other, Levinas asserts that 
we are always in proximity to the Other. The Other is always in close proximity to 
the Same, within both time and space. When Levinas uses the language of 
‘awakening’ to the Other, he is making us aware of a relational reality which has 
existed since the beginning of time between ourselves, however we identify 
ourselves, and the Other. The language of awakening allows us to fully grasp the 
autonomous existence of the Other. We accept that it is not our ‘awareness’ that 
gives existence and substance to the Other anymore than my ‘awakening’ to the 
sunrise gives the sun its existence. My experience of the sun (e.g. its light, heat, 
etc.) does not give the sun these properties. In the same manner, the relationship 
between myself and the Other ‘is thus asymmetrical, without noematic correlation 
of any thematizable pressence’10 It is always, ‘An awakening to the other man 
[sic], which is not knowledge. Precisely the approach to the other man [sic]—the 
first one to come along in his proximity as fellowman [sic] irreducible to 
knowledge, though it may eventually call for knowledge, faced with others in the 
plural, a knowledge required by justice’11 So proximity to the Other is in no 
manner connected to my agency, either on the level of knowledge, or personal 
agency. I am close to the Other long before I am able to sense my responsibility 
to the Other. 
Response 
                                            
10 Emmanuel Levinas, On Thinking-of-the-Other: Entre nous, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), Trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, 168. 
11 Ibid. 168. 
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The Other has the effect of challenging all of my fundamental 
assumptions. This challenge occurs long before I am able to solidify my sense of 
identity and respond.12 This responsibility has implications not only in a 
geographical or spatial dimension but also in a temporal dimension.13 We are in 
no manner able to manipulate, control, or construct the Other. For Levinas, the 
relationship is therefore asymmetrical; we are hostage, entirely emptied of 
agency in relation to the Other. Hence, there are some parallels between the 
relation of the Same and the Other for Levinas and that of the ‘preferential option 
for the poor’ in Liberation theology. In Liberation theology the ‘preferential option 
for the poor’ is not an actual preference in terms of a choice among other options 
but rather an intrinsic demand made by the Gospel. Another similarity between 
the Levinasian Other and ‘the poor’ of Liberation theology is that both seem to 
draw a very close correlation between the encounter of the immanent Other (or 
the poor) and the Divine. The theological implications are important in that the 
neighbor, the poor, or the Other all ultimately show us the ‘face of God.’14 
 
Critique of Levinas: On Matters of Particularity and Agency 
                                            
12 Totality and Infinity. 71. ‘ Responsibility does not let me constitute myself into an I think, 
as substantial as a stone or, like a heart of stone, into an in and for-oneself…It goes to the point 
of substitution for the other, up to the condition—or the noncondition—of a hostage.’ 
13 Ibid. 71. ‘This is a responsibility that does not leave me time: it leaves me without a 
present for recollection, or a return into the self. And it makes me late: before the neighbor I 
“compeer” rather than appear.’ 
14 See footnote # 1 in Introduction.  
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While I find the basic framework of Levinas compelling, I see two 
fundamental flaws in his understanding.15 The first flaw can be identified as a 
lack of agency or influence given to the Same in relating to the Other. By 
reducing the relationship to one of being held ‘hostage’ by the Other, Levinas 
essentially evacuates all power for the Same to act in a moral manner. If one of 
the conditions for authentic love to exist is freedom,16 then anyone being held 
hostage cannot truly love the person holding them hostage. By using the 
language and concept of hostage, Levinas is creating a condition that cannot 
allow for full participation on the part of any party towards the Other, for that 
would entail a much distorted sense of encounter with the Other. This would in 
part be due to the power differential which exists between anyone being held 
hostage and his kidnapper. Levinas, in trying to show the extraordinary power 
which the Other has in moral discourse, has ‘emptied’ all power from the Same 
or the Totality. The power differential and the lack of authentic agency on the part 
of the Same would militate against any authentic encounter. This would then 
render moot any possibility of love.  
The second flaw can be found in Levinas’ inability to assert the importance 
of particularizing some aspects of the Other. Levinas speaks frequently of 
encountering the face of the Other. Levinas, however,  wishes not to give any 
specific characteristics, contours or shape to the face. Is this the face of woman?, 
a black face?, the face of a child? For Levinas we are precluded from ever 
                                            
15 Anselm Min, The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after 
Postmodernism, (New York: T & T Clark Publishing, 2004). A sympathetic critique of Levinas is 
found in the work of Anselm Min.  Much of this section is inspired by Min’s reading of Levinas. 
16 Josef Fuchs, Human Values and Christian Morality, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970).  
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knowing. Levinas views all attempts at particularizing the Other as a reductionism 
which robs the Other of all their uniqueness. It is true that in noting some 
particular quality or aspect of the Other we risk reifying or fetishizing that quality 
or characteristic.17 Yet by purging all aspects of the Other Levinas depicts an 
Other who is ‘ontologically isolated from, and raised above, all sociohistorical 
relations’18 This lack of contextualization of the Other leads ultimately to an 
encounter which can make no specific moral demand on me. It is precisely 
because my love of neighbor has to acknowledge the potency of particularity that 
I must encounter not just an Other but rather this particular Other; this woman, 
this child. Rather than negate it, this specificity sharpens our moral response to 
the others’ demands. In this way, mediation is not seen as a hindrance to our 
ethical response, but rather as an indispensable pre-condition for its fulfillment.   
Even with these flaws I still find the work of Levinas fundamental to all 
understanding of encountering the other. I wish to take seriously his desire to 
maintain the complete transcendence of the Other while equally taking seriously 
his demand for us to respond ethically to this Other. This question may be 
framed in the following manner: how can we know the particulars of the Other 
without subsuming them into our pre-existing horizons. How can I view the Other 
within a specific particularity (gender, age etc.) without 1) reducing them only to 
that identity, and 2) having the Other be merely a reflection of my own 
predisposed understanding of that identity? In other words, how do we navigate 
                                            
17 Min, 22. “No doubt mediating totality can lead, and has lead, to intellectual and political 
totalitarianism, and Levinas’s prophetic outcry in defense of the irreducible transcendence of the 
other serves as an indispensable corrective against all totalitarian temptations.”  
18 Ibid. 22. 
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between the Syclla of the transcendent Otherness of the Other and the 
Charybdis of the mediating particularity which allows me to authentically love this 
transcendent Other?  
 
The Many Dimensions Where We Encounter the Other 
One solution to the problem posed above is found by drawing up 
parameters which serve as locations in which the encounter with the Other 
occurs. These locations are best understood as arenas or dimensions of the 
human experience. By understanding that all human experience is mediated 
through certain dimensions or arenas we can mitigate against some of the more 
extreme tendencies which are introduced above. By identifying who the Other is 
within these various dimensions of human experience we do risk, as is duly 
noted by Levinas, the reduction of the Other to only the understanding allowed 
within the horizon of each dimension; however, not to take this risk is to condemn 
ourselves to an ahistorical, non-particularized, and ultimately ineffective response 
to the Other.19 
There are many dimensions of human existence. Given the parameters of 
this project I will focus on only four: the Economic, the Cultural, the Political, and 
the Religious. A dimension or arena can best be understood as a 
spatial/temporal field through which human life is mediated. Two elaborations 
                                            
19 Ibid. 23. “It is often said that Levinas is more a prophetic thinker than a systematic 
philosopher and that, as such, he could afford to be one-sided and passionate about the “one-
thing necessary” and forgo the responsibility of the systematic philosopher for completeness and 
balance.  My argument thus far, has been that his “one sided” concern for the infinity of the other 
to the exclusion of all historical mediation is too costly precisely for the other’s own historical well-
being, the one thing necessary.” 
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must be made before we begin to present these dimensions. The first is that we 
must acknowledge at the outset that there are many other dimensions or arenas 
that could be listed and explored, such as the interpersonal, the psychological, 
and the familial to name but a few.  I will give some primacy to the economic, 
because of the foundational quality which the economic/political has in relation to 
all other dimensions.20 The second point to emphasize is that to see human 
experience as mediated through these various dimensions or arenas is useful for 
our project but also imprecise for it does not capture the dynamic and fluid quality 
of human reality.21  With these two points of clarification in mind, we will move 
forward. The following section undertakes two tasks: the first is to elaborate the 
                                            
20S. Roberto Goizueta, Caminemos Con Jesus: Toward a Hispanic/Latino Theology of 
Accompaniment (New York: Orbis Books, 1995), 121-22.  Goizueta does a masterful job of 
showing the way in which all other dimensions or arenas are fundamentally related to the 
economic/political dimension. “We have already seen how, in Latino popular Catholicism, human 
action is mediated by physical symbols. These, however, are not only religious symbols but also 
products of our labor: e.g., the beautiful dresses which the women wear of San Fernando so 
carefully placed on Our Lady and Mary Magdalen to prepare them for Good Friday, the pieces of 
bread distributed to the congregation at the end of Holy Thursday liturgy, the eucharistic offering 
itself, the gifts we exchange with each other, the house which, through a family’s interpersonal 
actions (praxis), becomes a “home.” Before these physical objects are religious symbols, they are 
economic products. Their religious meaning is mediated not only by their physicality in general, 
but by the specifically economic character of that physicality. The bread is not merely a physical 
object like any other; it is “fruit of the earth and work of human hands.” By way of another 
illustration, the inability to appreciate the complex ways in which family relationships are mediated 
by economic relationships is precisely the weakness of contemporary sentimentalized, neo-
conservative evocation of “family values.” That is, neo-conservatives fail to recognize how the life 
of the “home” is not isolated from but embedded in ethical-political and economic relationships. It 
does little good to promote family values while, at the same time, supporting political and 
economic structures that, by promoting autonomous individualism and an instrumental 
understanding of human life, lead to the breakdown of the family. When forced to make their way 
within such structures, family values have little chance of survival. We cannot promote family 
values unless we recognize that the “private” affective realm of love and relationship is mediated 
by the “public,” material realm of economics and politics.” 
21 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), X. “Part of the problem is that we have studied these phenomena in 
separate boxes to which we have given special names—political, economics, the social structure, 
culture—without seeing that each of these boxes are constructs more of our imagination than of 
reality. The phenomena dealt with in these separate boxes are so closely intermeshed that each 
presumes the other, each affects the other, each is incomprehensible without taking into account 
the other boxes.”  
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contours and content of each dimension. It will allow us to see what actually 
constitutes this dimension. The second task will be to identify who is the Other 
within each dimension. Based on these tasks we will be able to see who and how 
the Other is occluded within each dimension and to what particulars one must 
pay attention in order to encounter the transcendent Other.  
The First Dimension: The Economic-Living Labor within the World 
Capitalist System 
The first dimension we will examine is the economic dimension. This 
dimension, like all dimensions, has the potential for becoming reified in our 
understanding, for example by conflating the economic identity of the Other with 
their entire personhood. If we reduced the Other to their economic Identity (e.g. 
The Worker, The Capitalist, The Peasant, The Proletariat etc.) we would be 
incapable of seeing the absolute transcendent quality of the Other. We must 
guard against this totalizing quality so that we do not fall prey to what Levinas 
warns against. And yet it is also true that if we not acknowledge the Other within 
this dimension we become incapable of responding to their ‘economic’ needs. To 
particularize even more specifically Levinas’ concern I suggest that unless we 
see who the Other is within the economic dimension we cannot adequately 
respond to the Other in all of their needs. In order to do this we must ask two 
questions: First, what is the dominant economic horizon?, or, to use the 
conceptual framework of Levinas, How is the Same or the Totality best defined 
within this Dimension? Second, given what is this Totality, who is the Other who 
falls outside of its vision?  
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The End of History/The End of the Economic Other 
There seems to be some agreement that we are now living in an era in 
which some form of capitalist economic structures has attained hegemonic 
status. One can say with some assurance that the dominant economic system 
found in the world today is a free-market, capitalist model. This assertion is being 
made by people of all political and economic proclivities (left/right, 
capitalist/communist/anarchist etc.) to varying degrees.22 This is not to deny that 
there are many other economic models which are currently in existence in the 
world today23 but merely to say that all of them must deal in some form with living 
in a globalized capitalist world.24 capitalism in its current stage of development 
has taken on an almost ‘divine’ status in its capacity to envelope all reality and 
see itself with a self-referential lens.25  This is in almost direct opposition to 
classical Catholic Social Teaching, which asserts the primacy of labor in relation 
to capital.26 It is within this particular dimension that we will encounter the Other.  
                                            
22 There are many intellectuals who pronounce this reality; even as there is disputation of 
how salutary this condition is to the vast majority of people. To name but a few; Francis 
Fukuyama, Martin Feldstein, Thomas L. Friedman, Samir Amin, Slovoj Zizek, Michael Hardt, 
Antonio Negri, Noam Chomsky, Arundhati Roy, Amartya Sen, Holly Sklar etc. 
23 This is particularly true in Latin America where recent revolutions have allowed for 
some ‘alternative’ models to come into existence.  
24 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, Trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine 
Morkovsky, (Wipf and Stock Publishers: Eugene, Oregon, 1985), 143. “All economic reality takes 
place in a concrete system, be it microeconomic (e.g., the level of erotic economy or the industrial 
enterprise), or national, regional, or global macroeconomics. Small systems are only subsystems 
of the global economic system, which today is dominated by imperialist management of capital 
and the planetary dimensions of the transnational corporations. The controlling system is the 
capitalist, central mode of production, whose history Emmanuel Wallerstein records” [italics 
added]. 
25 Enrique Dussel, Ethics and Community, Trans. Robert R. Barr (Orbis Books: New 
York, 1986), 133. “Capital’s self-absolutization, its claim to utter singularity, isolation, and 
existence ex se, its denial that it is beholden to anyone or anything, constitutes its character as a 
false god and an idol” 
26 Laborem Exercens, Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritiage, Ed. David J. 
O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, (Orbis Press: New York, 2006) 352-92. “Capital springs from 
labor, and bears the mark of human toil...Capital, inasmuch as it is constitutes a set of means of 
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Because Capitalism does not acknowledge the place of human work in the 
production of capital, we can begin to see who might be the Other is in this 
dimension. We can say using the Levinasian formula that in the current 
manifestation of capitalism it is they who are ‘other than Capital,’ they who have 
become the occluded Other. In the economic dimension, which is presently 
constituted by a globalized capitalist model, the Other is best understood as the 
living labor of all the workers in the world. It is important to highlight that this 
living labor which we speak of as the Other exists prior to the labor found within 
the Capitalist (and Communist) dialectic of Capital/Labor.27   
The Other that is outside of the system is that which has an a priori 
existence in relation to Capital.28  This a priori aspect of the human experience is 
what Dussel terms pragmasis.29 This living labor aspect of human experience 
                                                                                                                                  
production, is only an instrument, or instrumental cause...All means of production, from the most 
primitive to the most ultramodern, have been developed gradually from the human being…[They 
are] the fruit of work” This insight is echoed in all subsequent encyclicals including Economic 
Justice for All; “Pope John Paul II has stated that “human work is a key, probably the essential 
key, to the whole social question.”…Because work is this important, people have a right to 
employment. In return for their labor, workers have a right to wages and other benefits sufficient 
to sustain life in dignity. As Pope Leo XIII stated, every working person has “the right of securing 
things to sustain life.”  The way power is distributed in a free market economy frequently gives 
employers greater bargaining power than employees in the negotiations of labor contracts. Such 
unequal power presses workers into a choice between an inadequate wage and no wage at all. 
But justice, not charity, demands certain minimum guarantees. The provision of wages and other 
benefits sufficient to support a family in dignity is a basic necessity to prevent this exploitation of 
workers. The dignity of workers also requires adequate health care, security for old age or 
disability, unemployment compensation, healthful working conditions, weekly rest, periodic 
holidays for recreation and leisure, and reasonable security against arbitrary dismissal. These 
provisions are all essential if workers are to be treated as persons rather than simply as a “factor 
of production.” These are but two examples but the entire corpus of Catholic Social Teaching 
seems to assert the importance of Labor and its primacy over and above that of Capital.  
27 Ethics and Community, 114. 
28 Enrique Dussel, Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism and Liberation Theology, 
Ed. Eduardo Mendieta (New York, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003) 140. “The 
human being, the living and free subject of creative labour, sells his labour and becomes a 
“wage-earner,” an intrinsic, optic element of capitalism, dependent on the being of capital. The 
“other” (who is free) becomes other than himself or herself, a thing.” 
29 Enrique Dussel, Ethics and Community, Trans. Robert R. Barr (New York: Orbis 
Books, 1988),  114. 
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occurs prior to any structured economic system and is much more essential to 
the human species.30  This distinction is important because this understanding of 
the Other must be understood as distinct from the more traditional Marxist 
category of Labor. The binary category of Marx is helpful but Dusselian notion 
precedes this categorization.  
 
From the Productive Circle to the Economic Other 
What all humans do is consume energy. ‘Human beings must replace their 
lost energy, their expended life. They must satisfy their needs.’31 Dussel terms 
‘this openness-of-need pragmasis (the Greek word for the “need to make use of 
something”), and the object needed pragmata (Gk., “things needed, 
useful”).32This entire process is named the ‘pragmatic circle.’ At some point in 
time, however, the pragmata (the object required to fulfill our needs) is not 
immediately available to us and must be extracted and transformed from the 
natural world. So now we have moved outside of mere pragmasis (our basic 
openness to fulfilling our needs) to poiesis or ‘producing’ the necessary object to 
fulfill our needs. For Dussel there still remains a basic link to the object which is 
produced and the life of the human person.33 This ‘blood’ of the worker is 
                                            
30 Ibid. 114. “The point of departure for any reflection of work must be a stage 
‘antecedent’ to the emergence of the phenomenon of work on the human scene (a merely utopian 
point, to be sure, hypothetical and perhaps a-historical).” 
31 Ibid. 114. 
32 Ibid. 114. 
33 Ibid. 114. “ In order to produce an object, then, we work. This makes our work itself an 
object…As an object precisely produced, it has become human toil objectified…But if the work of 
the worker has become real in the object, if it has been objectified, then the life of the worker has 
been objectified in it as well—and life has a sacred dignity, because it is human life, the life of a 
person—1.3. The “use-value” of the object produced then is then human life objectified—and 
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precisely what becomes unjustly appropriated in the Capitalist system and 
through this machination produces poverty, privation. What is perceived within 
the horizon of the system as a ‘mutual exchange’ between two parties in fact 
occludes the fundamental unfairness of the relation between the Same and the 
Other.34  
By seeing how Capitalism ‘exteriorizes’ and blinds us all to the Other, 
understood as living labor, we are better able to respond to the moral demands 
made by the Other within the economic dimension. Yet we should not see the 
human person as only ‘living labor’ or a pragmasis creature. For to do so would 
make us guilty of the very thing that Levinas warns against; we would be seeing 
the Other only from the vantage point offered by the horizon or totality of the 
Economic. Yet it is also important to note that in responding thus we would be 
responding as co-members within this dimension, so that the relationship would 
always be mutual and not asymmetrical in the ‘hostage’ sense of Levinas. Below 
we will see how the process of Agapic Solidarity will propose to address the 
                                                                                                                                  
nothing less. The use value of an object is “blood” (2.8, 3.10) it is life…The value of the object 
produced is ultimately the worker’s lifeblood coagulated.” 
34 Ibid. 126-29. “But there is a subtle inequality in this exchange, invisible both to the one 
who has the money and the one who offers the work [the Capitalist]. This is a social relationship 
(8.2) because it is a relationship of domination, of injustice. Invisibly, imperceptibly it is sin. Why? 
Because the person having the money uses the person of the worker while paying only for that 
person’s work capacity (11.9). The employer makes use of the whole worker, makes use of the 
“creative source of value” (11.9, 12.2), though paying only for his or her “upkeep.” It is as if 
someone wished to purchase an automobile by paying only for fuel and servicing. I receive the 
“creative subject” gratis, and pay only for what is needed to keep the subject from dying, to keep 
it working…Once the worker have sold their work, they are no longer their “own,” but the property 
of another. Now they are “made other” (“otherfied”) alienated, the objects of sin and exploitation, 
and this in an institutional manner (2.5) thanks to the social division of labor. Now their work must 
be sold daily. The only alternative is starvation…Now we have “work for hire,” the obligatory 
alienated social relationship that demands workers that they sell themselves for a wage that pays 
them less life than the life they objectify in the product destined to be possessed by the owner of 
the money. “Work for hire” is the name of the institutional sin of our time. It has held sway for the 
past several centuries of human life on earth. Thus work for hire is the “original” sin committed 
against the worker (2.5)—committed by the “rich” (in the biblical sense) against the poor.”  
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totalizing quality of globalized capitalism and create an encounter with the 
Economic Other.  
The Second Dimension: The Cultural — Interculturalidad as Encounter 
In the broadest sense the term culture may be designated as any work of 
human society. In this designation culture is frequently counterposed to nature. 
This conceptual framework has been used for many years.35  Because of the 
historical roots of this theoretical bifurcation we can see that it is difficult to speak 
of culture apart from the rise of the political (and economic) entity which is the 
modern Nation-State. The need to see these various dimensions as intimately 
integrated was emphasized earlier.36 Yet another aspect of this link between 
culture and national identity is also important in understanding who becomes the 
Other within the Cultural Dimension. The rise of so called Civilizations designated 
an ‘advance culture’ which could then pass judgment on the other ‘cultures.’ The 
application of this new category insisted that while all peoples had ‘culture,’ not 
all people were ‘civilized.’ This machination allowed the cultured (and civilized) 
nation-states of the European world (and later United States) to introduce ‘civility’ 
to the barbarian cultures of the new world.37 Its continued use within 
                                            
35 D. Walter Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, Blackwell Minifestos  (Blackwell: MA, 
2005), xvi-xvii. “Toward the end of the eighteenth century and through the nineteenth, nature, as 
God’s creation was opposed to culture as man’s creation. Consequently, the opposition between 
nature and humanity was not abandoned but simply redrawn. “Culture” (from the Latin colere, “to 
cultivate or to inhabit”) surfaced as a necessary concept during the process of secularization 
because “culture” meant “to cultivate” in the sense of human production and creation. In the 
sense of inhabiting, “culture” is the dwelling place, the inhabitation of what is created. “Culture” 
was needed to replace “relgion” as a community bond… “Culture,” in other words, created 
national unity: national languages, national literature, national flag and anthem, etc. were all 
singular manifestations of a “national culture.” It served to name and institute the homogeneity of 
the nation-state.” 
36 See footnote 21. 
37 The Idea of Latin America, xvii. “However, insofar as the term emerged in the 
nineteenth century when England and France were embarking on the second wave of colonial 
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contemporary discourse shows the importance of this legacy. When Samuel 
Huntington speaks of a “Clash of Civilizations”, and then proceeds to speak of 
cultural patterns from within a certain hierarchical framework, he is continuing a 
process which has its roots in an expansionist/imperialist process. This is not to 
diminish the genuine multiplicity of cultures but to note how, from the outset, this 
multiplicity was already framed within a hierarchical framework that privileged 
certain ‘cultures’ above others. From the inception of this new way of viewing the 
human experience, we see entire peoples as being outside of the system.  
Walter Mignolo, among others, has written extensively on the implications 
of this paradigm. He speaks of how this hierarchical arrangement has elevated 
certain communities while relegating others to the periphery. He has termed this 
phenomenon the ‘colonial wound.’38 By beginning to recognize how and by 
whom the colonial wound is constructed and maintained we can see who 
                                                                                                                                  
expansion, “culture” also served the colonial purpose of naming and describing those alien and 
inferior “cultures” that would be under European “civilization.” While European civilization was 
divided into national cultures, most of the rest of the population of the world would be conceived 
as having “culture” but not civilization.” 
38 Ibid. xii  “From the sixteenth-century Spanish missionary Bartolome de las Casas to 
G.W.F. Hegel in the nineteenth century, and from Karl Marx to the twentieth-century British 
historian A. J. Toynbee, all we can read (or see in maps) about the place of the Americas in the 
world order is historically located from a European perspective that passes as universal. 
Certainly, every one of these authors acknowledges that there was a world, and people, outside 
Europe. Indeed, both people and continents outside of Europe were overly present as “objects” 
but they were absent as subjects and, in a way, out of history. They were, in other words, 
subjects whose perspectives did not count. Eric Wolf’s famous book title, People without History, 
became a metaphor to describe this epistemic power differential. By “people without history,” Wolf 
did not mean that there were people in the world who did not have memories and records of their 
past, which would be an absurd claim. He meant that, according to the regional concept of history 
as defined in the Western world from ancient Greece to twentieth-century France, every society 
that did not have alphabetic writing or wrote in a language other than the six imperial languages 
of modern Europe did not have History. In this view, History is a privilege of European modernity 
and in order to have History you have to let yourself be colonized, which means allowing yourself, 
willingly or not, to be subsumed by a perspective of history, life, knowledge, economy, 
subjectivity, family, religion, etc. that is modeled on the history of modern Europe, and that has 
now been adopted, with little difference, as the official model of the US. Perspectives from 
coloniality, however, emerge out of the conditions of the “colonial wound,” the feeling of inferiority 
imposed on human beings who do not fit the predetermined model in Euro-American narratives.” 
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becomes marginalized (and by whom) within this dimension. I will focus on two 
aspects of this wound that are central to continued power in contemporary 
discourse; the enunciatory privilege and the epistemic privilege.39 
Enunciatory Privilege 
The privilege of enunciation has to do with the location from which truth 
claims are voiced. The communities that create the parameters of cultural 
discourse have a distinct privilege and power in all subsequent discussions.40 
This privilege allows for the system to create its own ontology without ever 
having to see the face of the cultural Other. The entire system sees only what the 
single privileged position deems worthy of attention. Furthermore, that privileged 
position views all challenges to this vision as suspect and deficient.41 This 
‘deficiency’ may be an actual deficiency or it may be merely the incapacity of the 
Totality or the center to perceive the truth quality in the vision presented by the 
                                            
39 Much of this work will be grounded in the work of Walter Mignolo. 
40 The Idea of Latin America, 35-36. “It is from the West that the rest of the world is 
described, conceptualized, and ranked: that is modernity is the self-description of Europe’s role in 
history rather than an ontological historical process. Without a locus of enunciation self-conceived 
as Occidental, the Oriental could not have been thought out…This allowed Western Europe to 
become the center of economic and political organization, a model of social life, an exemplar of 
human achievement, and above all, the point of observation and classification of the rest of the 
world.”  
41 Ibid. 35. “Hegel’s philosophy of history is a striking example in which the West is both a 
geo-historical and the center of enunciation. History [for Hegel] moves from East to West. In that 
move, the very idea of Western civilization became the point of reference for the rest of the world, 
and the goal as well. How was it that the “West” came to occupy the “center” in terms of political 
political theory, political economy, philosophy, arts, and literature? And when? Up to the fifteenth 
century, Western Christendom (or Europe in Greek mythology) was literally the “West”—but 
“West” of what? Of Jerusalem, of course, as it was the center of the Christian world. Athens and 
Rome were construed as part of the “West” that offered the foundations of knowledge, social 
organization, and the consolidation of the church and the state under Emperor Constantine three 
centuries AD. Thus, “Western Europe” did not occupy the “center” until the emergence of the 
“Indias Occidentales” (later called America and, even later, Latin and Anglo America) in the 
Christian European consciousness. The very idea of a West (Occidentalism) and the ideology of 
Western expansion since 1500 also began with the identification and invention of America. From 
that moment on, the Indias Occidentales defined the confines of the West and, as its periphery, 
were part of the West nonetheless. Those confines were traced back from a locus of observation 
that placed itself at the center of the world being observed, described, and classified.”   
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cultural Other. The central manner in which this enunciatory privilege is sustained 
is by having control of the categories, descriptions, and modes of understanding 
by which cultural reality is configured. This is understood as the epistemic 
privilege.  
Epistemic Privilege 
The epistemic privilege includes, but is not limited to, the ways in which 
knowledge is understood and constituted within any dimension.42 Through the 
logic imposed by this privilege, all perspectives which are outside of this horizon 
are deemed as not worthy of exploration. Another manner in which this logic 
deals with the cultural Other is that of ‘co-opting’ the vision and insights of the 
Other and seeing them merely as ‘reflections’ of already existing knowledge.43  
This helps us see that Mignolo is critiquing the logic and not merely the 
people who currently possess this logic. He is aware that the imperialist powers 
have changed hands throughout history but that the logic exercised by each era 
has remained fundamentally unchanged.44 The newest configuration of 
coloniality comes in the form of ‘multiculturalism,’ which does little to change the 
fundamental power arrangement. Mignolo is aware that non-Western, and hence 
                                            
42 Ibid. 36. Italics in text. “Western peoples have disciplines and Eastern peoples have 
cultures to be studied by Western disciplines. The West was, and still is, the only geo-historical 
location that is both part of the classification of the world and the only perspective that has the 
privilege of possessing dominant categories of thoughts from which and where the rest of the 
world can be described, classified, understood, and “improved.”  
43 Ibid. 36. “One of the most devastating consequences of such a system of belief is that 
the world seems to be what the European (and later US) categories of thought allow us to say it 
is. The rest is simply wrong and any attempt to think otherwise opens one up to harassment, 
demonizing, and, eventually, elimination.” 
44 Ibid. 7. “‘[C]oloniality’ refers to the logical structures of colonial domination underlying 
the Spanish, Dutch, British, and US control and management of the entire planet. In each of the 
particular imperial periods of colonialism—whether lead by Spain (mainly in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries) or by England (from the nineteenth century to World War II) or by the US 
(from the early twentieth century until now)—the logic was maintained; only power changed 
hands.”  
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non-dominant cultures may, inadvertently, accommodate the logic of coloniality.45 
For Mignolo multiculturalism does not address the substance of the problem 
which is the colonial wound in all its manifestations. Mignolo suggests we replace 
the vision proposed by multiculturalism with that of Interculturalidad.  
Dislodging Privilege: From Multiculturalism to Interculturalidad 
The vision that Mignolo proposes is found within the various social/cultural 
movements throughout the world. He is aware of how this shift has deep and 
broad implications for all peoples in the world.46  The project of interculturalidad 
advanced by Mignolo would demand that the cultural Other gain equal power in 
issues of ‘epistemic rights.’ In doing this, the Other would have access to 
interpreting the realities of the world on an equal footing with all other cultural 
communities.47 
 Because the imperialist project mentioned above created a world in which 
only one community had both enunciatory and epistemic authority we can speak 
of the cultural Other as any peoples or communities that were left out of the 
equation of shaping the world inhabited by the human species. The Other are 
any communities who suffered this wound. In the excerpt below we see Mignolo 
begin to identify who are some of these peoples, communities, and cultural 
                                            
45 Ibid. 37. “What is the difference? “Multicultural” means the hegemonic principles of 
knowledge, education, the concept of the state and government, political economy, morality etc., 
are controlled by the state and below the control of the state people have “freedom” to go with 
their “cultures” as far as they do not challenge “the epistemic principles” grounding politics, 
economy, and ethics as managed by the state.” 
46 Ibid. 124. “The question is not inclusion but inter-culturality, a shared project based on 
different “origins” confronting the colonial wound and overcoming the imperial/national pride and 
interests. In the words of another indigenous movement, the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, 
Mexico, it means dwelling in a “world where many worlds co-exist.”  
47 Ibid. 118. “’Interculturalidad’ doesn’t mean speaking the same logic in two different 
languages, but putting them into collaborative conversation: two different logics for the good of 
all.”  This also echoes aspects of the project of Anselm Min.  
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Others as well as who are some of the communities who have inflicted these 
‘wounds.’  
The proliferation of other paradigms can no longer be determined by 
universal liberating projects, be they theology of liberation or Marxism. 
Why would Islamic progressive intellectuals wait to be liberated by 
Christian theologians? Why would Afros in South America and the 
Caribbean, and Indians from Chile to Canada, want to be liberated 
following a Marxist blue-print for revolution?...The explosions coming out 
of the theoretical, political, and ethical awareness  of the colonial wound 
make possible the imagination and construction of an-other world, a world 
in which many worlds are possible…However, decolonization of 
knowledge and of being (and more generally, of politics and economy) 
cannot be thought out and implemented other than from the perspective of 
the damnes (and not from those of the World Bank or from an updated 
Marxism or a refreshed Christianity); that is, from the perspective, 
provided by years of modern/colonial injustices, inequalities, exploitation, 
humiliation, and the other humiliations of and pains of the colonial wound, 
of an-other world were creative care for human beings and the celebration 
of life will take precedence over individual success and meritocracy, and 
accumulation of money and of meaning (e.g., personal CVs, the personal 
satisfaction of celebrity, and all other ways in which alienation is being 
reproduced and encouraged). The imperial perspective (advanced and 
implemented by European and US men and institutions) cannot find the 
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solutions for the problems of the world created because of imperial 
designs and desires. Las Casas and Marx are necessary, but far from 
being sufficient. They should not only be complemented by Waman Puma, 
Fanon, and Anzaldua; their very critical foundation should be displaced. 
The Other can only obtain their cultural authority and authenticity when 
they revolt against the cultural categories given them by the dominant system. 
Those at the privileged center can only find authentic existence when they are 
able to see the face of the Other within an Interculturalidad encounter. 
The Third Dimension:  The Political — The Citizen as Subject  
Similar to the economic dimension we can see that the political arena is 
entering a period of contestation. There are now many identities by which people 
are choosing to affiliate within any one ‘body politic.’48 Nonetheless, one can still 
speak of a certain ‘model’ or ‘structure’ being dominant. The dominant political 
entity, which continues to hold sway within political discourse, is the nation-state. 
The dominant form of managing this ‘Leviathan’ is within a Western, liberal, and 
democratic framework.49 
Given the length of this dissertation project we cannot undertake here a 
full treatment of the history of the rise of the nation-state as a political reality. It is 
however important to note that the concept of the nation-state is a relatively 
recent phenomenon in world history. By historicizing this construct we can see 
                                            
48 A wonderful exploration of some of these issues can be found in Globalization and 
Identity: Cultural Diversity, Religion and Citzenship. Edited by Majid Tehranian and B. Jeannie 
Lum. We can also see in the rise of the 99% Movement a new way of configuring memberships 
within a Nation-State. 
49 The article by William T. Cavanaugh entitled Killing for the Telephone Company: Why 
the Nation-State is not the Keeper of the Common Good does a wonderful job of showing the 
development of the contemporary Nation-State. This includes some concerns about its continued 
efficacy within current ethical discourse. 
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how it is a human made horizon which can (and does) exclude certain 
perspectives and voices.50  This understanding of the historical roots of the 
concept of nation-state allows us to conceive who was, from its inception, outside 
of this system. But first, any proper apprehension of this dimension requires a 
brief exploration of its origins.  
The Rise of Imagined Communities 
In Nations and nationalism since 1780: Program, myth, and reality, Eric 
John Hobsbawm, following the work done by Miroslav Hroch,51 sees the 
development of the nation-state as occurring in three phases.  The first phase is 
a “purely cultural, literary and folkloric’52 component and has ‘no particular 
political or national implications.’53 “A body of pioneers and militants of ‘the 
national idea’ and the beginning of political campaigning for the idea” marks the 
second phase of the idea.54 In the third phase the ‘nationalist programmes 
acquire mass support’55 It is interesting to note that prior to the third phase, the 
pioneers and militants who are interested in this ‘programme’ will already claim 
its existence.56 As we unpack and unfold this process we can see how these 
pioneers and militants created an ‘us’ (the nation) which, de facto, created a 
                                            
50 Hobsbawm, J. Eric, Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth and reality, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3.  “Nations as we know—not least through the 
efforts of Hays—Kohn era—are not, as Begenhot thought, ‘as old as history.’ The modern sense 
of the world is not older that the eighteenth century, give or take the odd predecessor.” 
51 Hroch, Miroslav, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge, 
1985).  
52 Nation and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth and reality, 12. 
53 Ibid, 12.  
54 Ibid. 12.   
55 Ibid. 12.  
56 Ibid. 12. 
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‘them’ and excluded certain communities. In doing this they created an Other 
within the Political Dimension.  
Phase One: Proto-nationalism:  
The first phase in the rise of national consciousness is what Hobsbawm 
terms ‘proto-nationalism.’57 This term describes ‘certain variants of feelings of 
collective belonging which already existed and which would operate, as it were, 
potentially on the macro-political scales.’58 The conglomeration of these variants 
was used to fill the vacuum which was created in part by the disintegration of 
previous bonds of connection, specifically that of empires, and religious kinship. 
It is interesting to note that two of the more common sources of bonding found in 
contemporary political thought were not among the ‘variants’ which were used to 
create cohesion; I am speaking of language and ethnicity. There are several 
reasons why the place of language and ethnicity were not focal points for the 
creation of national identity.  
To a vast non-literate population, language was a much less homogenous 
phenomenon. The variations in dialects and vernacular made language as a 
source of connection much less feasible.59  Given the organic and varied quality 
of language in any pre-literate period its use as a source of unification would be 
                                            
57 Ibid. 46. All of chapter 2 is dedicated to explaining this phenomenon. 
58 Ibid. 46. 
59 Ibid. 52, “Non-literate vernacular languages are always a complex of local variants or 
dialects intercommunicating with varying degrees of ease or difficulty, depending on geographical 
closeness or accessibility. Some, notably in mountain areas which facilitate segregation may be 
incomprehensible as if they belong to a different linguistic family.” He later tempers his comment 
by stating that this does not “…exclude a certain popular cultural identification with a language, or 
a patently related complex of dialects, peculiar to a body of communities and distinguishing them 
from their neighbors…,”  
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premature.60 The reasons for ethnicity not being efficacious as a source of 
unification are threefold. Ethnicity was usually connected to a ‘common origin 
and descent’ and this sense of commonality of origin was difficult to ascertain 
given migration patterns.61 Another factor is that ‘ethnicity tends to be negative, 
inasmuch as it is much more usually applied to define ‘the other’ than one’s own 
group’62 It is difficult to see physical and ethnic difference in the other but easy to 
accept that we come in all different shapes, sizes, etc.63 The final reason is that 
ethnicity can be used most effectively to promulgate a proto-nationalistic passion 
when there is some historical precedent.64  It is important to remember that these 
groups were from their inception already incredibly ethnically homogenous. If 
language and ethnicity were not the proper instruments from which nationalism 
could be cultivated, then what were the original ‘building blocks’ of unity? The 
answer lay in religious affiliation and identity. This and what Hobsbawm calls “the 
consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity.”65 
This consciousness is further formed with the creation or invention of a ‘national 
history.’ 
Phase Two: Forming a National Narrative: 
The second phase is constructed by elites (read: the literate) of a given 
geography. The need for greater cohesion grew with the desire to shore up 
                                            
60 Ibid. 62-63, “In short, special cases aside, there is no reason to suppose that language 
was more than one among several criteria by which people indicated belonging to a human 
collectivity. And it is absolutely certain that language had as yet no political potential.”  
61 Ibid. 63. 
62 Ibid. 66. 
63 Ibid. 66. “For to ‘us’ it seems obvious that the members of our ‘nationality’ cover a wide 
range of sizes, shapes, and appearances, even when all of them share certain physical 
characteristics, such as a certain type of black hair. It is only to ‘them’ that we all look alike.” 
64 Ibid. 66. 
65 Ibid. 73. 
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greater support for the nascent nation-state apparatus. Some of the cohesion 
came ‘organically’ as more people came into more intimate contact with the 
State.66  This ongoing contact and intervention of State with the quotidian 
existence of the people allowed themselves to be seen as part of a larger unit.  
The importance manifested itself in that the State began to be the location of 
such key documents as birth and death certificates, and marriage licenses. The 
church was no longer the sole place in which this type of information was kept. 
However, this importance needed to be cultivated because loyalty was not 
guaranteed. Loyalty was important due to the need for protecting the nascent, 
and still fragile, authority and power of the state. The power of the state was most 
readily apparent in the formation of a military and a police force. There were two 
key elements in helping insure and shape the growth of this loyalty and strength.  
The first was an idea of revolutionary ‘participation’ in the creation of the state 
apparatus, a theory which would be called democracy. This concept created an 
entirely new subject: the citizen. The second element was the creation of an 
organized education system. This allowed the new elites “to spread the image 
and heritage of the ‘nation’ and to inculcate attachment to it and to attach all to 
country and flag, often ‘inventing traditions’ or even nations for this purpose.”67 It 
is through the educational system that the importance of national language grew. 
This was particularly true in equating language and citizenship. These aspects 
will have particular importance when we begin to realize who is the Other in the 
Political Dimension. 
                                            
66 Ibid. 80-81. 
67 Ibid. 92. 
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Phase Three: The Three Fields of Influence: 
The third and final phase of the creation of national consciousness came 
with the greater consolidation of three spheres found in society. These three 
spheres are still major forces in how people identify and perceive themselves 
within the political dimension. The first is what might be termed ‘national 
economies.’68 The second ‘was the rise of the modern mass media: press, 
cinema, and radio. By these means popular ideologies could be standardized, 
homogenized and transformed, as well as, obviously exploited for purposes of 
deliberate propaganda by private interests and states.’69  The final sphere is the 
rise of sports in its new permutation. The most obvious evidence of these new 
permutations is in the nationalistic frenzy of the Olympics. This includes, but is 
not limited to, the ‘medal count’ which many countries participate in. An event 
that is designed to bring the world together becomes a vehicle for greater 
allegiance to our nation-states.70 These three spheres created a seamless web 
of identification in such a manner as to create the modern political subject; the 
citizen.  
Citizenship as Subjectivity 
                                            
68 Ibid. 132. “By 1913 capitalist economies were already moving rapidly in the direction of 
large blocks of concentrated enterprise, supported, protected and even to some extent guided by 
governments.”  
69 Ibid. 141. 
70 Ibid. 142. “Between the wars sports as a mass spectacle was transformed into the 
unending succession of gladiatorial contests between persons and teams symbolizing state-
nations, which is today part of global life.”  
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Inclusive in the conceptual framework of the Nation-State is found the 
presupposition that the most effective manner of running this ‘sovereign’ entity is 
by means of a political process which can loosely be labeled as Liberal-
Democratic. The rise of the Nation-State as a means of political organization 
occurred concurrently with the rise of aspects of capitalist formation. The 
importance of this historical synchronicity is that the ‘rights’ of citizens within a 
nation-state was usually seen as identical with the rise of the propertied class.71 
The central concept that gives these disparate labels some cohesion is 
the birth of a new concept of subjectivity: the person as citizen. Within such 
discourse the ‘non-citizen’ becomes a ‘non-person. In much political discourse 
the non-citizen loses their subjectivity. Their ability to be treated as a human 
person in the political system (even more than in the economic system) is their 
membership qua Citizen by the nation-state. ’ We see that in much contemporary 
discourse the place of human rights in relation to citizenship rights is a highly 
contested arena. This contestation comes in the form of attempting to widen the 
parameters for who can be considered a ‘citizen’ and what constitutes human 
subjectivity.72 
                                            
71 Samir Amin, The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World, 
Trans. James H. Membrez, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004), 45. “According to this 
reasoning, democracy must necessarily be restricted, reserved for those who are both citizens 
and property owners. Hence it is easily understood how their electoral choices probably always, 
or almost always, conform to their interests as capitalists. But at the same time, the political loses 
its autonomy in this convergence with, not to say submission to, the economic. Economic 
alienation clearly functions here to hide the elimination of the autonomy of the political.” 
72 Ibid. 45-46. “The later extension of democratic rights to others in addition to citizen-
businessmen was neither the spontaneous product of capitalist development nor a necessity of 
that development. On the contrary, the extension of these rights was progressively attained by 
victims of the system, the working class, and later women; it is the result of struggles against the 
system.” 
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Because the dominant political organizational entity in contemporary life is 
the nation-state we can begin to see that the Same or the Totality is the citizen. 
The Other in this paradigm is the non-citizen. It is not uncommon to have many 
non-citizens having aspects of their humanity called into question. Given the 
length, and purpose, of this project we cannot fully delve into this topic, however, 
it is important to note how the nation-state can use various aspects of a people’s 
subjectivity (culture, labor, language etc.) and yet the actual persons themselves 
will be devalued or placed outside the system.   
The Fourth Dimension: Salvation, Redemption, and Purity  
In speaking of the Religious Dimension it is crucial to understand that we 
are not referring to anyone specific religion. We are speaking about a more 
general religious vision which characterizes all religions. This vision allows all 
religions to have similar paradigms even though their individual contents may 
differ greatly. The frames which form part of this religious dimension can best be 
understood using the categories of Authority, Morality, and Salvation. 
Religious Authority 
Religious authority will claim for itself a certain self-referential capacity. Its 
claim is precisely that its grasp of reality is based on something beyond all other 
dimensions (economic, political, cultural etc.). Thus, it will speak of a ‘natural’ or 
‘divinized’ view which precludes any need to seek any authority beyond itself.73 
                                            
73 Ethics and Community, 31-32. “Any system of prevailing, dominating practices (from 
Egypt or Babylon to Rome, the several Christendoms, or capitalist society) determines its 
established practices as good. Its project (its end, its telos, its beatitude, as the Latin theologians 
termed it) is confused with the “perfect human good” as such. Thus the norms that demand the 
execution of this project are “natural law.”…[It] now legitimates the praxis of the flesh and the 
world as if it were the praxis of the very reign of God.” 
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Many, if not all religions will have a version of this concept. They will tend to 
identify their praxis with some divinized order.  
Religious Morality 
The second frame within the Religious Dimension is an outgrowth of the 
first. It posits a certain foundational grasp of the moral universe that can only be 
ascertained by inhabiting the vision proffered by this dimension. It claims to be 
the ‘North Star’ from which all moral decisions must find their bearings. This 
moral authority has a two-fold effect; it allows the people who are following the 
moral law (within the religious system) to have a clear conscience74 and it allows 
for the system to self-regulate by abolishing that which is ‘bad’ or ‘morally 
degenerative.’75 It is precisely because of its certitude in matters of morality and 
law that it will view all questioning of its Totality as ‘sin’ or morally reprehensible. 
Because of this all communities which demonstrate anything other than moral 
rectitude, vis-à-vis the moral code as espoused by the system are seen as Other 
than moral within the Religious Dimension. 
Religious Salvation 
The final aspect of this religious vision involves the type of authority found 
within this dimension. The religious vision will claim to have ‘the keys to the 
kingdom’ (in some cases literally). It will claim to have a final and definitive 
                                            
74 Ibid. 33-34. “If my moral conscience has been formed within a framework of the 
principles of the system, it will recriminate me if I fail to comply with the laws of the system…In 
this fashion “moral” conscience, formed in the moral principles of the dominant system, creates a 
peaceful remorseless conscience vis-à-vis a practice the system approves but that may originally 
have been perverse (a praxis of domination).”  
75 Ibid. 31. “This system is closed in upon itself. It has replaced the universal human 
project with its own particular historical project. Its laws become natural, its virtues perfect, and 
the blood of those who offer any resistance—the blood of the prophets and heroes—is spilled by 
the system as if it were the blood of the wicked, the totally subversive. “ 
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jurisdiction on all that has ultimate meaning. This understanding of “ultimate” has 
a two-fold quality; it will understand its judgment as pertaining to matters of 
‘ultimate’ importance; and also it will assert its judgments to be of an ultimate or 
terminal nature. Thus, the religious dimension will deal with questions such as: 
Who is Saved? Redeemed? or even Good? at an ontological level. Some 
element of this logic is found embedded within all religious logic or theology.76 To 
some degree, all theologies and religious visions will have to address the 
questions of who is saved and who is redeemed. Each will also have to deal with 
the question of what Salvation or Heaven would look like. Because of this binary 
quality to religious salvation it will speak of an in group and an out group.  
The Religious Other: The Sufferer, the Sinner, the Hell Raiser 
When we speak of the Other in the Religious Dimension we must speak in 
terms of those who are outside of the categories referred to above: authority, 
morality, and salvation.  
Religious Authority: 
If religious authority is based on a self-referential reflection, then the Other 
is that source of authority which challenges a priori this self-referential reality and 
reflex; most precisely, the unjust suffering of the innocent.77Given the reality that 
all humans experience suffering we must try to make more precise the quality of 
                                            
76 Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism and Liberation Theology, 210. “ A 
theology of domination fixes the “frontiers” (“that my salvation may reach to the end (frontiers) of 
the earth” Isa. 49:6), and declares the Other “beyond” salvation, beyond being, beyond dignity. ”  
77 Johann B. Metz, A Passion for God: The Mystical-Political Dimension of Christianity, 
Trans. J. Matthew Ashley (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 134. “In my view there is one authority 
recognized by all great cultures and religioins; the authority of those who suffer. Respecting the 
suffering of strangers is a precondition for every culture; articulating others’ suffering is the 
presupposition of all claims to truth. Even those made by theology…The sole content of its 
universal responsibility is this: There is no suffering in the world that does not concern us.” 
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suffering of which we speak. When we speak of the suffering of the Other we are 
speaking of the ‘flesh of the suffering Other.’78 We are not speaking here of one 
aspect of the human person (e.g. psychological, physical etc.) but rather the 
existence of the human persons in all their dimensions.79 This includes both the 
individual dimension of human person and what we would term the socio-
historical elements.80For religious authority to become authentic it must break the 
chains of solipsistic epistemology and ground itself in the sensibility and 
corporality of the Other.81 A way to avoid the potential for idolatrous totalizing of 
corporality or sensibility is to connect it, not with our ‘flesh’ but with the sensibility 
of the Other.82 In this move we have shifted the source of authority from its 
original ‘self-referential’ totality to the corporeal suffering of the Other. All our 
                                            
78 Ethics and Community, 60-61.  
79 Ibid. 60. “The “flesh”, the “flesh” of the other, his or her “face” (persona—see 1.3), is 
the only sacred thing in creation. It is second only to God in worth and dignity. Hence everything 
bound up in any way with “flesh” (sexuality, sensibility, pleasure, and so on) is good, worthy, and 
positive, not to be rejected. Only sin in the flesh, which occurs when the flesh idolatrously 
totalizes itself, is to be rejected.”  
80 Ibid. 60. “The flesh is the whole human being, then, the human order of things, the 
history and society of human beings.” 
81 Ibid. 60-61. “By “sensibility” (“sensitivity”) here I do not mean only the sensible 
cognitive faculty, the “senses”—sight, hearing, and so on—as a means of the constitution of the 
“sense” or meaning of what appears in the world (referring to the intuitive moment). No, here I 
wish to stress sensing itself—the actual sensation of pain, hunger, cold and so on, or indeed of 
pleasure, satisfaction, empirical happiness. Our subjectivity is wounded in the deepest, most 
secret, intimacy when something wounds our “skin”—when our corporality is assaulted in its 
constitution by some trauma. By “sensibility,” then, I mean the resonance of, the impact on, our 
capacity for “contentment,” for suffering, for joy or sorrow in reaction to some stimulus irrupting 
from the world around us.” It is important to note that Dussel here extends his understanding to all 
living creation. In this way I believe he opens up possibilities for some powerful ecological ethical 
theory to be created. This would entail seeing the suffering of the Other as including the ‘natural’ 
world.  
82 Ibid. 61-62. “I am speaking of “sensibility.” And the “sensibility” of which I speak is that 
of others. What is under consideration here is their hunger, thirst, homelessness, cold, illness—
the “negatives of sensibility” that sin produces…If the “flesh” is something positive, something 
worthy and good, then hunger, thirst, homelessness, cold and so on, will be evil. And their evil is 
not only physical, but ethical, political, communal, as well. These things are evil as the fruit of sin, 
of injustice…Thus the pain of the flesh, in its sensibility, constitutes the “last judgment” of human 
praxis. Jesus’ expression, “I was hungry and you…,” capsulizes the sensitization in the 
oppressed of the sense of the praxis of the dominator and the just, respectively.” 
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‘judgments’ and, in fact, our ‘last judgment’ will be based on how we relate to any 
system, and in particular, in relation to the corporeal well-being of the Other. 
Religious Morality:  
Because the dominant morality within any system is always the following 
of the moral ‘laws’ which are articulated by the moral authority of the religious 
system, we can see that morally ‘good’ behavior would just be an extension of 
the will and desires of the authority.83 Because of this, all ethical behavior that 
takes into account the Other will appear as ‘lawless’ or ‘criminal.’ At times the 
ethical demands placed upon us by the Other, and particularly his or her 
suffering, may call us to engage in activity which will be deemed to be the 
behavior of an ‘out-law,’ and, in a sense, the assessment would be correct.84 It is 
important to note that disregard of any law would not be arbitrary, but rather is 
guided precisely by the authority found in concern for the corporeal suffering of 
the Other. In this manner our ethical behavior will be improvisational but not 
arbitrary and will always be grounded in the situational needs of the Other.85  
                                            
83 Ibid. 32. “The classic definition of morality was expressed in terms of relationship to a 
norm or law. Kant demanded the moral law be loved. For Thomas Aquinas it was the relations of 
an act to the moral law that determined its morality. The problem, obviously, is that once the 
system of the world has asserted itself as the foundation or law, morality will depend precisely on 
the actualization of the system. An act will be morally good if it is “adequated to,” if it complies 
with, the ends of the prevailing system. If I pay taxes, the minimum wage, and so on, as required 
by law, I shall be a “just” person, a “good” person. The law itself may be unjust. The taxes may be 
insufficient, the wages may be starvation wages. But all of that lies outside any possible moral 
consideration.” 
84 Ibid. 32. “Correlatively, immorality will be constituted by the sheer non-realization of the 
prevailing norm. The thief whose thievery is a vice is now less wicked thatn the prophet who 
criticizes the system in its totality. Barabbas and Jesus are both “evil” for the Jewish and Roman 
morality of their time. Juan del Valle, bishop of Popayan was regarded by the encomenderos of 
sixteenth-century Latin America as “the worst bishop of the Indies” because he defended the 
Indians.” 
85 Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism, and Liberation Theology, 144. “It is not 
possible to begin by defining as moral theologies do the morality of an action by its 
transcendental relation to a norm or law. On the contrary, the absolute morality of the action 
indicates its transcendental relation to the building of the kingdom in the historical processes of 
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Religious Salvation: 
In speaking of this element within the Religious Dimension we are 
speaking of something which goes by many terms within many traditions. For 
purposes of this project we will focus on one term; the Kingdom of God. Those 
who are ‘saved’ will inhabit the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God, however, 
always has a dialectical dynamic composed of an ‘already’ but ‘not yet’ quality.86 
In this way Salvation can be understood as those who already exist in the 
Kingdom of God or are guaranteed entrance at the appropriate time. Those who 
are, by definition, outside of the Kingdom are those who are condemned. This 
creates an insider/outsider dialectic which can only be broken by moving beyond 
binary thinking in terms of salvation. The only ones capable of breaking free of 
the spell created by the binary thinking within this dimension are those that are 
outside of ‘kingdom logic: the poor or the Other.87 The Other, precisely and 
ironically because they exist outside of the ‘pseudo’ Kingdom of God that is 
claiming an inauthentic reality, allows us to encounter the true Kingdom in all its 
                                                                                                                                  
liberation of actual material peoples, “who are hungry.” It is only subsequently within this 
framework, that it becomes possible to situate all the problems of abstract moral subjectivity (with 
which all moral theologies start)…The ethics comes afterwards, affirming as its first premise the 
absolute priority of the poor person in whom we encounter, as an absolute challenge 
responsibility Christ, a poor person who is God himself [sic].”  
86 Ibid. 85-86. “The Kingdom of God is an “already” which has been inaugurated among 
me; it is God’s free gift in the redemptive reality of Christ, through his liberating lordship in the 
Church. But it is equally a “not yet” which is coming, which directs hope to the parousia and which 
is coming towards us as future. The Kingdom as the “already” now present and as the “not yet” in 
the future, as history “already” transformed by the incarnation of the poor and crucified Christ and 
as the “beyond” of history, as true History, this Kingdom is the dialectical unity of an action that is 
real, yet is also in the process of fulfilling itself without end.”  
87 Ibid. 86-87. “Every system in history tends to close in on itself, sacralizing itself as a 
divine whole. It claims to be the Kingdom of God on earth. In its long history, the Jewish-Christian 
tradition has known many different systems and has, within each of them, fulfilled the function 
assigned to it by God in world history. In each successive sacralized system, God has made 
himself [sic] known in the poor; for their sake he was the God of Moses, of the Judges and 
Prophets, of Jesus and the Christians. God reveals himself [sic] in the poor because they cannot 
live in the divinity of the system that is oppressing them. In the very pain of their oppression is 
revealed to them the non-divinity of that oppressive system.” 
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dialectical complexity. To the degree that the poor exist outside all kingdoms they 
inhabit both the Immanent Kingdom of God which is already here and also point 
us toward the Transcendent Kingdom of God which is not yet fully realized.88 
 
Conclusion: From the Levinasian Other to the Disrupting Other 
In the beginning of this chapter I spoke of how this project would use the 
Other as defined within the work of Emmanuel Levinas in dealing with the 
question of an ethical response toward the Other given our pluralistic reality.  
After defining and explicating Levinas’ position I also introduced a critique of his 
work. In illuminating his shortcomings, specifically what I consider to be his 
inadequate understanding of the question of the particularity of the Other, I 
proffered a solution by introducing the concept of Dimensions which is part of all 
human experience. I specifically introduced four Dimensions: the Economic, the 
Cultural, the Political, and finally the Religious. I do concede the danger of 
reducing the Other to the limited identity options offered within that dimension 
(e.g. The Other in the Economic Dimension becomes only his or her living labor, 
the Other in the Political Dimension becomes only the non-citizen in the Nation-
State etc.) however it is precisely because I take seriously the moral and ethical 
demands of the Other which is so persuasively articulated in the work of Levinas 
                                            
88 Ibid. 98-99. “The poor, moreover, by having no part in the system, by being oppressed, 
marginal, non-subject of rights and property, are outside the system. By being outside the system 
they are inside the Kingdom. In other words, the marginality of the poor in respect of the kingdom 
of this world is a measure of their participation in the eschatological Kingdom of God. Non-
possession and marginality in the system are possession and participation in the Kingdom…The 
poor, like exteriority in the system, are “already” in the Kingdom. It may well be that they have no 
knowledge of this; it may well be that no explicit mention of Christ and his Gospel has come to 
their ears. Yet anything they do in order to eat and drink, in order to achieve a juster [sic] order, is 
a being “already” in the Kingdom.” 
91 
 
that I hold we must know some specifics of the existence of the Other.  It is, 
however, precisely because the Other is always more than any one dimension 
that he or she will always appear to me as disruption. The Other will always 
demand (command) that I inhabit not only these four Dimensions but, in fact, 
transcend them and their respective horizons. It is through engaging the Other in 
all dimensions of human experience that I can begin to love the neighbor, myself, 
and God. What became necessary was to become more precise about the 
content of this encounter. We can find some elucidation to this issue in the 
writing of Johann B. Metz and Enrique Dussel.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 BIOGRAPHY AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL LOCI: THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
OF JOHANN B. METZ AND THE LIBERATION THEOLOGY OF ENRIQUE 
DUSSEL 
  
 
The love command is central within Christian ethical discourse. This 
command, however, must constantly be reconfigured for it to become effective 
within each historical period. As we saw, the work of Emmanuel Levinas does an 
admirable job of creating the conditions necessary for all Christians to realize the 
implications of this command within our contemporary milieu. Levinas, however, 
was incapable of moving us towards a more precise understanding of how and 
what this moral demand might entail given current historical conditions. His 
desire to maintain, at all cost, the ultimate otherness of the Other made it 
impossible for the ethical demands made by the Other to have any true 
substance. This was the case because, ultimately, all demands of the Other 
would have to be mediated within a specific socio-historical location. The 
demand of the Other would have to be shaped, in part, by who the Other is (e.g. 
a woman, an indigenous person, a child etc.) and what the needs of that 
community were within that given period.  
To resolve this shortcoming I proposed the concept of human Dimensions. 
This concept allows us to understand that what we and the Other share in 
common is that we experience of life within the parameters of certain 
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dimensions.  We all experience life through the matrices of these dimensions. 
When we speak of the Other we are always speaking of ‘an’ Other within a 
specific dimension. This conceptual framework allowed us to acknowledge some 
element of particularity while also granting a certain transcendent quality to the 
Other precisely because each dimension is itself always understood as only part 
of a larger reality. No person is ever only who they are within the economic 
dimension, cultural dimension etc.  
What was lacking in this concept was a more precise apprehension of 
what was needed to fully encounter the Other within these dimensions, 
particularly the method and content of this encounter. I found some guidance in 
this area from two sources: the political theology of Johann Baptist Metz, and the 
liberation philosophy of Enrique Dussel.  
This chapter will serve as a brief introduction to the political theology of 
Johann B. Metz and the liberation philosophy of Enrique Dussel. It has three 
sections: the first is a general introduction to each author’s overall vision, the 
second introduces some very specific concepts found within their respective 
theology or philosophy, and the final section is a critical appraisal of their work.  
Johann Baptist Metz: The Sacred Subject in Political Theology 
Johann B. Metz is one of the founders of Political Theology.1 Metz himself 
has stated that ‘the itinerary of political theology has been a reflection of my life.’2 
He, like Elizondo and Said, is aware how theology and biography are profoundly 
                                            
1 Johann B. Metz, Faith in History and Society, Trans. J. Matthew Ashley (New York: 
Herder and Herder Book, 2007), 1.  See also Love’s Strategy: The Political Theology of Johann 
Baptist Metz, Ed. John K. Downey 
2 Johann B. Metz, A Passion for God: The Mystical-Political Dimension of Christianity, 
Trans. J. Matthew Ashley, (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 1. 
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intermingled. His theological vision deeply reflects his commitment to the potency 
of particularity, including his particular faith/intellectual journey. This chapter 
focuses on three aspects of his vision: the safeguarding of the subject in modern 
and post-modern discourse, his shift away from what he labels Bourgeois 
Religion, and finally his eschatological vision. While these three aspects are 
interdependent within the political theology of Metz, here I address each 
separately.  
The Endangered Subject in Modern/Post-Modern Discourse 
Metz is a theologian who is deeply concerned with the retrieval and 
importance of the Subject.3 This subject is not the atomized individual within 
most modern and post-modern discourse but rather a profoundly social 
creature.4 His concern for the disappearance of this subject arises from what he 
perceives as a two-pronged assault: the first is the ahistorical existence of the 
modern person, and the second is the dangerous distance which exists between 
the modern subject and the suffering of the world, including the awareness of the 
subject’s own suffering. 
No History, No Humanity  
                                            
3 Johann B. Metz, Love’s Strategy: The Political Theology of Johann Baptist Metz, Ed. 
John K. Downey (Pennsylvania, Trinity Press International, 1999), 83. The essay is entitled 
Between Evolution and Dialectic: The Point of Departure for a Contemporary Fundamental 
Theology, “Any Christianity, then, can be defined, at least in its task and intention, as a defense of 
hope. What is the hope that is in question here? It is the solidarity of hope in the God of the living 
and the dead, who calls all men [sic] to be his [sic] subject. “ 
4 Faith and History, 70. “The history of religion in the Bible is the history of a people, and 
the individuals within it, becoming subjects in the presence of their God. “Subjects” here does not 
mean the isolated, the monad, who subsequently ascertains his or her coexistence with other 
subjects. Solidarisitic-antagonistic and liberative-unsettling experiences with other subjects 
belong to the constitution of the religious subject right from the start, and here the question about 
the relation between the individual subject to other subjects seems rather forced, the product of 
an abstraction after the fact. To talk about “universal solidarity” as a fundamental category of 
political theology does not, therefore, mean the absorption of the individual religious subject; 
rather, it is the way that these subjects exist—before God and through God.”  
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For Metz, the modern person’s subjectivity is threatened by our 
overreliance on technology and concurrent lack of historical consciousness. 
We have already received public notice of the successor to the human 
person, one which is no longer plagued by any memories of suffering or 
catastrophes. Time magazine portrayed it in a recent cover: the robot, a 
quietly functioning machine, an intelligence without memories, without 
pathos, without morality. Is this the future of humanity? Is this the overman 
[Ubermensch], the strong and pitiless one? With its memoria passionis, 
and the understandings of history and times that are operative in it, 
Christian theology struggles against such disappearance of the human 
being, against the decline of the subject and against a widespread 
weariness in history.5 
Metz combats some of this ‘decline of the subject’ by introducing 
categories which battle some of the most powerful features of this new reality; 
this includes, but is not limited to, a renewed emphasis on the importance of 
memory as a theological concept. It is important to note that this robot-individual 
will have little capacity to engage in an authentic encounter precisely because of 
its inability to honor the particular characteristics of the Other.  
An Apathy which leads to Domination 
The second concern which is a threat to the quality of human life is found 
in a growing apathy among all modern persons. These subjects, who inhabit 
insular and distracted lives, are disconnected from all suffering and, ultimately, 
                                            
5 A Passion for God, 41. Found in the essay entitled On the Way to a Postidealist 
Theology.  
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even from death. Metz concludes that this numbing allows for the subject to 
sustain modes of domination that discount the suffering of the Other.  
Only when people themselves remain capable of suffering do they refrain 
from forcing suffering arbitrarily on others, and are able and ready in their 
own way to share in the suffering of others and become active in the 
liberation struggles of the tortured and exploited. The same Nietzsche who 
forces into submission all sufferings afflicting him and cooks them into the 
food of his domineering will becomes the great enemy of compassion 
toward the suffering of others. The culture of the subjugators is one of 
apathy and disconnectedness from others.6 
Because of this concern with how numbing can lead to a culture of 
domination we will see that an essential aspect of political theology will be a 
demand to stay connected to the ‘stories’ of the suffering subjects within history. 
This demand requires that all subjects be in intimate contact with the struggling 
peoples of the world.7 For Metz this demand of being conscious of one’s 
connectedness to all humanity is not principally created by the modern world but 
rather is inherent in the love command itself.  
Bourgeois Religion or Messianic Christianity? 
Metz draws a sharp distinction between what he terms Bourgeois Religion 
and Messianic Christianity.8 Two aspects in Bourgeois Religion which Metz 
                                            
6 Love’s Stategy, 57. Found in an essay entitled Bread of Survival. 
7 Ibid. 8. “We must act and do theology while touching victims.”  
8 Johann B. Metz, The Emergent Church: The Future of Christianity in a Postbourgeois 
World, Trans. Peter Mann (New York: Crossroads Publishing Company, 1981), 1-16. This essay 
is entitled Messianic or Bourgeois Religion?; however, he addresses this issue in much of his 
work. Political theology can be seen as an alternative to what he terms Bourgeois Theology. 
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wishes to combat are its superficial optimism9 and its understanding of faith as 
exclusively or primarily a ‘private matter.’10 For Metz these features, found in 
much contemporary Christianity, threaten to make the Christian faith, and the 
Gospel message, anemic and irrelevant to the modern world.  
Optimism as Cheap Grace 
The optimism found in the bourgeois expression of much contemporary 
Christianity is merely a reaffirmation of the worldview held by the dominant 
groups of the world.11 The superficiality of this ‘faith’ appears disingenuous and 
naïve in light of the profound horrors of history.12 It is precisely the inability to 
critically engage history in all its complexity which makes Christianity, or more 
precisely for Metz, the Bourgeois religion that is currently understood as 
Christianity, culpable in silencing the suffering of the victims in history.13 This 
silencing of the suffering makes its claims of hope superficial and ultimately not 
the authentic hope found in Messianic Discipleship. For Metz, Christianity must 
                                            
9 Ibid. 1. 
10 Ibid. 2. 
11 Ibid. 1. “ When the church in West Germany repeats the messianic sayings regarding 
the reign of God and the future disclosed therein, it is speaking primarily in this case to people 
who already possess a future. They bring their own future, as it were, into the church with them—
the powerful and unshakeably [sic] optimistic to have it religiously endorsed and uplifted, the 
fearful to have it protected and confirmed by religion. In this way, the messianic future frequently 
becomes a ceremonial elevation and transfiguration of a bourgeois future already worked out 
elsewhere and in the face of death the extension of this bourgeois future and ego dominant within 
it into the transcendence of eternity. In the Christianity of our time, the messianic religion of the 
Bible has largely been changed into bourgeois religion.” 
12 A Passion for God, 56. The essay is entitled Theology as Theodicy. “Do we believe in 
God? or do we believe in our beliefs about God and, in so doing, perhaps really believe only in 
ourselves or in what we would like to think about ourselves? Consider, however, a faith that does 
not believe only in itself, but really believes in God…Finally this is true even for a Christian’s faith: 
Whoever hears the message of the resurrection of Christ in such a way that the cry of the 
crucified had become inaudible in it, hears not the Gospel but rather a myth.” 
13 Metz addresses this issue throughout his corpus but a powerful example may be found 
in this essay entitled Christians and Jews after Auschwitz: Being a Meditation Also on the End of 
Bourgeois Religion found in Love Strategy.  
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always exist within the tension that is intrinsic to our waiting for the Kingdom, 
even as we build towards the Kingdom.14 
From Private Theology to Political Theology 
The second feature of Bourgeois Religion that is problematic for Metz is its 
desire to privatize the political dimensions which he believes are intrinsic to the 
Gospel.15 He asserts that much of this shift occurred in the writing of Augustine 
who ‘continues to be extremely significant even when he erred.’16 Metz contends 
that St. Augustine shifted the focus away from the theodicy question and towards 
the soteriological concerns of Jesus’ ministry. In this shift salvation becomes 
defined exclusively as redemption.17 Because of this shift the central concern for 
Christianity became personal salvation rather than engaging the political or public 
understanding of the salvation question.18 He claims that, “The reversal of this 
                                            
14 A Passion for God, 56. The essay is entitled Theology as Theodicy? “There is a hint of 
something unreconciled in Christianity. To banish this would be an expression not of faith, but of 
smallness of faith.” 
15 A clear explanation of how Metz views this issue can be found in Anamnesis as 
Dangerous Memory: Political and Liturgical Theology in Dialogue by Bruce T. Morrill S. J.   
16 A Passion for God, 59. The essay is entitled Theology as Theodicy?  
17 Ibid. 61. “3. Discourse about God, as we know it from the biblical traditions, contains a 
promise: the promise of salvation, paired with the promise of a universal justice that salvificallly 
includes even past suffering. But in Augustine “salvation” now becomes thought of exclusively in 
terms of “redemption,” as redemption from sin and guilt. What has been lost from view is all the 
suffering and histories of suffering which in our everyday experience simply cannot be traced 
back to sin or to a history of guilt and which nonetheless make up the largest part of this world’s 
suffering that cries out to the heavens. The biblical vision of salvation, the promise of salvation 
that is implicit in God’s name (soter) touches not only sin and guilt, but above all deliverance from 
all the situations of suffering in which men and women find themselves. In Augustine the God-
question determined by the hunger and thirst for justice, that is, the eschatological question about 
God’s justice, is replaced by the anthropocentric question about human sin. The theodicy 
question as the eschatological question is silenced.” 
18 Love’s Strategy, 30, In an essay entitled The Church’s Social Function in Light of a 
“Political Theology.”  “Salvation, the object of Christian faith in hope, is not a private salvation. 
The proclamation of this salvation drove Jesus into deadly conflict with the public authorities of 
his day. His cross does not stand in the exclusive privacy of the individual, nor in the sanctuary of 
a purely religious experience, but outside the threshold of sheltered privacy and the screen of the 
purely religious: it stands “outside,” as the theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews formulated it. 
The veil of the Temple has definitely been torn. The scandal and promise of this salvation are 
both equally public. This public aspect cannot be taken back, dissolved, or hushed up. It 
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“privatizing” tendency is the primary critical task of political theology.”19One way 
to reverse this trend is by concerning ourselves with the dangerous memories of 
the innocent suffering of all victims.20This is what Metz terms an ‘open-eyed 
mysticism that obligates us to perceive more acutely the suffering of others.’21 
Metz is emphatic that this concern for the suffering of others is not limited by time 
or space or any human boundary but is inherent in the love command. 
The ‘Eschatological Proviso’: A Demand and Opportunity  
Metz wishes to retrieve the eschatological dimension of the Gospel.22This 
eschatological proviso is important because of its capacity to be a critical 
corrective to two paradigms which dominate our understanding. The first is our 
uncritical evolutionary view of the universe; the second is our tendency to 
absolutize a particular historical construction.  
The End of Time: Promise or Threat? 
Christianity must retrieve the apocalyptic insight that speaks to a God that 
is not only found within time, but also is the Lord of time. In order to achieve this 
new understanding Christians must break free from the current model of viewing 
                                                                                                                                  
accompanies the message of salvation on its way through history. And in serving this message 
the Christian religion has been molded in the critical and liberating form of public responsibility.” 
19 Ibid. 28. 
20 Ed. Kevin F. Burke, and Roberty Lasalle-Klein, Love That Produces Hope: The 
Thought of Ignacio Ellacuria (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2006), 260: “Jesus did not look in the 
first instance on others’ sins, but rather on others’ suffering. In this way Christianity had its 
beginning as a community of memory and narration in following a Jesus whose gaze was 
directed first at others’ suffering. This new sensitivity to others’ suffering was a defining feature of 
Jesus’ “new way of life.”  
21 A Passion for God, 69.  Found in an essay entitled Theology as Theodicy?  
22 Love’s Strategy, 30. Found in an essay entitled The Church’s Social Function in the 
Light of a “Political Theology.”  “Political theology seeks to make contemporary theology once 
again aware of the suit pending between the eschatological message of Jesus and the reality of 
political society.”  
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time exclusively in evolutionary terms.23 The effect of viewing time in this fashion 
is a growing apathy. This creates a subject who inhabits a world which is ‘no 
longer capable of surprising him’24 and, in turn, creates a sense of despair that 
whatever one does will have little impact within history. This freedom from 
carrying the weight of historical responsibility has the unexpected effect of de-
anchoring our sense of reality and leaving us afloat in a sea of temporal 
indifference.25 In having time be eternal it diminishes the importance of our 
action. When time has no end, the provisional quality of our life becomes merely 
a banality of existence. What needs to be retrieved, for Metz, is a more authentic 
understanding of the ‘end times’ or the eschatological vision so pronounced in 
the Biblical tradition. This apocalyptic vision will urge each of us to re-evaluate 
our praxis based on a new level of accountability. This vision, however, in order 
that it not fall under the spell of Bourgeois religion, must be interpreted not 
exclusively as a concern and demand on my individual life and death but also as 
a concern and demand made on our political (in the broadest sense of this term) 
life and death.26  
                                            
23 Love’s Strategy, 51. Found in essay entitled The Second Coming. “In the interval the 
symbols for the understanding of time have changed. The Christian apocalyptic symbol of time 
coming to an abrupt end has been exchanged for the crypto-religious symbol of evolution. That 
has penetrated all of us in its very impenetrability, right to the last glimmer of awareness, to such 
an extent that we hardly notice any longer its irrational sway over us and its quasi-religious 
totality.”  
24 Ibid. 87. Found in an essay entitled Between Evolution and Dialectics.  
25 Love’s Strategy, 154.  Found in an essay entitled The Second Coming. “Surely the idea 
of time as something evolutionary and unending has long since bred in people’s minds a special 
form of resignation that persists long after it has been labeled as “science,” “objectivity,” and 
“pragmatism.” 
26 Ibid. 152-153. “Following Christ on the basis of immanent expectation of the second 
coming averts the danger of an ineffectual state of permanent reflection. The kind of following we 
want does not merely reflect on itself but impels one toward action and forbids any postponement 
of following Christ…Imminent expectation on the second coming repairs hope that has been 
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An Apocalyptic Sting that Inoculates 
The second paradigm which Metz feels needs correcting is the human 
tendency to universalize the particular. In the biblical tradition this may be spoken 
of as the problem of idolatry. By re-asserting the apocalyptic and eschatological 
dimension of the Christian perspective we can affirm the provisional but not 
arbitrary character of our contemporary social arrangement.27 This re-orientation 
allows us to move away from the mystification so prevalent within modern and 
post-modern thought which understands God as existing within time (if it 
acknowledges God’s existence at all) rather than God being the “Lord of all,” 
including time. This insight allows Christians to challenge the hegemonic reading 
of history which seem to be perennially written by the victors and see the world 
through the preferential lens of the victims.28This apocalyptic sting allows us to 
critique the evolutionary understanding and impels us to image a new, and as 
yet, unimagined future, one not completely of our making.29 
                                                                                                                                  
soothed and led astray by ideas of evolution. It offers hope to the perspective of expectation and 
time. It does not paralyze responsibility but gives it a solid foundation.” 
27 Love’s Strategy, 31.  Found in an essay entitled The Church’s Social Function in the 
Light of a “Political Theology.”  “The New Testament community knows that it has been called 
from the beginning to live the promise of the future in the present conditions and thus to 
overcome the world. The orientation toward the promise of peace and justice changes every time 
our historical presence changes. It creates and forces us constantly into a fresh critical and 
liberating position with regard to the existing social environment in which we live. In a somewhat 
similar way, the parables of Jesus are parables that put us into a new critical relationship with the 
world that surrounds us. Therefore, every eschatological theology must become a political 
theology in the sense of a theology of social criticism.” [italics in text] 
28 Ibid. 80. Found in an essay entitled Theology Today: New Crisis and New Visions: 
“The biblical God has always allied himself with those who, according to an endless evolution and 
its pressure of selection, should have no history, no future. This is true from the alliance of God 
with the weak, insignificant tribes of Israel to the alliance of God with the defeated Jesus of 
Nazareth on the cross. I do not see how we can hinder the absorption of history, which is always 
God’s history with us, into a timeless time without reclaiming the apocalyptic dimension of our 
Christian eschatology. This is why I hand on to you the question of an as yet undisclosed, 
suppressed truth in the apocalyptic symbols.”  
29 Bruce T. Morrill, Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory: Political Theology and Liturgical 
Theology in Dialogue, (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 2000), 30. “The definite memory of 
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Political Theology: A Resurrected Hope for All Others 
Metz sees the Subject as being enthralled and ultimately victimized by 
various forces which threaten human dignity. These forces threaten not only the 
oppressed but the oppressor (albeit, in a different manner) and make an 
authentic encounter with the Other more difficult. However, in typical dialectical 
fashion these very same obstacles become conditions which are optimal for such 
an encounter to occur.30   
Enrique Dussel: The Transmodern Other of Liberation Philosophy 
Enrique Dussel is one of the early architects of Latin American liberation 
philosophy. Dussel combines aspects of traditional (read Western/European) 
philosophical contents and concerns but with a unique perspectival and 
methodological turn. Like Said, Elizondo, and Metz, he thus becomes a bridge 
figure that engages our unique pluralistic contemporary world.31 
                                                                                                                                  
suffering, therefore, is dangerous in its capacities both (1) to render a critique of the evolutionary 
world view and (2) to stimulate human imagination for social-political action.” 
30 Faith in History and Society, 213. “It is only today, for instance, when human beings 
are becoming more and more present to each other as humanity—and this not only as an idea 
but in terms of their dependency, neediness, and suffering—that it is becoming possible to see 
the breadth of obligation contained in a statement as seemingly self-evident as the one about the 
equality of all men and women as God’s creatures.” 
31 Enrique Dussel, Thinking from the Underside of History: Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy 
of Liberation, Ed. Linda Martin Alcoff and Eduardo Mendieta, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 2000), 2. “No one has contributed more to the development of Latin American 
philosophy as a critical reflection on modernity and globalization in the last half of the twentieth 
century then the Argentine-born philosopher Enrique Dussel. Dussel’s life has included extensive 
studies of “pure” Western philosophy, political activism, repression and exile from a military 
dictatorship, a turn toward Marxism and liberation theology, and the development of the 
comprehensive articulation of a philosophy of liberation. Dussel has incorporated and arguably 
surpassed the leading critical resources of European philosophy toward this project, including the 
hermeneutic critique of universalism, the critique of totality in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, and 
the discourse of ethics developed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. Dussel insists that 
our primary concern must be nothing less than the ongoing global genocide. An estimated 20 
million persons die each year from starvation and malnutrition perpetrated by the new world order 
of global capitalism. Like many African philosophers and Indian postcolonial cultural critics, 
Dussel is convinced that European thought is an important site at which one might interfere with 
the smooth production of this system. In his philosophy of liberation, Dussel has sought a solution 
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Because of the breadth of Dussel’s work we will focus on only three 
aspects of his project: the Subject as possessing inherent dignity, the Subject as 
existing within a communal ontology, and finally the Subject as Other in relation 
to all Totalities.  
Atheism as Protection of the Subject 
For Dussel, the dignity and worth of the human person is intrinsic to the 
creaturely character of the person and exists prior to any outside 
acknowledgement or recognition of this fact.32  This dignity will be in constant 
tension with all the systems which try to subsume the dignity into its own totality. 
An aspect of all liberation theologies, philosophies, and ethics will be to combat 
this ever-present threat. This is done primarily through not allowing any system to 
become totalizing in relation to the Subject, or the Other. Dussel begins by 
asserting that any system can move into this Totalizing category. He speaks of a 
system becoming ‘fetishized’ and this leading to the system becoming self-
referential.33 This will require that we be atheistic ‘vis-à-vis all Totalities or 
                                                                                                                                  
to the totalitarian thought of oppression through a recourse to what is excluded: the perspective, 
and the labor, of its victim. What emerges very clearly from this approach is that liberation must 
be a pluri-topic not mono-topic, and that it will be culturally local. Dussel calls such an approach, 
which revises universality by combining recognition of irreducible difference, a “diversality.” 
32 Enrique Dussel, Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism and Liberation Theology, 
Ed. Eduardo Mendieta (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003), 207. “Man [sic] 
possesses “dignity” intrinsically, through being a human person; there is nothing in all creation 
more dignified then the human person.” 
33 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, Trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine 
Morkovsky (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1985), 95-96. “In this section our discourse 
reaches its end and confronts itself with the phenomenon of fetishism. I call “fetishization” the 
process by which a totality is made absolute, closed, divinized. Politically totality is fetishized 
when it takes over within imperialism (3.1.5) or nationalistic totalitarianism (3.1.1.). Erotic totality 
is fetishized when it succumbs to fascination with the perverse phallus of macho ideology 
(3.2.5.6.). Cultural totality is fetishized when oligarchical ideology alienates popular culture 
(3.3.6.) or castrates the son (3.3.5.). Fetishism is the death of totality, of the system, of 
discourse…Atheism vis-à-vis the present system is a prerequisite for innovative, procreative, 
liberative praxis.”  
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systems. This atheism however is not the atheism that denies a transcendent 
Other but rather one that seeks to relativize all systems in relation to this 
transcendent Other.34 
This vision of the primacy of human dignity over any system put forth by 
Dussel could, in our modern hyper-individualistic milieu, be interpreted as an 
affirmation of a more traditional libertarian position where individual freedoms 
trump all else. This, however, would be an incorrect understanding of his position 
precisely because of Dussel’s anthropology. For Dussel the human person is 
constitutively social. All humans are created within the warp and woof of 
community.  
The Communal Face of the Other  
The Subject which is confronting us, for Dussel, is therefore not primarily 
the atomized, self-enclosed specimen of humanity we are so used to envisioning 
in modern (and post-modern) ethics, but rather is always already found within a 
web of relationships. The face of the Other is never merely one face but always 
the face of a community.35 This demand of seeing the Other as ontologically 
communal in character is especially important given that a significant feature of 
much theological, philosophical, and ethical discourse is predicated on the 
                                            
34 Ibid. 99. “Pure atheism, without affirmation of the infinite Other, is not sufficiently 
critical; it permits the fetishization of a future system. Only if it is affirmed that the divine is other 
than all possible systems will liberating revolution be possible. Hence disbelief in the fetish—
atheism—must be affirmed as the exteriority of the absolute and of the Origin.” 
35 Enrique Dussel, Metodo para una filosofia de la liberacion: Superacion analectica de la 
dialectica hegeliana, (Salamanca: Sigueme, 1974), 182 “The Other is never only <<one alone>> 
but rather, also and always, <<a we>>. Each image in the face to face is equally an epiphany of a 
family, a class, a people, an epoch of humanity, and of humanity as a whole, and, even more so, 
the Absolute Other.” [author’s translation] 
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individual Subject. This has inadvertently but systematically made invisible the 
collective Other. 
The face of the other, primarily as poor and oppressed, reveals a people 
before it reveals an individual person. The brown face of the Latin 
American mestizo wrinkled with the furrows of centuries of work, the 
ebony of the African slave, the olive face of the Hindu, the yellow face of 
the Chinese coolies is the irruption of the history of a people before it is 
the biography of Tupac Amaru, Lumumba, Nehru, and Mao Tse-Tung. To 
describe the experience proximity as individual experiences, or the 
metaphysical experience of face-to-face as lived experience between two 
persons, is simply to forget that personal mystery is always risked in the 
exteriority of the popular history of a people (3.1.3-4). The individualization 
of this collective personal experience is a European deformation derived 
from the bourgeois revolution. Each face, unique, inscrutable mystery of 
decisions not yet made, is the face of a sex, a generation, a social class, a 
nation, a cultural group, a historical epoch.36 
We can no longer speak of ontology exclusively as an individual quality 
which must be guarded, developed, protected, etc. but rather we must 
acknowledge a collective ontology in our encounter with the Other. This collective 
or social aspect of human dignity is, in a sense, more foundational to our 
                                            
36 Philosophy of Liberation, 44. 
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humanity then an abstracted, individual, and ahistorical dignity.37 It is this 
communal dignity which we must protect. 
The Human Subject as Trans-Totality: Beyond Instrumental Reasoning 
Given the emphasis that Dussel gives to the communal or collective 
aspect of the subject, how can we ensure that the unique particularity of an 
individual is not subsumed under a collective identity?  What precludes this 
genuine danger from ever being fully realized is Dussel’s insistence that any 
individual person also always exists beyond all systems and their instrumental 
logic or reasoning.38 This understanding of the person as always ‘more than’ any 
Totality or Collective identity helps create a corrective to dismissing the ineffable 
quality of the individual person. It would be impossible to have someone become 
exclusively something (e.g. a mestizo, an African slave, a Hindu etc.). It is in this 
fashion that Dussel becomes equally critical of the fetishizing of a group 
identity.39 
 
                                            
37 Enrique Dussel, Ethics and Community, Theology and Liberation Series, Trans. Robert 
R. Barr, (New York: Orbis Books, 1988). “But our “being” is more than our materiality, our 
corporeality, despite what some have thought. Our most radical being is our social being, our 
“being” in virtue of our being human (and not merely animal). The place we occupy in the social 
texture (see 2.4) determines (although not absolutely) our being…In authentic community, 
genuine individuality is fully actualized. In anticommunist, individuality is fetishized and ultimately 
destroys itself, by way of the death of the poor. It is this death that is now of interest to us.” He 
also speaks to this issue in Philosophy of Liberation, chapter 2, entitled From Phenomenology to 
Liberation. 
38 Philosophy of Liberation, 40. “The face of a person is revealed as other when it is 
extracted from our system of instruments as exterior, as someone, as a freedom that questions, 
provokes, and appears, as one who resists instrumental totalization. A person is not something, 
but someone.” [italics added] 
39 Michael Barber, Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of 
Libertation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 119. “Abundant textual evidence exists 
that Dussel believes that every culture, including the former Inca and Aztec empires, is prone to a 
mistaken self-absolutization. Moreover, he repeatedly admits that “the people” are not free from 
inauthenticity, voices infrequent misgivings about popular religiosity, observes that the oppressed 
have often introjected the oppression they received, and refrains from any uncritical endorsement 
of populist spontaneity.” 
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From Problems towards Solutions  
The Theology of Johann B. Metz and the Philosophy of Enrique Dussel  
It is clear that both of these intellectuals show deep concern for justice and 
the human subject within a pluralistic and complex world. They also share deep 
concerns for engaging the Other. The next section demonstrates how they 
respond to these concerns. This section has two sub-sections; the first 
introduces the Political Theology of Johann B. Metz, the second the liberation 
philosophy of Enrique Dussel.  
The Interrupting Categories of Johann B. Metz 
Political Theology is a term given to the theology which was created by 
many European theologians including Johann B. Metz, Jürgen Moltmann, and 
Dorothee Sölle. Given the incredible variety found under the banner of Political 
Theology, this project will only focus on the work of Johann B. Metz and even 
more particularly on two aspects of his work: his categories, and his 
understanding of religion as interruption.  
One cannot understand the political theology of Metz without becoming 
conversant with his Categories. The Categories of Memory, Narrative, and 
Solidarity function as the building blocks from which he creates the edifice which 
is his theology. Each category, while wholly distinct, is nonetheless deeply 
connected to the other categories.40 
                                            
40 Faith in History and Society, 167. “The Categories that are treated in the following part 
(their characterization as “categories” is meant in a very broad sense) stand in an inner 
relationship to one another. Only together are memory, narrative, and solidarity the basic 
categories for a practical fundamental theology. Memory and narrative do not have their practical 
character without solidarity, and solidarity does not attain its specifically cognitive import without 
memory and narrative.”  
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Memory: 
For Metz, there was much talk within contemporary theology of the human 
person as an historical subject. However, this never translated into theology 
immersing itself concretely in the historical events of its time.41 One of the major 
impetuses for creating political theology was to counteract this ahistorical 
element of much theological discourse. Metz’s phrase after Auschwitz captures 
this desire to resist vacuous talk of the human person as historical subject 
without engaging in historical particularity.42 Yet this appreciation for history and 
memory is not neutral. Metz is clear that this ongoing struggle for remembrance 
will be a battle between the memory of the victors and the memory of the 
vanquished.43 
The remedy for this ongoing desire for the victors to ‘forget the past’ or 
remember it in some idealized form is to grant a particular epistemological 
privilege to certain memories. These are the powerfully dangerous memories of 
                                            
41 A Passion for God, 39. Found in an essay entitled On the Way to a Postidealist 
Theology. “Because of the way Auschwitz showed up—or did not show up—in theology, it 
became (slowly) clear to me how high the apathy content in theological idealism is, how 
incapable it is of taking on historical experiences—despite, or even because of, all its talk about 
history and historicity.”  
42 A Passion for God, 25. Found in an essay entitled The New Political Theology. “Late 
(too late?) the new political theology became conscious of the fact that it is a theology after 
Auschwitz, that this catastrophe belongs to the inner situation of Christian discourse about God. 
In no way does this mean that Auschwitz should be stylized as a negative myth. Just the 
opposite! To be true to the situation, after Auschwitz means nothing other than this: finally to 
accept the fact that concrete history, and the theological experience of nonidentity connected with 
it, have broken into theology’s logos. Confronted with Auschwitz theology, theology itself—as 
discourse about God—cannot maintain its historical innocence: neither by the division of labor 
whereby the theme is diverted into Church history, nor by the usual talk of human historicity (as a 
sort of anthropological constant) that, because abstract, is impervious to experiences of confusion 
or bewilderment; nor, finally, by a faceless universalism of history, seemingly devoid of human 
beings, by a kind of idealism of history endowed with a considerable amount of apathy when it 
comes to the misfortune of the other or to  historical catastrophe or ruin.” [italics in text] 
43 Faith in History and Society, 171. “It is a memorative solidarity with the dead and the 
vanquished, which breaks the spell of history as a history of victors—be it evolutionary or 
dialectically.”  
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suffering. These memories which are ceded a unique authority are not merely the 
blanket suffering of an abstract humanity.44 They are the dangerous memories of 
the suffering of the Other caused by those in power. This is, in part, what makes 
them dangerous. They function to subvert all dominant discourses.45  
This struggle for remembrance has a profoundly ethical edge precisely 
because it is in retrieving and safeguarding these dangerous memories that our 
human subjectivity is maintained.46This element is decisive in speaking to the 
authority of all theological and ethical claims47 and helps explain why the 
category of Memory is so central to political theology.  
Narrative: 
                                            
44 Ibid. 110. “A second explanatory point has to do with a more precise determination of 
what is understood here in the concrete under the title of “suffering.” Is it not very dangerous to 
talk about “suffering in general”? Does not thereby the “memory of suffering” lose its critical, 
above all also its social-critical and political power? Is not suffering then completely privatized and 
internalized? Does not everyone suffer in one way or another? Where can we find the criteria, the 
starting points for a critical consciousness, especially in the interest of the oppressed and their 
suffering? Without them does not social and political engagement end up in that boring, 
indeterminate gray on gray that for the most part is the image that Christianity and the church 
present to the world today? And is it not true that this all boils down to a consolation that finally 
consoles no one, since it supposedly consoles everyone in the same way?”  
45 Ibid. 112. “It becomes apparent in light of the Christian memory of suffering, however, 
that social power and political dominion ought not simply to be accepted, but rather they have to 
continually justify themselves anew in the face of concrete suffering. The social and political 
power of the rich and the rulers must always allow the question to be posed to it concerning the 
extent to which it itself is causing suffering. It cannot dispense itself from giving an account of this 
by appealing to the suffering that the rich and the powerful themselves experience. This critical 
question of power and wealth belongs precisely to the consolation which the Gospel offers to the 
rich and the powerful. Thus, the memory of suffering, in its Christian sense, does not evade the 
issue in the gray areas of what is left to social and political discretion; rather it sharpens a social 
and political conscience in the interest of the suffering of others. It prevents the privatization and 
internalization of suffering and the flattening of its social dimension. The history of suffering and 
the social history of oppression are certainly not simply identical in this memory of suffering, but 
neither can they be separated in the concrete.”  
46 Ibid. 172.  “In connection with this, “remembering” ends up being fundamental for the 
theological understanding of how men and women are subjects: “remembering” as a category for 
salvaging identity.”  
47 A Passion for God, 134. Found in an essay entitled Theology and The University. “In 
my view there is one authority recognized by all great cultures and religions: the authority of those 
who suffer. Respecting the suffering of strangers is a precondition for every culture; articulating 
other’s suffering is the presupposition of all claims to truth. Even those by theology…The sole 
content of its universability is this: There is no suffering in the world that does not concern us.”  
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For Metz, the desire to recover narrative structure as an authentic mode of 
theological discourse finds its impetus on two fronts; the first is based on a wish 
to de-link the connection made between theology and the epistemological 
presuppositions which are a carry-over from the Enlightenment; the second is a 
desire to move away from understanding all theological discourse, including 
theological ethics, as an activity which can be conducted only by elites or 
experts.   
Metz asserts that Christianity betrayed one of its most authentic sources 
of authority when it allowed the technological, scientific, logic of the 
Enlightenment to dictate the terms of discourse by which truth is communicated, 
and measured. This allowed for a particular species of truth to be categorized as 
the only credible definition of truth. This paradigm shift allowed a narrow criterion 
for what constitutes all legitimate mode of knowledge to dominate.48 In fully 
grasping what Metz desires it is important to realize that Metz is not defending an 
uncritical acceptance of all types of narratives. His desire for a renewal of the 
place of narrative within theological discourse is not a parochial or provincial anti-
intellectualism.49 He makes a clear distinction between stories which only 
                                            
48 Faith in History and Society, 203. “The question about the scientific character of 
theology also has to be posed anew in a theology that bases itself on life histories. What we have 
to bear in mind here is that the most important achievements in the history of theology and the 
church have always arisen from a scientifically “impure” theology, in which biography, 
imagination, accumulated experiences, conversions, visions, and prayers are woven inextricably 
together in a “system.” Even today theology is not simply for professors; it is not identical with 
academic theology. All the more reason then for a biographical theology not to let itself be forced 
into the mold of some exact and regulated scientific language. The lived conviction and learned 
experience of faith cannot be adequately justified by metalogical rules and analytical modes of 
argument. This is also why it cannot let itself be made unconditionally subject to the vocabulary of 
exactness. Theology is not a natural science of the divine.” 
49 Ibid. 193. “As a consequence, the emphasis on narrative that I am looking for here has 
to be defended especially against the misunderstsanding that it would give a new legitimation to 
the usual “storytellers” in the pulpit, and the catechesis class for telling anecdotes, when what is 
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disguise or falsely ameliorate oppression and those dangerous stories which are, 
and lead to, a liberative praxis. 50 
Solidarity: 
Solidarity must first be understood as a category which demands an 
ethical position of concern for the Other.51It is the enacting and embodying of the 
mission of the church in its most lucid manner. 52Furthermore this helps 
guarantee that Christianity will not devolve into a bourgeois Religion which, as 
stated above, is imbued with a disingenuous spirit of triumph over historical 
suffering. Solidarity does not take away our faith or hope in the Resurrection; 
instead, it is our faith in the Resurrection that allows us to engage in acts of 
solidarity within historical struggles for the defense of the dignity and subjectivity 
of the human person.53 We are conscious that a faith in the Resurrection of the 
Lord and all its implications does not allow us to be merely ‘spectators’ as these 
                                                                                                                                  
really demanded of them is to provide arguments. There is a time for telling stories and a time for 
providing arguments! Apparently this distinction too is one that still has to be learned and taken 
seriously.” 
50 Ibid. 193. “There are, to be sure, stories that pacify and soothe (like for example, telling 
jokes in a dictatorship). But there are also stories that are “clued in” that harbor a sense of 
freedom and move toward “discipleship.” These are the kind of stories that the immature 
(Unmundigen) tell, but also the wise, who “have eaten a second time from the tree of knowledge” 
(Kleist). The “little ones” tell them, as well as the oppressed: stories that do anything but mislead 
one into celebrating one’s oppression and immaturity. That is to say, they are dangerous stories, 
stories in search of freedom.”  
51 Ibid. 208. “As a category in a practical fundamental theology, solidarity is a category of 
assistance, of supporting and encouraging the subject in the face of that which threatens him or 
her most acutely and in the face of his or her suffering.” 
52 Ibid. 208. “Like memory and narrative, it [Solidarity] belongs among the fundamental 
determinants of a theology and a church that want to bring their liberating and redemptive power 
to bear within human history of suffering, not over people’s heads and not detouring around their 
painful sense of nonidentity.” 
53 A Passion for God, 41. Found in an essay entitled On the Way to a Postidealist 
Theology. “It is precisely because Christians believe in an eschatological meaning for history that 
they can risk historical consciousness: looking into the abyss. Precisely because of this, they can 
risk a memory that recall not the successful but the ruined, not only that which has been realized 
but that which has been lost, a memory that in this way—as dangerous memory—resists 
identifying meaning and truth with the victory of what has come into being and continues to exist” 
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struggles occur within history but rather impels us to engage with, and in, 
history.54  
The category of Solidarity requires engagement with historical struggles 
for justice as an extension of the love command. Solidarity also resists the 
aforementioned tendency to privatize the Gospel demand and make it a purely 
interior experience.55 It seeks to move away from understanding human 
experience only through the lens of exchange and barter and requires a 
‘commitment, without counting the cost, to shattered lives.’56 Finally, this 
category of Solidarity has, for Metz, an inherent trans-temporal quality. It allows 
us to speak of being in Solidarity with all those marginalized subjects in our 
contemporary world but to extend this deep compassion for those that have been 
silenced within the larger historical narrative.57 This also disallows a purely 
‘materialist’ reading of historical suffering by giving a certain gravitas to the 
suffering which was experienced by subjects who can no longer impact social-
political conditions.  
While the three categories of Metz hold a unique authority within his 
corpus, he also uses the term Interruption as a key element in his theology. One 
way he uses this term is as a heuristic device to help illuminate the manner in 
which theology and religion should be held within public/political discourse. 
                                            
54 Ibid. 208. “The fact that Christians believe that the pain of death and guilt have been 
overcome in Christ in no way absolves them from the commitment to overcome the pain of 
oppression and injustice, in solidarity with those who are not yet able, or no longer able, to be 
subjects.”  
55 Ibid. 67. “Fighting against the radical interiorization and privatization of these pathic 
ways of expressing social praxis is integral to virtually every topic in this book.”  
56 Ibid. 209.  
57 Ibid. 67. “Solidarity is not least among these structures: a solidarity that is an openness 
to past suffering; a solidarity, thus that “looks backward”; a solidarity with the dead and 
vanquished.”  
  
 
113 
Messianic Discipleship as Interruption 
So for Metz the concept of Interruption is both a heuristic device and a 
methodological construct. In both cases Interruption is one manner in which the 
Categories are embodied and applied.58 Throughout his writings he seems to use 
this concept to speak both of theology and religion.59 Theology, by introducing a 
conceptual category, seeks to de-absolutize all humanly constructed discourses. 
Because of this conceptual category, which he refers to as ‘the idea of God,’ any 
pre-existing Totality will experience theological insights as interruptive.60   
This understanding of theology or religion being interruptive has 
implications for all areas of our existence. He notes how this insight demands 
that we create an alternative view of history and subjectivity which challenges all 
dominant discourses.61 Practicing this alternative requires an ongoing metanoia 
for ourselves and the society in which we live.62 The position requires that we 
                                            
58 Ibid. 62. “Metanoia, conversion, and exodus are not just purely moral or pedagogical 
categories; rather they are thoroughly noetic. Therefore, stories of conversion and of exodus do 
not serve as dramatic window dressing for a preformulated “pure” theology. Rather, they belong 
to the fundamental way theology itself operates. This practical structure of the idea of God also 
explains why it is that memory and narrative are not just subsequent additions or ornaments to 
talk about God. On the contrary, talk about God has an essential and inalienable memorative and 
narrative structure.”  
59 Ibid. 158. “The shortest definition of religion: interruption.” 
60 Ibid. 62. “The idea of God is itself a practical idea. God simply cannot be thought 
without this idea irritating and disrupting the immediate interests of the one who is trying to think 
it. Thinking-God happens as a revision of those interests and needs that are directly organized 
around one ’s self.”  
61 Ibid. 107. “In addition, a kind of Darwinism rules the domain of history. Thus, it would 
be of great importance to narrate a kind of anti-history based on the memory of suffering. This 
would be a way of understanding history in which we would also always be thinking about the 
alternatives that have been defeated and destroyed, a history ex memoria passionis as a history 
of the vanquished.” 
62 Ibid. 107. “For the truth of the passion of Jesus and of humankind’s history of suffering 
that is remembered under the name “God” can only be thought in such a way that the goals and 
intentions of the one who is trying to think it do not come away unscathed. The eschatological 
truth of the memoria passionis certainly cannot be derived from the historical, social, and 
psychological forces of any given time. This is really what makes it a liberating truth. But this is 
also what makes it something constitutively foreign within the prevailing cognitive structures.” 
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highlight two aspects of all ethical discourse; the first is that we must have an 
ongoing interrogation of the authority of all moral claims; the second will be the 
acceptance of a certain element of improvisational, but not arbitrary aspect to 
ethical claims. When speaking from within a theological centered ethical 
perspective we must question how much of any moral systems authority is 
derived merely from the ‘cognitive structures’ of the ruling elite of that society. We 
must recognize how all human ethics is contextual and particular to its socio-
historical limits. This does not mean we accept an indiscriminate relativism but 
rather that we apprehend the full depth of the Interrupted life which is called forth 
by the demands of the Gospel.  
 
Enrique Dussel: The Sacred Other in Liberation Philosophy  
Enrique Dussel is one of the original architects of what has been labeled 
Liberation Philosophy. Because of his prolific writing and his ability to traverse 
many disciplines (history, theology, philosophy, post-colonialist theory etc.) it will 
be necessary in this work to focus our discussion on a mere fraction of Dussel’s 
corpus. We will focus on three aspects of his philosophy: his Anadialectical 
method,63 his critique of modernity and postmodernity which is captured in the 
term Transmodernity, and finally his vision of the Other. Like Metz, he attempts to 
create a cohesive and coherent philosophy which has deep implications and 
application for our contemporary setting.  
The Analectical Outlook: Beyond the Dialectic 
                                            
63 As I will note early on, Dussel uses both Analectical and Anadialectical in describing 
his method. I will also use the terms interchangeably. In citing specific quotes from various 
sources I will be consistent with the wishes of the authors.  
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Dussel’s method is grounded in a deep appreciation for, but critical break 
with, the Western philosophical method of the dialectic.64 What he sees within 
the traditional dialectical method is a circumscribed, binary mode of 
conceptualizing the world, a mode which, inadvertently, excludes the Other. The 
dialectic method precludes seeing the full autonomy of the Other precisely 
because all alterity is subsumed under a pre-constructed Totality.65  
This inability to fully see the Other is, for Dussel, the central sin of all 
Western philosophical and theological thought. It was the philosophical and 
theological justification that allowed for the wanton destruction of all 
manifestations of the Other. 
Historically and actually this sin since the fifteenth century has taken the 
form of a “no” on the part of the North Atlantic centre to the Indian, the 
African, the Asian and to the worker, the peasant, and the outcast. It has 
been a “no” to the woman in patriarchal families, and a “no” to the child in 
the oppressor’s educational system.66 
This sin allows for the ultimate sin of idolatry to poison all subsequent 
interactions between the “I” of Western philosophical and theological discourses 
and the Other.67 It does this precisely because, in the negation of the Other, we 
                                            
64 Enrique Dussel, Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism, and Liberation 
Theology, Ed. Eduardo Mendieta, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher Inc., 2003), 5. 
65 Ibid. 5. 
66 Ibid. 26.  
67 Ibid. 26. “Sin, beginning as a “no” to my neighbour, [sic] takes the form of self-
deification, the exalting of self as an object of worship and leads to idolatry—“no” to the 
Creator…The most serious effect is that the other or the neighbour [sic] (the Indian, the African, 
the Asian, or the woman) is reduced to the level of an idea. The meaning of the other is 
formulated in terms of the “I” who dreamed it into existence. The other is made a separate entity, 
becomes a thing, is abstracted into a cogitatum.” It is important to note that this is one place 
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experience the world as merely a reflection of our own ontological horizon. We 
make the world, including the Other and his or her world, in our image. Dussel’s 
solution to the inherent violence created by the dialectical method is to introduce 
that which is beyond (ana) the dialectic; the anadialectical method’s point of 
origin does not begin with the traditional “I” but rather with the Other.68 It is 
especially important to recall here that the other is not merely an other “I” but 
rather is also a people or community.69 This aspect is all the more urgent 
because of the way in which traditional ontological discourse has been seen 
through the prism of the Western conception of the autonomous, monadic, and 
individual subject. The anadialectical method avoids this totalizing element by 
locating authority and ontological authenticity outside of the system’s purview.70 
                                                                                                                                  
where Dussel makes some explicit connection between the Other and the Neighbor as well as 
the immanent other and the transcendent Other. 
68 Ibid. 142. “The ethics of liberation, in contrast, starts from the affirmation of the real, 
existing, historical other. We have called this trans-ontological (metaphysical) positive element of 
the impetus, the active starting point of the negation of the negation, the analectical element. The 
Greek prefix ana- is meant to indicate a “going beyond” the ontological horizon (the system, the 
“flesh”). This logos (ana-logos), a discourse which has its origins in the transcendence of the 
system, contains the originality of the Hebrew-Christian experience. If “in the beginning God 
created” (Gen 1:1), it is because the Other is prior to the very principles of the cosmos, the 
system, the “flesh.” The metaphysical priority of the other (who creates, reveals himself or herself) 
also has historical, political and erotic elements. The poor, the oppressed class, the nation, on the 
periphery, the woman treated as a sexual object, have reality “beyond” the limits of the system 
which alienates, represses, and dehumanizes them.”   
69 See footnote 65 in chapter one. 
70 Philosophy of Liberation, 44-45.  “The other is the exteriority of all totality because the 
other is free. I do not mean freedom here as just a certain possibility of choosing between diverse 
mediations depending on a given project. Freedom here is the unconditioning of the other with 
respect to the world in which I am always the center. Others as other—that is, as centers of their 
own worlds (though they be dominated or oppressed)—can point out what is impossible, 
unexpected, unpublicized, in my world, in the system. All persons, insofar as they are free, and 
insofar as they take part in a system, are functional, professional, or members of a certain 
structure—but they are not other. Others are other insofar as they are exterior to the totality (and 
in this sense they are suppliant human faces—persons). Without exteriority there is neither 
freedom nor personhood. The fact of freedom, of free choice, is discovered only in the 
unconditioning of the other’s behavior.”  
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The Five Moments of the Anadialectic:71 
The Anadialectical method is Dussel’s conceptual framework for realizing 
and understanding the encounter between the Totalities and the Other.72 This 
method consists of five moments: (1) originating in the quotidian (2) the entities 
involved in the encounter as having autonomous, ontological legitimacy, (3) the 
analectic as such, (4) the ethical self-revelation of the Other, and finally (5) an 
ethical praxis which is made manifest in service in justice.73 Each of these 
moments allows for our ethical capacities to be configured in a manner which 
disallows the hegemonic tendencies found in most Totalities to have sway. This 
quality also demands that the analectical method is always an open-ended 
process that requires constant re-evaluation.  
The First Moment: Originating in the Quotidian. The first moment within 
the anadialectical method holds a sustained tension between two poles: that of 
the quotidian existence of the human experience, and a more critical 
consciousness which allows a certain hermeneutical distance from this everyday 
existence.74 We begin with the ‘common sense’ of everyday life, in the most 
literal meaning of this phrase; sensory reality which is held in common, while also 
acknowledging the ethical demand that we extricate ourselves from its totalizing 
horizon. We are always a part of the everyday but also apart from everyday 
reality.  This gap engenders a crisis of consciousness which requires a critical 
                                            
71 Much of the following information will be gleaned from many sources including Roberto 
Goizueta’s Liberation, Method and Dialogue and Enrique Dussel’s Metodo para una Filosofia de 
Liberacion, and Philosophy of Liberation. 
72 Liberation, Method and Dialogue, 69. 
73 Ibid. 69. 
74 Ibid. 69. 
  
 
118 
evaluation on our quotidian existence and a concurrent response.75  This 
separation is an a priori precondition to all authentic encounters.76 
The Second Moment: The Re-Configured “I”. The second moment 
requires that the subject re-examine his ontological certitude in light of this new 
experience. The second moment becomes a corrective by disengaging ourselves 
from traditional ontology which will tend to inhabit a disembodied, ahistorical, and 
immaterial world. It will challenge us to view our Beingness as already and 
always existing within a ‘being-in-the-world.’77 This moment is essential because 
it begins to cipher the ‘cognitive structures’ of modernity which allows for the 
illusion of subjectivity to exist within an ahistorical and amoral world. It is a re-
affirmation of the ethics before ontology position articulated by Levinas.  
The Third Moment: The Other which is not of our World. The third moment 
is one in which our ‘being-in-the-world’ becomes challenged by an entity that 
cannot be mediated by any of our cognitive structures. It is the distinct Other. 
According to Dussel, traces of this understanding of the Other can be found in 
                                            
75  Ibid. 69. “Consequently, this first moment already involves a dialectical critique of the 
everyday-as-given and, hence, a movement towards the ontological horizon. This distanciation 
from the everyday represents an existential crisis in which one “dies to the obvious and 
ingenuous manner of living in the world.”  
76 Introduccion a una Filosofia de la Liberacion LatinoAmericana, 118. “While someone 
inhabits a quotidian existence one is not “separated” and does not have any other criteria and 
makes no judgment. What changes in the separation is a movement which allows one to, from a 
‘transcendent’ place; a different horizon to return to the quotidian and pass judgment on it. This 
crisis of which we speak is an existential crisis in that it is a crisis of everyday existence, a life 
crisis for the person who experiences it as a rupture in their lives. No one can truly be said to 
‘think’ without first being “con-verted’ away from the quotidian mode of ‘thinking’ which will signify 
suffering, and a rupturing of many habits, a ‘con-version’; a new life” [all translations are the 
author’s]. 
77 Ibid. 124. “The first correction: The modern understanding which begins with the “I 
Think” is opposed by the assertion that one is first an “I-in-the-World.” The “thinking” is grounded 
in a previous reality. The second correction: The “I” who thinks is second, in respect to the 
concrete “I”; the concrete, existencial “I” is the “I” in the world; the I which is ‘thinking’ and 
reflecting is an I which must return to the everyday of this world.”  
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the writings of both Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Soren Kierkegaard78 
However, for Dussel the most cogent expression and understanding of the true 
distinction and uniqueness of the Other is found in the writing of Emmanuel 
Levinas. He is, however, critical of how Levinas conceptualizes this Other.79This 
third moment is the true moment of ‘ana’ (beyond) for Dussel. The Other is that 
which is ‘beyond’ all of our Totalities. It shares the transcendent qualities of the 
Levinasian Other but with the caveat of always having some explicit 
particularities.80 
The Fourth Moment: Distinction Negates Extinction. In the fourth moment 
the distinct and autonomous existence of the Other destabilizes and de-centers 
all our ontological categories. The distinction principle states that no matter how 
intimate is our encounter with the Other there is always an element of autonomy 
in relation to ourselves and the Other. It is clearly a moment of encounter; 
however, in it we are always conscious of the complete exteriority of this Other. It 
is in recognizing and acknowledging this other-centered world that we begin to 
touch our personhood.81 Prior to this moment in the anadialectical method there 
is some risk that the Totality can subsume the otherness of the Other. This would 
be an act of violence in that it would disregard the transcendent dignity of the 
Other. In this moment the Totality, in faith, gives over himself or herself to 
recognizing the Other qua Other.82 It is in this moment of epiphany of the Other 
                                            
78 Ibid. 128-129.  
79 Ibid. 129-130. 
80 Ibid. 129. 
81 Philosophy of Liberation, 112.  “It is openness to the other, to other-directedness, that 
enables a person to be a person, to be substantively properly so called.” 
82 Ibid. 41. “Among the real things that retain exteriority to Being is found that has a 
history, a biography, freedom: another person (4.1.5.5). Persons beyond Being, beyond the 
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that we are most fully awakened from our ontological slumber and set free. 
Paradoxically, we are freed by the Other, rather than us granting freedom to the 
Other.  
Fifth Moment: The Distinct Prophet. The final moment occurs when this 
newly awakened subject is able to inhabit a place of sustained tension. He or 
She is conscious that they are not the Other, and yet he or she can no longer 
inhabit their previously held Totality. From this liminal space he can render the 
last moment  “in the dialectical method: anadialectical praxis, or “service in 
justice.”83 This service in justice requires that the subject begin an ongoing 
apprenticeship of sorts in how to relate to the Other. The Other is seen as distinct 
but analogously similar.84 Through this process of ongoing conversion and 
apprenticeship85 the subject takes upon himself or herself the task of ‘destroying 
the obstacles which impede the revelation of the other.’86 This ongoing 
recognition of distinction and connection makes the embodied acts of solidarity 
truly authentic. This newly configured subject, who is part of the struggle for 
justice (for the Other), Dussel terms the Prophet.  
The Anadialectical method allows us a process by which we can begin to 
engage the Other in a manner which is respectful of distinction but also 
acknowledges the commonality of experience between ourselves and the Other. 
                                                                                                                                  
comprehension of the world, beyond the sense constituted by interpretations supplied by one’s 
own system, transcending the determinations and conditions of one’s totality, can reveal 
themselves as opposition to us, can rebuke us. Even in the extreme humiliation of a prison, in the 
cold of the cell and the total pain of torture, even when the body is nothing but a quiver wound, a 
person can still cry: “I am another; I am a person; I have rights.”  
83 Liberation, Method, and Dialogue, 72. 
84 Metodo, 195.  
85 The term which is most often used by Dussel is Discipleship. 
86 Metodo, 195. 
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This is central to any possibility of an authentic ethical encounter. This is so 
because it honors both aspects of our current milieu: the potency of particularity 
and our globalized interdependence.  
The Transmodern Perspective:  Beyond Modernity and Post-Modernity 
While Dussel has deep admiration and respect for and interest in the 
projects of both Modernity and Post-Modernity, he holds that there are significant 
lacunae in both of these paradigms. For him, the central flaw can be found in an 
unconscious acceptance of certain assumptions held by both positions.87 The 
trans-modern perspective allows us to take a world-systems perspective88 toward 
historical events. This includes looking at moral discourse from within this 
perspective.89This vision allows us to navigate between the Scylla of naïve 
modern inauthentic universalism which does not honor the potency of 
particularity and the Charybdis of cynical postmodernism which disregards all 
commonality and leaves all communities in a balkanized and fragmented state. 
Dussel asserts that all ethical discourse, whether philosophical or theological, 
                                            
87 The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of 
Liberation, xxii: “Interestingly, while Dussel himself already in the early seventies talked of 
liberation philosophy as a type of postmodern philosophy, inasmuch as it saw itself overcoming 
the philosophy of consciousness or its egological dialectic, more recently, since the vogue of 
postmodern brought on by the Lyotard et al., Dussel has opted for a different descriptive term: 
trans-modernity. The term trans-modernity underscores that Liberation Philosophy is not about 
either negating modernity or blithely accepting it, but about transcending it anadialectically; that 
is, to think the couplet of modernity and postmodernity not just from within, but also, and 
especially, from the perspective of its reverse, its underside, its occluded other.”  
88 While there are many who have written on the World System perspective, an excellent 
introduction to this concept can be found in World-Systems Analysis by Immanuel Wallerstein.  
89 Ibid. xxvi. “Here again are profiled two of the central theses of this book, and of 
Dussel’s most recent work, namely, that eurocentrism must be taken seriously as a philosophical 
problem, and that philosophy must abandon as no longer appropriate or useful notions or 
categories of universal history; instead it must appropriate for its methodology the more concrete 
methodological approach of world-systems.”  
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whether from the left or the right, is ensconced in the prison of seeing history as 
emanating from a center which is located in a certain time and a certain location.  
There is a false premise that Modernity originated with the birth of the 
subject as articulated by Rene Decartes in his famous formulation of cogito ergo 
sum. With this premise, all modern philosophy occludes that this subject has a 
much older history that includes a long and violent history.90 This fallacy leads us 
to view all history from within a linear framework. All people will eventually pass 
through identical stages of development, albeit during different historical periods. 
In this model the lack of reasonableness, rationality, and intelligibility is merely a 
lack of development on the part of the Other and never an intrinsic systemic 
shortcoming of its own Totality. This vision of developmental stages has historical 
precedents which must be illuminated and interrogated.91 It also understands 
postmodernity as merely a moment ‘ahead’ of modernity but does nothing to 
                                            
90 Ibid. 20. “The “I” which begins with the “I conquer” of Hernan Cortes or Pizarro, which 
in fact precedes the Cartesian ego cogito by about a century, produces Indian genocide, African 
slavery, and Asian colonial wars. The majority of today’s humanity (the South) is the other face of 
modernity; it is neither pre- nor anti- nor post-modern.”  
91 Ibid. 52. “The argument was clearly developed by Gines de Sepulveda, in the 
Valladolid dispute of 1550 with Bartolome de las Casas. This argument can be summarized in the 
following way: 1) European culture is the most developed and superior to all other cultures. 
(eurocentric). 2) The other cultures abandon (the Kantian Ausgang) or exit from their own 
barbarity by means of the modern civilizing process constitutes their progress. 3) But the 
underdeveloped are opposed to the civilizing process, and therefore it is just and necessary to 
utilize violence in order to destroy such opposition. 4) On the other hand, the modern violent 
warrior (who exterminates Amerindians, enslaves Africans etc.) thinks that he is innocent 
because he exercises violence as a duty and a virtue. 5) And lastly, the victims of modernity in 
the periphery (the extermination of the Indians, the enslavement of the Africans, the colonization 
of the Asians) and in the center (the genocide of the Jews, the third holocaust) are the 
“responsible ones” for their own victimization. This irrational myth of modernity will be applied 
from the conquest of America (genocide of Amerindians), to the enslavement of the African, to 
the Chinese Opium War, to the invasion of Panama (1990) or the Gulf War (1991).” One might 
also recall the rather absurd logic spoken of and recorded by many, including war correspondent 
Peter Arnett, who attributed it to an unidentified army officer in Vietnam: “We had to destroy the 
village to save it.” 
  
 
123 
challenge the fundamental premise and irrationality of the modern/post-modern 
paradigm.92 
The Dusselian Other  
While Dussel’s vision of the Other is deeply shaped by his encounter with 
Emmanuel Levinas, he seeks to transcend aspects of his teacher’s conceptual 
framework. The Dusselian Other is similar to the Levinasian other in that both 
find that the Other originates beyond all totalities or ontologies. The dissimilarity 
is found in the more explicit and intentional formulation of the Dusselian Other as 
a political and historical subject.93 Levinas was able to see that the totalizing 
vision intrinsic to European philosophy precluded (and occluded) the recognition 
of the Other. Dussel affirmed the insight of Levinas in saying that the place of 
Western ontology, particularly as formulated in the cogito of René Descarte, 
allowed for the violation of the Other by the Same. To Dussel, however, Levinas 
was not able to properly promblematize the issue to allow for an authentic 
resolution. To do this Dussel had to cast the issue in much more communal and 
explicitly political terms. This included seeing the face of the Other not merely as 
the face of an individual person but rather as the face of communities, 
communities with their unique histories in relation to all other commuities. To 
further develop this new conceptualization of the occluded Other Dussel began to 
                                            
92 Michael Barber, Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of 
Liberation (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 74: “Dussel sets off his position from 
postmodernism. Whereas postmodernism criticizes modern reason as reason, Dussel criticizes 
modern reason for concealing an irrational myth.” 
93 Underside of Modernity, 82. “Soon enough, however, I realized that Levinas himself 
could not address our hopes. Levinas showed us how to formulate the question of the irruption of 
the Other, but we could not develop a politics (erotics, pedgogics, etc.) which placed in question 
the ruling Totality (which dominates and excludes the Other) and could develop a new Totality. 
This critical-practical question of a new Totality was exactly the question of “liberation.” With this 
Levinas could not help us.”  
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explore World-System, and Post-Colonial theories.94 He realized that this new 
understanding required taking a radical skepticism in relation to virtually all 
Totalities.95 This newly configured Other and practical atheism were the starting 
points of Liberation Philosophy.  
                                            
94 Ibid. 216-17. “The world system is a philosophical problem because Europe confused 
the evolution of subjectivity within the limits of Europe not only with universality (as much in the 
morality of Kantian autonomy, as in the supposed post-conventional stage), but also with 
globality. That is, what Europe came to realize as a center of a world system (using not only 
economic wealth, but cultural information) was attributed to its autonomous creativity as self-
enclosed, self-referential, autopietic system. It not only elevated as universality its European 
particularity (speaking like Hegel), but it also pretended that the work of humanity “in it” (Europe) 
was the product of its autonomy and exclusive creativity. Modernity, and modern philosophy with 
it, never abandoned its Eurocentric dream. It never defined itself as a hegemonic center where 
information is controlled, where learning of humanity is processed, where political institutions 
(political, economic, and ideological, etc.) which permits greater global accumulation of wealth in 
the center (economic, cultural, and all other types of wealth), thus “systematically” exploiting the 
periphery, are created.”  
95 Ibid. 11. “Liberation Philosophy affirms that all Totalities can be fetishized: the political 
as in the empire of the State; as historical manifestations of the divinity; the erotic, as in the 
fetishist machismo, pedagogy, because ruling ideology is a historical manifestations of the divine, 
such as the “Western and Christian civilization” or the American way of life. All critique, then, 
ought to begin by negating the divinity of the fetishized absolute which negates the possibility of 
human realization. Atheism as a negation of the negation of the person (Feuerbach) is the first 
thesis of Liberation Philosophy. But, from a rational point of view (and from the popular cultures of 
peripheral nations), one can, however, affirm the Absolute only in the case that it would ground, 
justify or give hope (Bloch) to the oppressed in their process of liberation. Symbolically, the 
Pharaoh-god justified domination; the Yahweh of the slave of Egypt, led by Moses, gave motives 
for libeation. These symbolic structures (as in Ricoeur’s “They symbols that make one think!”) are 
metaphors of a rational discourse: if there is an absolute, it ought to be Other than every historical 
system (otherwise such a system would be unsurpassable; it would be an end of history). The 
negation of the divinification of every Totality (the anti-fetishism of Marx with respect to 
capitalism), as negation of the negation of the human person, is the negative and correlative 
moment of attention. If there is an absolute, it cannot be but the Other of every system, as the 
breath of life of all that lives. In this case, religion becomes a fundamental moment of praxis of 
liberation. It is not necessary to negate the popular religions of the peripheral world (especially in 
African and Asia, but in Latin America as well). It is necessary to negate the moments that negate 
the person, and to develop the moments that justify liberation. It is a hermeneutical task (of 
“tradition”) to discern the (introjected by the dominators in said “tradtions”) in these religions their 
regressive elments of human affirmation. If there is an Absolute, it cannot but affirm and develop 
the person in justice, autonomy, and freedom. On this point Liberation Philsophy is inscribed 
within the popular traditions of the peripheral world and in the philosophical schools of Hamann, 
Schelling, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Levinas, without leaving to the side 
Kierkegaard, Marx, or Bloch. The hermeneutics of the symbol, politics and economics as cults, 
the utopian hope as horizon of popular praxis of liberation—this is an entirely new project for the 
“majority” of humanity (which lives in the South which dances in Africa; which contemplates in 
suffering in Asia, and venerates its traditions in Latin America). Secularization is the false name of 
fetishism; and the atheism of the left was a first dialectical moment, whose second moment is the 
affirmation of the absolute as liberation. Forgetting the second moment has distanced the left 
from the peoples who explain their daily lives, in the Lebenswelt, with symbols, rituals, and cults.”  
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Lauds and Lacunae: A Critique of Political Theology and Liberation 
Philosophy 
In bringing together Metz and Dussel I find that both are necessary to 
appreciate and engage our pluralistic and globalized world. However, I see 
shortcomings in both theorists. This section will be a review of the theories 
presented above with a critical lens that highlights the areas which I think are in 
need of development.  
The Ahistorical Solidarity of Political Theology 
While Political theology is much more sophisticated in engaging the Other 
within a globalized, and pluralistic world, two critiques can be made of it: its lack 
of development in the historical particularity of suffering, and its vague 
articulation of Solidarity.  
Metz does speak to the need to precisely define whose suffering is most 
central to the liberative thrust of Political theology96 but in subsequent writings he 
seems not to develop the particularities of the suffering of certain groups. When 
Metz compares Messianic or Bourgeois Religion, he clearly asserts that some 
communities’ suffering should be held in higher regard then others. 
It is possible that what love demands of us here may look like treason—a 
betrayal of affluence, of the family, and of our customary way of life. But it 
is also possible that this is the very place where the discernment of spirits 
is needed in the churches of the rich and powerful countries of this earth. 
Certainly, Christianity is never just there for the very brave. Yet it is not we 
who define the demands of love, nor is it we who fix the conditions under 
                                            
96 Faith in History and Society, 110.  
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which it is tested. So, for example, Christian love in periods of nationalistic 
thinking may well have to incur the suspicion of harming national honor. In 
situations of racism it will incur the suspicion of race treason. And in 
periods when the social contradictions in the world cry out to heaven it will 
incur the suspicion of class treason for betraying the allegedly necessary 
interests of the propertied. Did not Jesus himself incur the reproach of 
treason? Did not his love bring him to that state? Was he not crucified as a 
traitor to all the apparently worthwhile values?  Must not Christians 
therefore expect, if they want to be faithful to Christ, to be regarded as 
traitors to bourgeois religion? True, his love, to which everything at the 
end was taken from him, even the whole majesty and dignity of a love 
which suffers in powerlessness, was still something other than the 
expression of a suffering of others, with the unfortunate and the 
oppressed, out of sheer solidarity. It was rather the expression of his 
obedience, an obedience that submitted to suffering because of God and 
God’s powerlessness in our world. So must not Christian love in following 
after Christ continually strive toward that same obedience?97 
Part of the task of this project will be to articulate more fully who are the 
particular parties involved in struggles for justice within a specific context. This 
shortcoming of Metz’s work is in part because his primary audience is still a 
European church. This is not an inherent weakness in his theory but more the 
intrinsic limit in theologies which honor the importance of location. Nonetheless, 
                                            
97 The Emergent Church, 14-15. This is found in an essay entitled Messianic or 
Bourgeois Religion? 
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he does at times speak in abstract categories which diminish the potency of 
particularity mentioned above. While Political theology speaks of the importance 
of honoring the place of suffering in ethical discourse it does not do enough to 
identify and prioritize the suffering in the world. How do we create a criterion by 
which we can measure the suffering in the world? How do we come to a decision 
about whose Memories and Narratives have ethical and epistemological 
privilege? Because all subjects experience some type of suffering as part of their 
creaturely existence, how can we mediate and judge the qualities of suffering? 
This critique is similar to that which Metz aims at his mentor Karl Rahner. 
According to Metz, Rahner spoke of the historicity of the human subject without 
explicitly engaging historical reality in his work. We can see that by speaking of 
suffering, as well as Memory, and Narrative in somewhat abstract terms they can 
become obstacles to engaging particular communities in ethical discourse. What 
is needed is not an abandoning of these categories or concepts but rather a 
refinement of them which renders them more precise and useful to the creation 
of a Christian ethic.  
The category of Solidarity also needs a more precise articulation to 
become useful in helping create an authentic encounter with the Other that 
embodies the love command in the current milieu of globalized pluralism. While it 
is clear that one of the demands posed by Political Theology is to be in solidarity 
with the Other it is much less clear what and how this Solidarity is to be 
embodied and enacted. Articulated in an even more particular question, it is this: 
how can we create a criterion by which we can authenticate the claims of 
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Solidarity with the suffering other? How do we know, or how can we verify, that 
we are indeed in Solidarity with the Other? Again, what is needed is a further 
development and refinement of this concept, not an abandoning of its imperative 
element. I believe that this can be done by a reworking the heuristic device of 
religion as interruption98 that is found within Political theology. This assertion will 
be further articulated in the next chapter.  
The Dusselian Other Revisited 
While the Liberation philosophy of Dussel is indispensable in creating an 
ethic which honors the potency of particularity and yet seeks to honor the 
connectedness of our globalized world, the two areas which need clarification 
and amplification are: how the initial encounter between the Other and the 
Totality occurs, and how the Trans-Modern perspective inadvertently replicates 
aspects of the Modern/Post-modern vision. 
In the Analectical Method ‘I can only advance toward the Other ‘to the 
extent that the Other receives me, or pleads for my aid.’”99 Part of the concern 
with the articulation of this interaction is that it inadvertently limits the fashion in 
which the Other and the Totality initially encounter each other. The Totality may 
experience the initial contact with the Other more as interruption than invitation. 
This is particularly true when we realize that, for Dussel, the Other is always that 
which exceeds all of the cognitive structures or horizons of the Same. The 
invitation cannot come from a language with which we are completely familiar 
precisely because the language which the Totality would recognize would not 
                                            
98 Faith in History and Society, 158. 
99 Liberation, Method, and Dialogue, 70. 
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allow us to experience the complete otherness of the Other. Hence the ethical 
demand posed by the Other will be more of a disruption than an invitation. We 
will explore the implications of this issue in the next chapter. 
Dussel’s vision of Trans-modernity, while clearly superior to earlier ways 
of honoring the voices that have been previously marginalized within historical 
discourse, is still held captive to a vision of a ‘timeless time.’100This vision is, for 
Metz, ‘the secret Lord of late modernity.’101 In this understanding of time there is 
an uncritical acceptance of an evolutionary paradigm. This paradigm may have 
begun with our increased acknowledgement of the power of evolution within 
human history but how has taken on a pseudo-religious force in which even God 
is found within time rather than viewing God as being the ‘lord of all’ including 
time.102 The critique that Metz makes of modernity and to some degree post-
modernity could also be made of the Trans-modern vision of Dussel. An 
important difference, however, is that Dussel’s Trans-modernity does seek to 
subvert aspects of this evolutionary vision by introducing the transcendent Other, 
which would include a trans-temporal Other. There is, however, a very strong 
potential for Dussel with a trans-modern perspective to uncritically accept 
aspects of this eternal evolutionary paradigm.  A solution Metz proposes is to 
retrieve the apocalyptic tradition found within theology. In this way we can speak 
of even the Trans-modern perspective finally having to come to terms with a 
judgment day that will have ultimate consequences. 
Agapic Solidarity: A Model for Love in the Twenty-First Century 
                                            
100 Love’s Strategy, 79. Found in an essay entitled Theology Today. 
101 Ibid. 79.  
102 Ibid. 78-79. 
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Even with the shortcomings mentioned above I do believe that the Political 
Theology of Johann Baptist Metz and the Liberation Philosophy of Enrique 
Dussel are indispensable elements in the creation of any ethic for the twenty-first 
century. The way in which Political Theology problematizes the question of the 
Subject in modern and post-modern discourse illuminates so many of the 
obstacles that lead to the marginalization of all Others. The way in which Dussel 
re-visions the Other in a manner that does justice to the communal ‘face’ of the 
Other is central to living in a globalized, and pluralistic world. Their work is clearly 
worthy of much attention and development. The process of Agapic Solidarity 
which I introduce in the following chapter will seek to build on the work of these 
two authors. Agapic Solidarity seeks to accomplish two goals: it will be a 
corrective to the lacunas mentioned above, and it will also seek to respond to the 
original question mentioned earlier, namely, how does one accomplish the Love 
Commandment in the twenty-first century given the two major features of this 
historical period-- the potency of particularity and the interdependence of a 
globalized world? 
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CHAPTER 4  
AGAPIC SOLIDARITY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 
 
The Love Command in Three Moments  
The previous chapter explained why a mono-cultural world is a thing of the 
past. The exact date of when pluralism began or its implications is not as 
germane as the question of how to deal with its undeniable reality.1 This project 
asks: What are the implications of such pluralism for a contemporary Christian 
ethics? How do we practice our love of neighbor in encounters with the Other?  
There are two potential pitfalls to ethical discourse about encountering the 
Other. The first is to see the various communities as so unique that any attempts 
at universal claims will be futile.2 The second is to underestimate the potency of 
particularity which ultimately does violence to the Other.3 The alternative that we 
are seeking is a mode of engaging the Other which has the capacity to seek, 
create, and maintain common ground while concurrently seeking and maintaining 
a sacred distinction that honors the otherness of our neighbor, the Other. 
Because of our new understanding of the importance of location and perspective, 
we are aware of the equal importance of honoring both poles within this 
                                            
1 In the Pluralism of Religious and Cultural World, 169: “We live, one might say, in a 
world of undeniable plurality. Pluralism is not simply the answer, but first of all the question and 
the problem.”  
2 Enrique Dussel, Frontiers of Theology in Latin America, Ed. Rosino Giblellini (New 
York, Orbis Books, 1975), 190. This is found in an essay entitled Historical and Philosophical 
Presuppositions for Latin American Theology. “In that case “pluralism” would be without 
unity…difference would really represent total ignorance of another.”  
3 Ibid. 196: “This refuse s to recognize creative “distinctiveness,” stifling or suffocating the 
poor for the sake of a vaunted “Universality” that is only an absolutized ”particularity.”  
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spectrum: that of seeking unity and that of honoring particularity. We can no 
longer think of the role of Christian love as being to create an exclusive unity 
which may inadvertently stultify distinction or particularity for a ‘vaunted 
“universality” that is only an absolutized “particularity.” This is especially 
important because through liberation theology and philosophy’s ‘preferential 
option for the poor’ we have become aware of how the poor are frequently at a 
distinct disadvantage in resisting this hegemonic impulse. This insight allows us 
to see how the principle of the ‘preferential option for the poor’ must be shaped to 
fit the particular socio-historical context.4   
The model of Agapic Solidarity will facilitate such an application of the 
option for the poor sensitive to the contemporary global context. The first section 
presents the process of Agapic Solidarity. It includes some elaborations on how 
this process was influenced by the work of Johann Baptist Metz and Enrique 
Dussel. The second section briefly applies the process of Agapic Solidarity to the 
human dimensions introduced in chapter two. The final section will present some 
of the challenges and questions posed about this process. This section includes 
some responses to the challenges and questions posed. 
Love for a Fragmented World: Introducing Agapic Solidarity 
Agapic Solidarity is a process which seeks to engage the Other in a 
manner which avoids the pitfalls mentioned above. It is a process which seeks to 
honor particularity without being parochial and seeks to be universal without 
                                            
4 Ibid. 58. “The poor person is poor because he or she does not share in the reigning 
value of the system; if the value of the system in the Middle Ages is honor, he or she has no 
honor; if the supreme power in the system is money, he or she does not have it; if in the future 
society the system has technology as its supreme value, he or she will be a person without 
technology.” 
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being hegemonic. The Three Moments which comprise this process are: 
Disruption, Agapic Solidarity, and Emancipatory Praxis. In the first moment our 
lives and horizons are disrupted as we initially awaken to the Other. This 
encounter is unsolicited and shatters all our cognitive structures. Because of this 
it will be experienced as a ‘disruption.’ The second moment, Agapic Discipleship, 
requires that we not merely acknowledge the Other but make a three-fold 
commitment on the part of ourselves towards the Other. This three-fold 
commitment involves cultivating a solidaristic knowledge of the Other by coming 
to know the history, worldview, and engaging in a praxis of solidarity with the 
Other. The final moment of Emancipatory Praxis demands a manner of living that 
embodies an ongoing conversion with the Other. 
The First Moment: Disruption  
Disruption, the initial moment of Agapic Solidarity, has two noteworthy 
features: the first is the dialectic of continuity and discontinuity found within this 
moment, the second is a fundamental acknowledgement of the autonomous 
existence of the Other.  
One Biblical example of “disruption” is the synoptic pericope describing 
Jesus’ call to Simon and Andrew:  
.  
 
 
 
As Jesus was walking by the Sea of Galilee he saw two brothers, Simon, 
who was called Peter, and his brother Andrew; they were making a cast in 
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the lake with their nets, for they were fishermen. And he said to them, 
“Follow me and I will make you fishers of men.” And they left their nets at 
once and followed him. [Matthew 4:18] 
 
Many elements of this pericope can be highlighted:  the two brothers are 
defined by their activity as fishermen and ttheir ordered existence as fishermen is 
profoundly disrupted by Jesus’ invitation. They leave their nets rather than simply 
tidying them away for the day; this signals radical discontinuity. Yet Jesus, by 
inviting them to be ‘fishers of men,’ indicates that there will be some continuity 
with their old lives. Some of their accumulated skill would be put to use in their 
new life.  
Unlike the encounter of which Levinas speaks, this encounter with the 
Other is at first not completely asymmetrical; there are elements which speak to 
the autonomous character of the Other. In the pericope above we know that the 
fisherman could have rejected Jesus’ invitation. And Jesus could have chosen 
quite different people to help him at the beginning of his ministry. This rejection, 
however, would have had a deleterious effect on both parties, giving one’s life a 
degree of inauthenticity that ultimately would find its way into all aspects of one’s 
existence, or rendering the Other invisible. Instead, we read of an immediate 
response. 
Immediate Response: “They left their nets at once” 
There is an important distinction between Disruption and the manner in 
which Dussel views the initial encounter with the Other. Dussel insists that I can 
only advance towards the Other “to the extent that the Other receives me, or 
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pleads for my aid.”5 Disruption is much more of an impelling reality than an 
‘invitation.’ Unlike an invitation which allows for a planned response (Please 
RSVP by…) a disruption demands a more immediate and spontaneous response 
(“And they left their nets at once and followed him.” italics added). Another 
distinction between invitation and disruption is that there is a lack of certitude 
about the outcome of the disruptive encounter (compare this with an invitation 
that informs: “The dinner will begin at 7:00 and will be semi-formal; dress 
accordingly“). In the pericope neither party knows for sure what will result from 
the disruption. This first moment of Disruption has a much more improvisational 
and open-ended quality for both the Same and the Other.  
Metz speaks frequently about how a theology is interruption.6 For Metz 
one of the central features of Messianic Discipleship that distinguishes it from 
Bourgeois Christianity is its capacity to live with the ongoing tension of an 
interrupted life. However, the term interruption itself is problematic. The term 
interruption implies that one can ‘pause’ whatever one is doing and return to it at 
a later time. A disruption, on the other hand, implies the total dissolution of or 
change in all that came before. A disruption fundamentally alters the character of 
my existence. Therefore the term Disruption seems to have both longer lasting 
and more foundational implications.  
In Disruption we assert the autonomous existence of both the Same and 
the Other. In the fishing pericope above we are aware of how both parties had a 
life before and will have a life after their encounter. This autonomous nature of 
                                            
5 Liberation, Method, and Dialogue, 70. It is important to note that in some later writings 
Dussel has begun to reconsider other ways in which this ‘invitation’ occurs.  
6 Faith and Society, 59.  
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both parties is important because it dislodges the Totality from having certain 
epistemological and enunciatory privileges. This will have immediate impact on 
how we experience the second moment of Agapic Solidarity: Agapic Discipleship. 
The Second Moment: Agapic Discipleship 
The second moment in Agapic Solidarity is that of Agapic Discipleship. 
This moment contains three inseparable but distinct sub-moments: 
Remembrance, Recitation, and finally Resurrection. Each sub-moment is 
indispensible in helping us to engage the Other. In this moment we and the Other 
surrender some degree of control and allow ourselves to be introduced to the 
world of the Other.7 These sub-moments are deeply influenced by the categories 
found in the political theology of Metz; Remembrance most closely resembles the 
category of Memory, Recitation the category of Narrative, and finally 
Resurrection resembles most closely the category of Solidarity. Prior to the 
completion of this second moment we can speak of an encounter but not an 
actual engagement with the Other. The Disruption was the shift in reality caused 
by the Other but the second moment is our response to this disruption. Only after 
we have fully immersed ourselves in the world of the Other can we speak of 
having some knowledge of the Other. I believe that it is only after we have gone 
through this period of ‘pedagogic apprenticeship’ that we can speak of knowing 
how to love the Other.  
Remembrance 
                                            
7 Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation, 53: “To 
avoid such a univocal obliteration of the Other, one must commit oneself in humility and 
meekness to a pedagogic apprenticeship with the Other as master and to a following of the way 
that the Other’s word traces, day in and day out.”  
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The two imperatives that this sub-moment must not lose sight of are first, 
that the Other has a history which exists before our encounter with them, and 
second, that all remembrances must be done with a ‘preferential option’ for the 
dangerous memories of the innocent suffering of the Other.  
The reality, as Levinas and Dussel assert, is that we awaken to the Other. 
We did not create, discover, or make the Other appear. The Other has an 
absolute and autonomous existence relative to ourselves. In the sub-moment of 
Remembrance we are called to learn about the history of the Other, not our 
history, nor even our history of interaction with the Other, but exclusively their 
history. This arduous process will require that we, with the help of the Other, 
become archeologists into the various discourses, terrains of understandings and 
epistemological paradigms that are operative in the world of the Other. This sub-
moment will require that we learn the history of the Other from the Other. This will 
include learning a new language, in the broadest sense of this term. This sub-
moment may include learning how we have injured the Other, both ‘in what we 
have done and what we have failed to do.’ This will require a fundamental 
metanoia on our part, a shift in our understanding of history of our memory of the 
Other.  
The sub-moment of Remembrance, following the lead of early Liberation 
Theology and all Catholic Social Thought, will give a special epistemological 
privilege to The Poor. Their history and remembrance will take precedence in our 
focus and attention. Remembrance here is similar to Metz’s notion of the 
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dangerous memory of innocent suffering that forces us to confront this suffering 
and then calls us to a discipleship to reduce it. 
  We recall that the definition of the poor in Agapic Solidarity is best 
understood using the lens of Dussel who speaks of the poor always within a 
contextualized framework.8 In this way Remembrance will always include 
ongoing development and change.  
Recitation 
In this sub-moment we are citing the narratives of the Other with the help 
of the Other. This action will entail two dialectically related elements. The first 
element is that of acknowledging that while we are reciting their stories and 
rehearsing their worldview, we are aware of how we are not the Other. Central is 
the distinction principle: we are absolutely distinct from the Other but not 
absolutely different. The second element is that as we become better versed in 
the stories and worldview of the Other, we begin to see the world with the eyes of 
the Other. It is through living the Remembrance and Recitation portion of Agapic 
Discipleship that we begin to inhabit a new, larger life. This new reality I entitle 
Resurrection.  It is similar to the category of Narrative in that we are here 
speaking of the Other’s ‘stories,’ in the broadest sense of this term. 
Resurrection 
The sub-moment entitled Resurrection consists in inhabiting a new reality 
that has both continuity and discontinuity with our past. The continuity consists in 
our maintaining aspects of our old identity. In our continuity we are not ‘absorbed’ 
into the world of the Other. We maintain our own Remembrances and 
                                            
8 See footnote #4. 
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Recitations; and are much more keenly made aware of their content and 
connection with our worldview. This allows us to maintain our authentic 
personhood. The discontinuity comes in terms of our inhabiting a new world that 
is not merely a construction of an atrophied ego or cogito but rather allows us to 
exist in a ‘world were many worlds co-exist.’ Because this dialectical movement 
of continuity/discontinuity will from now on be a feature of our existence we must 
always understand ourselves as a ‘pilgrim people.’ 9 
 
The Third Moment: Emancipatory Praxis 
In the third moment of Agapic Solidarity we bring the Remembrances and 
Recitations of the Other into our communities of origin. Two features which are 
imperative in this moment of the process are allowing the Other’s radical critiques 
and allowing ourselves to radically critique the Other. This mutual critique can 
occur only after our due diligence has been fulfilled and we have some degree of 
mastery (as determined by the Other) of the memories and narratives of the 
Other. We must see and understand the Other as Other and this the Other must 
fully acknowledge in order for it to be verified. In doing this they acknowledge that 
we have truly engaged them and that we are not merely seeing a reflection of our 
ego which is circumscribed by our cognitive structures. Equally important to note 
is that we no longer accept prima facie all accounts and assertions made by the 
Other.10 
                                            
99 The language of a Pilgrim People from Vatican II would need to be mined here for its 
full implications.  
10 Ethical Hermeneutics, 124: “Surely, too, Dussel could agree with Schutte that 
philosophy involves critical thinking, testing the validity claims, presenting phenomenological 
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This moment requires that we live always ready for metanoia. It is a call to 
inhabit the tension–filled existence of this ongoing apocalyptic moment. This 
emancipatory moment exists between the ever present and concurrently 
transcendent historical period that is the proleptic dimension of Jesus’ ministry. 
This will place all who practice this process and particularly this Moment in a 
transitional location in relation to all human dimensions.11Because of this, the 
final moment will require that we live in an ongoing state of or openness to 
disruption.  
The process of Agapic Solidarity is best understood as being circular 
rather than linear in its configuration. The emancipation that this process offers, 
for ourselves and the Other, allows us to live a life of ongoing Disruption which 
leads again to the moment of Agapic Solidarity and the ongoing life of 
Emancipatory Praxis.  
The application of this process will always have an improvised, but not 
arbitrary, element to its enactment. In the next section we will apply this process 
to the Four Dimensions of human experience introduced in chapter two.  
                                                                                                                                  
descriptions for scrutiny, and not holding that claims are justified merely because they emerge 
from the Other. It is the Other who invites self-criticism and the Other who asks that one justify 
one’s positions and prove validity. One’s responsibility for the Other, which precedes whatever 
stance one adopts, in a way precludes differing with the Other or criticizing the Other for the 
Other’s sake. The nature of apology and the daring, risky character of discourse, which does not 
unfold like a prefabricated internal logic, do not demand a mindless conformity with the Other, 
and it is always possible that radical disagreement with the Other springs from the deepest love 
for the Other.” [italics added] 
11 The Emergent Church, 15: “It is possible that what love demands of us here may look 
like treason—a betrayal of affluence, of the family, and of our customary way of life. But it is also 
possible that this is the very place where the discernment of spirits is needed in the churches of 
the rich and powerful countries of this earth. Certainly Christianity is never just for the brave. Yet it 
is not we who define the demands of love, nor is it we who fix the conditions under which it is 
tested. So, for example, Christian love in periods of nationalistic thinking may well have to incur 
the suspicion of harming national honor. In situations of racism it will incur the suspicion of race 
treason. And in periods when social contradictions in the world cry out to heaven it will incur the 
suspicion of class treason for betraying the allegedly necessary interests of the propertied.” 
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Agapic Solidarity in the Four Dimensions 
To review how we arrived at this juncture: we began by realizing that two 
of the most salient features of our current reality are that of pluralism and of deep 
interconnection.12 Given pluralism, we acknowledge that all ethical discourse 
must now be constructed and articulated within the context of various 
communities who look to different sources of authority and coherence. While this 
is clearly not a new issue, given the riven cultural clashes that seem so much of 
our discourse, this insight recently has taken on new urgency.13 The reality of our 
deep interconnectedness must also be kept in mind precisely because many 
issues seem now to have a globalized dimension. Like pluralism, globalism is not 
entirely novel but its implications are now being acknowledged with new force.14 
These two features are important to keep in mind as we construct a moral 
expression of the love command in the twenty-first century.15 
We began by using the work of Emmanuel Levinas to construct an answer 
to how, given these two features, we might live out the Love Command which is 
demanded of all Christians. In realizing the lacunae of the work of Levinas, 
                                            
12 See the various authors who were introduced in chapter 3.  
13 Min, 228: “In this sense, solidarity of others in their dignity and praxis is not a new 
demand of our time. It has always been an implicit challenge of our social, historical, existence: 
how we live together with those who are different from us has been the permanent crux of our 
coexistence in history. What is distinctive of our time is that globalization has heightened our 
sensibility to the other as other, to the many differences in class, gender, ethnicity, tribal origins, 
nationality, religion, and culture to a degree unprecedented in history.” 
14 Ibid., 228: “Globalization compels us, with a likewise unprecedented urgency, to 
cooperate in the construction of a totality, a system of laws and institutions that would do justice 
to our shared dignity as others, under pain of a mutually destructive spiral of violence and 
alienation.” 
15 Ibid., 228: “The supreme challenge of our time and century is that of solidarity, 
solidarity of others that recognizes our common infinity and collaborates in the building of a 
totality that will do justice to that infinity at this particular stage of historical existence.” 
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particularly his insistence on the transcendent otherness of the Other (which 
precluded our ability to respond to many of the moral demands of the Others) we 
created the concepts of human Dimensions of human experience.  The 
Dimensions allowed us to create some parameters for interacting with the Other 
that safeguarded the transcendence of the Other by accepting that the ‘identity’ 
of the Other could not be subsumed by any one Dimension. The Dimensions do, 
however, allow us enough information about the Other to make a genuine moral 
response possible. The Other problematic quality to the Levinasian Other is his 
explicit non-political understanding of the Other. By articulating the collective 
subjectivity of the human person, the Dimensions allowed us to see how the 
Other inhabits a communal (or political) reality.16 The following section applies 
the process of Agapic Solidarity to each of the four dimensions introduced in 
chapter two. Conscious that the nature of a loving response towards the Other 
will always have a dynamic and context-sensitive quality, this application can 
only be drawn in broad terms with the specifics being filled in with the 
consultation of the Other.  
 
Agapic Solidarity in the Economic Dimension 
Disruption 
The first moment of Agapic Solidarity within the economic dimension 
occurs when our quotidian experience is disrupted by having to acknowledge the 
‘invisible’ labor that is part of our existence. It is uncomfortable to note that we 
                                            
16 Both Anselm Min and Enrique Dussel make this critique of Levinas and propose similar 
solutions to the Dimensions. 
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owe our day–to–day existence to a multitude of people whom we do not see. 
Few people have been able to capture the remarkable degree of interconnectivity 
that is part of our existence as well as did Dr. Martin Luther King: 
It really boils down to this: that all life is interrelated. We are caught in an 
inescapable network of mutuality, tied into a single garment of destiny. 
Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. We are made to live 
together because of the interrelated structure of reality. Did you ever stop 
to think that you can’t leave for your job in the morning without being 
dependent on most of the world? You get up in the morning and go to the 
bathroom and reach over for the sponge, and that’s handed to you by a 
Pacific islander. You reach for a bar of soap, and that’s given to you at the 
hands of a Frenchman. And then you go into the kitchen to drink coffee for 
the morning, and that’s poured into your cup by a South American. And 
maybe you want tea: that is poured into your cup by a Chinese. Or maybe 
you’re desirous of having cocoa for breakfast, and that’s poured into your 
cup by a West African. And then you reach over for your toast, that’s given 
to you at the hands of an English speaking farmer, not to mention the 
baker. And before you finish eating breakfast in the morning, you’ve 
depended on more than half the world. This is the way our universe is 
structured; this is its interrelated quality. We aren’t going to have peace on 
earth until we recognize this basic fact of the interrelated structure of all 
reality.17  
                                            
17 A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King Jr., 
Ed. James M. Washington, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986) “A Christmas Sermon on 
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In this period of globalized capitalism, no one community can claim 
anything resembling an autonomous economic existence. Yet capital 
surreptitiously occludes the living labor of the human person. The Other in a 
globalized capital system is that which is ‘other than’ capital.  
The illusory reality which claims that all wealth is not socially produced 
(prior to distribution) should be abandoned. The disruption should occur at the 
level of production because otherwise we will find ourselves arguing about just 
distribution. Framing the question in terms of “Why should we give that which is 
‘ours’ to any Other?” is not an intrinsically anti-capitalist bias but merely seeks to 
assert a more realistic reflection of the economic dimension. To live a Disrupted 
life in the economic dimension is to inhabit this reality on an ongoing basis and to 
make our moral decisions and responses from within this location. 
In awakening to this new paradigm, We are not diminishing our labor in 
the entire process. We are realizing that we are always already part of a larger 
network of activity.18 There are two fundamental losses that will occur as part of 
this disruption. The first loss is the death of what is popularly referred to as the 
“Horatio Alger” myth of the self-made man or woman. We can see how we are 
intimately connected and how we owe an aspect of our existence to the Other 
                                                                                                                                  
Peace,” 253.  Elizabeth Warren recently articulated a similar sentiment: “You built a factory out 
there? Good for you. But I want to be clear: you moved your goods to market on the roads the 
rest of us paid for; you hired workers the rest of us paid to educate; you were safe in your factory 
because of police forces and fire forces that the rest of us paid for. You didn’t have to worry that 
marauding bands would come and seize everything at your factory, and hire someone to protect 
against this, because of the work the rest of us did. You built a factory and it turned into 
something terrific, or a great idea? God bless. Keep a big hunk of it. But part of the underlying 
social contract is you take a hunk of that and pay forward for the next kid who comes along.” 
18 While I may have some concerns about how they view capitalism in its current 
configuration, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their works Empire, Multitude: War and 
Democracy in the Age of Empire, and Commonwealth do an excellent job of addressing a new 
way of understanding capitalist production in its current formation.  
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and they to me. The second loss will be a loosening of the grip of our economic 
identity in such a way that acknowledges how production itself is more a ‘web of 
creation’ than distinct communities of self-interest.19 
It is important here to take seriously the cautionary tone struck by Levinas 
and never to lose sight of the transcendent quality of the Other. Even as we can 
now see how the Other is ‘a baker,’ ‘a farmer,’ or ‘a sponge harvester,’ etc. who 
is always part of life (not just ‘our’ life), so too we can never merely reduce the 
Other to the role they play in the economic dimension. 
 
Agapic Disicipleship 
Remembrance 
By learning the history of the Other who, we now realize, has always been 
in our midst, and by using the imagery of Dr. King, even in our home we begin 
the process of Remembrance. The two central insights to highlight from this 
moment are, first, that the Other has a long history prior to our encounter with the 
Othe, and second, that we will always give a ‘preferential option’ to the 
remembrances of those who are marginalized within any economic discourse. 
Returning to the images from King’s narrative, we can say that while we first 
encountered the Pacific Islander through the sponge in our shower or the West 
African through the cocoa which we drink in our kitchen, the reality is that these 
communities have a long and rich history which we must come to view from their 
                                            
19 Ibid. 253: “Our loyalties must transcend our race, our tribe, our class, and our nation; 
and this means we must develop a world perspective. No individual can live alone; no nation can 
live alone, and as long as we try, the more we are going to have war in this world. Now the 
judgment of God is upon us, and we must either learn to live together as brothers [sic] or we are 
all going to perish together as fools.” 
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perspective. It is their history we are learning, not solely our history with them. 
Also recalling the way in which capitalism occludes the place of labor within 
economic discourse gives a certain epistemological and enunciatory privilege to 
the workers in this sub-moment. This remembrance may include ways in which 
the current economic arrangements have impacted the Other in ways of which 
we were not aware before.  
Recitation 
In the second sub-moment of recitation we take seriously the various 
threads that comprise this ‘single garment of destiny’ mentioned at the beginning 
of the King passage. We will see who are the key figures, moments, and events 
that have shaped the economic existence of the Other. What is also crucial in 
this sub-moment is becoming aware of how a figure, moment, or event may be 
recalled or held differently by the Other than by ourselves.20  In the economic 
dimension this will include challenging some of our basic assumptions and 
categories (economic development, productivity, wealth, poverty etc.). There will 
be a moment in the process when we can interrogate the perceptions, positions, 
assumptions etc. of the Other. However, first we must be a student of the Other, 
checking and rechecking our perceptions in light of their understanding and 
interpretations of figures, moments, and events.  
Resurrection 
We will find ourselves in this stage of the process existing in a larger ‘more 
abundant’ world. This would be particularly true in our apprehension of our 
                                            
20 This insight is expressed in the dictum of Walter Benjamin that, “Every great work of 
civilization is at the same time a work of barbarism.” 
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economic existence. We may still choose to drink coffee, tea, or cocoa but we 
will now live in a world where the origins of these ‘economic’ items more 
accurately reflect the world of the Other (and ourselves). We will have an 
ongoing recognition of how each economic activity is intimately and 
foundationally dependent on many others. This will not negate or diminish our 
contribution to this dimension but rather enlarge the world towards the vision 
offered by the Zapatistas, of a ‘world where many worlds co-exist.’21Because of 
the inherent tendency of capitalism to occlude the living labor of the Other, we 
will constantly have to be on guard so that our resurrected life does not atrophy. 
Such resurrection leads to the final moment, that of Emancipatory Praxis. 
 
Emancipatory Praxis  
 Emancipatory Praxis in the economic dimension is difficult to address 
precisely because it would be powerfully shaped by one’s position within the 
economic dimension. We can speak of three activities which would be impacted 
as we move into this moment; production, distribution, and finally consumption.22  
Our task in this moment is to constantly challenge any production pattern 
that does not take into full account the place of the Other from the perspective of 
the Other. The measure of a just or ‘good’ production pattern is not efficiency, 
cost, or even profitability but rather the wellbeing of the newly resurrected life. 
This desire for continuing cultivation of this resurrected life will entail not only 
careful interrogation and attention to how commodities or products are created 
                                            
21 The Idea of Latin America, Mignolo. 
22 The example offered in the Appendix clarifies this moment.  
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but also how they are distributed. This will in part necessitate that we pay close 
attention to the common good on issues of distribution. Finally our consumption 
patterns will be shaped, in great part, by our living in the world with the Other. 
This may entail restraining our patterns of conspicuous consumption, which are 
frequently cultivated for the sake of capital and not for the sake of the Other (or 
ourselves).  
 
Agapic Solidarity in the Cultural Dimension  
Disruption 
For us to perceive how the Disruption moment manifests itself in the 
cultural dimension we must first recall the concept of the colonial wound. This 
concept seeks to address how the subjectivity of the Other was dismissed and or 
deformed within the cultural dimension. The two manifestations of the colonial 
wound on which we focused were the privilege of enunciation and the privilege of 
epistemic authority. The privilege of enunciation is defined as having ultimate 
prerogative in the various categories (e.g. spatial, temporal etc.) from which 
claims about reality are addressed. The epistemic privilege deals with how and 
what constitutes knowledge.  This is particularly true in terms of what constitutes 
rational and logical discourse.  
The disruption in the area of enunciation will require that we envision all 
traditional categories from the vantage point of the Other.23 One specific 
                                            
23 There are many examples of this occurring in scholarly and popular writings. I would 
recommend the following titles, though I am conscious that it is a very incomplete list: The Darker 
Nations: A People’s History of the Third World by Vijay Prashad; Local Histories/Global Designs: 
Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking by Walter Mignolo; Borderlands/Frontera: 
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expression of this disruption will come in dismissing the myth of culture in general 
and civilization in particular as originating from one location.24 This critique, which 
goes by many names, should not be seen as merely a crude ‘anti-
European/American’ or ‘anti-Western culture’ perspective but rather desires for 
us to see all of history as ‘part of a piece.’25 The disruption will require that we 
accept that we have always inhabited a plural-cultural world.26 This reconfiguring 
                                                                                                                                  
The New Mestiza by Gloria Anzaldua; Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing  
Solidarity by Chandra Mohanty; Global History: A View from the South by Samir Amin, The 
Inventions of the Americas: The Eclipse of the Other and the Myth of Modernity; and The 
Underside of Modernity: Apeal,  and finally Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of 
Liberation by Enrique Dussel.  
24 Enrique Dussel, World Systems and “Trans”-Modernity, Project Muse, 
http://muse.jhu.edu, Nepantla: Views from the South 3.2, (Duke University, 2002) 234: “That is to 
say, exteriority is a process that takes off, originates, and mobilizes itself from an “other” place 
(one “beyond”the “world” and modernity’s “Being,” one that maintains a certain exteriority, as 
figure 2 indicates) than European and North American modernity. From this “exteriority,” negated 
and excluded by hegemonic Europe’s modern expansion, there are present-day cultures that 
predate European modernity, that have developed together with it, and that have survived until 
the present with enough human potential to give birth to a plurality that will emerge after 
modernity and capitalism. These living and productive cultures, creative and in otherness [di-
ferentes], are not just post-modern, since “postmodern” only labels a final stage of modernity. 
Rather, they are cultures that have developed on a “trans”-modern horizon, something beyond 
the internal possibility of simple modernity. This “beyond”(“trans-“) indicates the starting point 
from modernity’s exteriority (arrow E in figure 2), that is, from what modernity excluded, denied, or 
ignored, as “insignificant,” “senseless,” “barbarous,” as a “nonculture,” an unknown opaque 
alterity, but at the same time evaluated as “savage,” uncivilized, underdeveloped, inferior, merely 
“Oriental despotism,” the “Asiatic mode of production,” and so on. These are diverse names given 
to the nonhuman, the urecoverable, the “historyless,” to what will be extinguished by the 
sweeping advances of Western “civilization” in the process of globalization.”  
25 The Idea of Latin America, xvi-xx. 
26 World Systems and “Trans”-Modernity, 236: “All of this outlines a multi-polar twenty-
first century world, where cultural difference is increasingly affirmed, beyond the homogenizing 
pretensions of the present capitalist globalization and its supposedly universal culture, and even 
beyond the postmodern affirmation of difference that finds it difficult to imagine universalities from 
a millenary tradition outside of Europe and the United States. This “trans”-modernity should adopt 
the best of modern technological revolution has to offer—discarding antiecological and 
exclusively Western aspects—and put it at the service of differentiated valorized worlds, ancient 
and actualized, with their own traditions and ignored creativity. This will allow for the emergence 
of the enormous cultural richness and the transnational capitalist market now attempts to 
suppress under the empire of “universal” commodities that materially subsume food (one of the 
most difficult things to universalize) into capital. The future “trans”-modernity will be multi-cultural, 
versatile, hybrid, postcolonial, pluralist, tolerant, and democratic (but beyond the modern liberal 
democracy of the European state). It will have splendid millenary traditions and be respectful of 
exteriority and heterogeneous identities. The majority of humanity retains, reorganizes 
(renovating and including elements of globality), and creatively develops cultures in its everyday, 
enlightened horizon. The cultures of the majority deepen the valorative “common sense” of their 
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begins to release us from our myopic vision of the past and begins to allow us to 
encounter the cultural Other in a more authentic manner. This disruption provides 
us a space to view all cultures, including our own and the Other’s, in a manner 
which is historically situated. It is from this new location that we can critically 
interrogate all cultural discourse.27 
 
Agapic Discipleship 
Remembrance 
The seriousness of this sub-moment is found in how much cultural 
conditioning has the inadvertent effect of creating epistemic categories that 
prevent us from viewing the history of the Other. At times we will view their 
history, but only from within the horizons offered by our cultural lens. This level of 
ignorance, however, is an unacceptable position for an appropriate ethical 
response,28 because we cannot love the neighbor if we do not first have an 
                                                                                                                                  
participants’ real and particular existences, countering the exclusionary process of globalization, 
which precisely because of this process inadvertently “pushes” towards a “trans”-modernity. It is a 
return to the consciousness of the great majorities of humanity of their excluded historical 
unconscious!” 
27 The Underside of Modernity, 144-146: “By necessity, the telos or good of a culture, or a 
Totality, cannot be the last foundation of the morality of our acts. It will only be “for now” while the 
negated Other is not discovered in this type of system…The empirical is not abandoned ideally or 
transcendentally (as Habermas does from an “ideal speech situation,” or as Apel does in a 
“transcendental pragmatics,” i.e., ideal communication community); instead the horizon of the 
system is “perforated” (“transcended) in search of the excluded Other…Furthermore, since at this 
level no one can be excluded, it is necessary to recognize transcendentally or ideally each 
“participant” as a  distinct person; the Other of everything else, the principle of every possibility of 
“dissent”(origin of new discourse). This respect and recognition at the transcendental or ideal is 
the point of departure that allows the Other “participation” in the community into which she has 
factically irrupted as a new Other.” 
28 The Inventions of the Americas: Eclipse of “the other” and the Myth of Modernity, 
Enrique Dussel (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencas Sociales, 1996/2002), 10: “One must 
break with this reductionist horizon to open to a world and planetary perspective—and there is an 
ethical obligation toward other cultures to do so.” This book is a wonderful example of the work of 
Remembrance on the part of one thinker. 
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authentic encounter with this neighbor, the Other. This encounter will lack 
substance if it is limited by our cultural categories  
The work of Enrique Dussel in general and in particular his book entitled 
The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “the other” and the Myth of Modernity is 
an exemplar of this sub-moment. I summarize it here only briefly. In this work 
Dussel begins to create a ‘counter-narrative’ to the traditional historical narrative 
of modernity.29 He accomplishes this in part by speaking of the experience of 
those who were the co-creators, albeit in a dialectical manner, of modernity.30 He 
begins by noting how some important figures (particularly Hegel and Habermas) 
were and are deeply immersed in a Eurocentric perspective.31 In this work he 
demonstrates the liberationist ‘strand’ by privileging the poor in both an 
epistemological and enunciatory manner.32 In this project Dussel is ‘awakening,’ 
us, in the Levinasian sense, to the history of the Other.33 This remembrance of 
                                            
29 Ibid. 9. “My undertaking here differs from theirs, since I argue that while modernity is 
undoubtedly a European occurrence, it also originates in a dialectical relation with non-Europe. 
Modernity appears when Europe organizes the initial world-system and places itself at the center 
of world history over against a periphery equally constitutive of modernity.” [italics added] 
30 Ibid. 26. “They make up the other face (te-ixtli in Aztec), the alterity, essential to 
modernity.”  
31 Ibid. Part One: From the European Ego: The Covering Over 
32 Ibid. Part Three: From the Invasion to the Dis-covery of the Other.  
33 Ibid. Preface, “As Richard Bernstein has shown so well in The New Constellation, we 
face a new historical moment and a new constellation of philosophical problems and questions. In 
this book, I consider constellations which European and United States thinkers often neglect and 
which involved far more than what Ihab Hassan has called an “ideological commitment to 
minorities in politics, sex, and language.” I focus on the immense majority of humanity, the 
seventy-five per cent of the world situated in the southern hemisphere, the excolonial world. 
These exploited, excluded and poor peoples, whom Fanon termed the “wretched of the earth,” 
consume less then fifteen per cent of the planet’s income. Their history of oppression began five 
hundred years ago. This history of world domination originates with modernity, which thinkers 
such as Charles Taylor, Stephen Toulmin, or Jürgen Habermas consider as an exclusively 
European occurrence, having nothing to do with the so-called Third World. The expositions of 
these thinkers explain modernity by referring only to classical European and North American 
authors and events. “ [italics in original text] 
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the Other in general and the ‘marginalized’ Other in particular is the central 
feature of this sub-moment.  
Recitation 
The recitation sub-moment is the stage where we are made familiar with 
the symbols, language systems, imagery, and general Weltanschauung of the 
Other. We must be conscious of becoming involved in this sub-moment while 
addressing the Other. We need constantly to be asking the Other; ‘Are we doing 
justice to your story and experience?’ This allows us to further surrender the 
epistemic and enunciatory privilege which was part of the colonial wound. An 
element which is important to highlight here is that of the distinction principle. 
Here we recall that ultimately we are to seek clarity and authenticity rather than 
merely similarity. Beyond celebrating diversity we are respectfully acknowledging 
distinction.  We must see the Other as distinctly other than ourselves in order to 
fully honor them.  
Resurrection 
In this moment of Agapic Solidarity we inhabit a cultural existence that is 
being reborn as we encounter anew both the Other and a new cultural 
understanding of ourselves. This sub-moment will always have to it an element of 
the unknown precisely because we no longer have the certitude that came with 
the epistemological and enunciatory privilege that was part of being the cultural 
center. This sub-moment is ambiguous precisely because it requires that we live 
in the ‘already but not yet’ existence of a people who are waiting for the full 
fruition of the Reign of God.  
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Emancipatory Praxis 
One of the ways we will manifest this moment in the cultural dimension is 
by working against all the damage done in the past, present, and future by the 
colonial wound. Recalling that all cultures tend to move towards self-referential 
totalities, this praxis must always be done with reference to the other previous 
moments so as to ensure that we do not fall again into any pattern of cultural 
hegemony. This will mean living in a constant state of metanoia. This conversion 
will mean that that we will revise and evaluate all our cultural discourses, 
patterns, and practices with one eye towards the abolishing of all past patterns of 
oppression and another eye towards creation of conditions which allow for 
human flourishing as understood by ourselves and the Other.  
 
Agapic Discipleship in the Political Dimension  
Disruption 
In the political dimension, where citizenship constitutes subjectivity, the 
subjectivity which must be accounted for is that of the non-citizen. However, that 
is only one component of this disruption. The other component which needs to be 
disrupted is the pervasive loyalty to the nation-state that seems to be impervious 
to critique.34 This loyalty manifests itself in three particular areas: military action, 
                                            
34 In an issue of Sojourner magazine the founder and editor Jim Wallis asks the very 
pointed question: “To Whom Do We Belong?” In this editorial Wallis challenges the place that 
loyalty to the nation has in relation to loyalty to our Faith. This he does in the context of U.S. 
involvement in the Middle East. Others, such as Oscar Romero and Dorothy Day, have raised 
this question as well.  
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the incapacity to view non-citizens as fellow human beings, and the ahistorical 
framework through which we view the creation of nation-states.  
The loyalty to one’s country is particularly pronounced in the citizenry’s 
loyalty to its military. This is especially true given that all countries intentionally 
downplay the costs that their military has wrought on citizens from another 
country.35 The second disruption occurs in the area of awakening to the way in 
which the ideology of “National Security” in our political discourse had taken on 
an almost divine status.36The power of this ideology is particularly troubling 
because in some cases it leaves no room for political beliefs to be challenged, 
thus rendering political change impossible. This allows all assertions of the 
political threat posed by the Other to go unchallenged without those making the 
assertions feeling a need to create a cogent argument for their position.37 The 
final disruption occurs as we awaken to the historical reality that the civilizing 
process of nation-states always already includes the element of silencing the 
Other.38 The importance of this disruption is that it will allow us to continue to 
hold on to our national identity, albeit with a much looser grip. We are awakened 
to the full cost to the human family of the creation of this identity and its 
accompanying ideology.  
                                            
35 One of the most powerful critiques of militarism in the United States, but also part of a 
larger critique of militarism in undermining the political, democratic process, can be found in the 
writings of Chalmers Johnson’s trilogy: Blowback, Sorrows of Empire, and Nemesis. See also 
Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism by Robert Jay 
Lifton and Richard Falk, as well the writings of Arundhati Roy.  
36 There are many critiques of this reality. Particularly helpful are those by Jose Comblin, 
Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, Ched Meyers, Walter Wink, Franz Hinkelammert, and Arundhati Roy.  
37 This will become more evident in the Appendix but can also be seen in the recent 
discourse around the ‘illegal alien’ in the United States. 
38 There are many great works that demonstrate this; Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee is 
a classic. The spate of “People’s History” books is also a way of creating this disruption. 
  
 
155 
Agapic Discipleship  
Remembrance 
This sub-moment will entail a comprehensive re-telling of the human 
experience from the side of the non-citizens of each historical period. While this 
may appear to be an impossible task, many authors and scholars are already 
tackling it.39 It is here that the principle of “preferential option for the poor” would 
need to be strongly asserted. If the victors write the history of a country, we as 
people of faith must allow ourselves to hear, read, and know the history of the 
vanquished. This allows us to inhabit and articulate the dangerous memories of 
innocent suffering within history.40 
Recitation  
This sub-moment will include the active dissemination of these new 
histories. It includes, however, an introduction to many more themes, topics, and 
categories than just the history of the Other. This sub-moment will function in a 
dialectical manner affirming aspects of the political dimension while concurrently 
negating them. For many of us the language system created by the nation-state 
and its apparatus is given a ‘natural’ veneer. When terms like ‘security,’ 
‘prosperity,’ ‘development,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘freedom,’ etc. are used, we all assume 
that we are speaking of the same experience. The tutelage of the Other makes it 
                                            
39 While Howard Zinn’s, A People’s History of the United States is still the premier 
exemplar of such historical revisionism, we can see that there are now many others. In Appendix 
I include some of the ‘alternative’ historical texts which are more focused on Latin American 
experience.  
40 A Passion for God: “On the Way to a Postidealist Theology,” 41. “It is precisely 
because Christians believe in an eschatological meaning for history that they can risk historical 
consciousness: looking into the abyss. Precisely because of this, they can risk a memory that 
recalls not only the successful but the ruined, not only that which has been realized but that which 
has been lost, a memory that in this way—as dangerous memory—resists identifying meaning 
and truth with the victory of what has come into being and continues to exist.”  
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patently clear that this is not the case. With the help of the Other, this sub-
moment creates a space for us to critically interrogate some assumptions that we 
have heretofore accepted.41  In this sub-moment we will not a priori condemn or 
accept any category, image, theory etc. Rather, in dialogue we will revisit all of 
them. We are not aiming to be ‘anti’ development or ‘anti’-democratic; rather, we 
will acknowledge that these concepts cannot be fully realized until we grasp how 
the Other understands, enacts, and holds them.  
Resurrection  
The resurrection sub-moment may take on many forms or embodiments. 
There will, however, be two general elements to this ‘new life’: an altered 
understanding of citizenship, and a qualitatively different relationship to the 
military. The first feature is a more porous and flexible understanding of our 
loyalty to the nation-state. This does not, however, entail a complete rejection of 
our country. This newly resurrected life leads to our holding much more loosely to 
our identity as citizens of a specific nation. This new life allows us to challenge 
                                            
41 One can see that part of Dussel’s project is to have us interrogate many of these 
assumptions, particularly the ‘logic’ of modernity, which is to say its epistemological foundation. 
Philosophy of Liberation, Preface: “What follows is addressed to the neophytes of philosophy of 
liberation. It does not claim to be an exhaustive exposition. It is a discourse that proceeds by 
elaborating one thesis after another, using its own categories and its own method. It is a 
provisional theoretical philosophical framework…Written from the periphery, for persons and 
peoples of the periphery, this book nonetheless also addresses readers in the center of the 
present world system. It is like the alienated child who protests against the overbearing father; the 
child is becoming an adult. Philosophy, the exclusive patrimony of, first, the Mediterranean world 
and then of Europe, now finds an origination that allows it to be authentically worldwide for the 
first time in the course of human history. It is my hope that the theoretical philosophical framework 
that I am proposing—an ensemble of theses calculated to foster a certain type of thinking—will 
spark a worldwide philosophical dialogue. It sets out, of course, from the periphery but, for the 
most part, it uses the language of the center. It could not do otherwise. The slave, in revolt, uses 
the master’s language; the woman, when she frees herself from the dominant male, uses macho 
language. Philosophy of liberation is postmodern, popular (of the people, with the people), 
profeminine philosophy. It is philosophy expressed by (“pressed out from”) the youth of the world, 
the oppressed of the earth, the condemned of world history.”   
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not only the perceptions and assumptions of the nation-state but our fellow 
citizens. To some degree this would be in direct opposition to an essentialist 
reading of any community. This essentialist framework is the kind that was found 
most pronounced in the conflict model presented above. In the resurrected sub-
moment we will see that the Nation-State was a socially constructed reality which 
has its usefulness but can no longer take the place of deeper and more 
foundational affiliations in general and ethical demands in particular. The second 
shift will be the disentangling which will need to occur between our identification 
with the nation-state and its military. In common parlance, we speak of how the 
members of the military are ‘our’ men and women serving in the military. This is 
important because we do not speak with the same level of commitment to other 
communities that are part of our nation-state.42 This understanding of who is part 
of ‘our’ community and who is not is important because it tends to fetishize the 
military and make all interrogation of its practices more difficult because more 
suspect. What is especially important is that it is not uncommon for ‘our’ military 
to be involved in the killing of ‘the Other’ as part of their duty. Here we see how 
the faculty to identify who is us and who is Other has life and death 
consequences.  
 
Emancipatory Praxis 
                                            
42 Many authors have written about our ‘overzealous’ allegiance to ‘war’ in general and 
the military in particular. The writings of John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas speak 
eloquently to this point. I would also cite the work of Walter Wink, particularly his Powers trilogy, 
as well as the work of Ched Myers, and the political theology of Dorothee Sölle. 
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The moment of Emancipatory Praxis has a two-fold dialectical quality. It 
seeks to stay attuned to two functions within the political dimension. The first is 
that it must be on guard to assure that our loyalties to the nation-state, and to its 
various apparatuses, do not mitigate our larger and deeper connections, 
particularly to the Other. The second is to allow the correct use of the nation-
state, and its various apparatuses, to construct a society that deepens, supports, 
and protects the wellbeing of the Other. In the more traditional nomenclature of 
Catholic social thought we can say that Emancipatory Praxis makes certain that 
the principles of Subsidiarity and the Common Good are honored within this 
dimension. 
 
Agapic Solidarity in the Theological Dimension 
Given that we spoke earlier of the religious lens or theological vision being 
shaped within the categories of authority, morality, and salvation we can assume 
that it is within these categories that the process of Agapic Solidarity would 
occur. 
Disruption 
Because it is in this dimension that the tendency for self-referential 
totalization is most pronounced, the most profound disruption will occur in the 
category of authority. The shift from self-referential authority to Other-referential 
authority will be the central shift that must occur.  
In the area of authority it will mean that all that we term ‘natural’ or 
‘divinely sanctioned’ will have to be interrogated through the eyes of the Other. 
  
 
159 
This is important because in this dimension we are in a slumber that gives us the 
illusion that our universe is ordered through divine sanction. In the newly 
disrupted reality, even our most cherished and sacred traditions must be held 
accountable to and by the Other.43 This disruption will lead to a radical ‘atheism’ 
vis à vis all of our divinized systems. This atheism is grounded in our faith in the 
immanent Other in our midst and the Transcendent Other— God.  
Similar to the area of authority our morality will also undergo a thorough 
interrogation by the Other to arrive at a more authentic grasp of the Summum 
bonum. We move from a relative morality which, while appearing absolute, is 
truly just a reflection of the morality sanctioned by the religious authority of that 
time and space. This ethical praxis is more improvisational but it is not arbitrary, 
for it is guided by a deep concern for the Other.44 In this disrupted life we will 
never be completely sure of how ‘good’ we are being from within a self-referential 
morality.  
                                            
43 A Passion for God; “Theology and the University,” 134: “In my view there is one 
authority recognized by all great cultures and religions: the authority of those who suffer. 
Respecting the suffering of strangers is a precondition for every culture; articulating others’ 
suffering is the presupposition of all claims to truth. Even those made by theology.” [italics added] 
44 Ethics and Community, 49-50: “To many, Jesus’ ethical demands have seemed 
paradoxical. Are these “obligations’ not impossible to understand or fulfill? If “paradoxical” (Gk., 
para “alongside of, beyond”; doxa, “opinion, decree”) be taken to mean something opposed to the 
prevailing moral opinion, then Jesus’ teaching is indeed paradoxical. It flies in the face of the 
whole of morality, in the name of the absolute, transcendent, critical horizon of all morality: the 
“ethical.” It consists in praxis as activity directed toward, and relationship to (1.2) the other as 
other, as a person, as sacred, as absolute. The ethical is not governed by moral norms—by what 
the system proclaims to be good (3.7). The ethical is governed by what the poor require, by the 
needs of the oppressed, by the struggle with the domination, the structures, and the relationship 
established by the Prince of “this world” (2.10). Thus the ethical transcends the moral. Moral 
systems are relative. Latin American history has witnessed the Aztec, the colonial, and the 
capitalistic morality. Each of these systems has sought to legitimate the praxis of domination as 
good, each in its own way. Ethics by contrast, is one, and absolute—valid in every situation and 
every age.”  
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It is in the area of salvation that the ana- or beyond of the analectical 
method is most explicitly applied. For it is here that we see that salvation can 
only occur to the degree that our praxis calls us ‘beyond’ our reigning systemic 
moral codes and laws and toward the Other who is still suffering. In the disruption 
moment we make the connection between our salvation and that of working 
towards ending all oppressive systems. In this way we come to realize how 
intimate and interdependent is the salvation of ourselves and the Other. This is 
particularly unsettling and disruptive because it reminds us that our religious fate 
is intimately tied to that of the Other. No longer can we earn ‘heaven’ by our 
‘selves.’ We live with a degree of uncertainty when it comes to our salvation.45 
This degree of uncertainty need not be seen as a curse or even a punishment, 
but rather as a vocation of living an ethical love of neighbor life this side of the 
fully realized Reign of God.  
Agapic Discipleship  
Remembrance  
The remembrance aspect of the theological dimension demands that we 
pay singular attention to the dangerous memories of the innocent suffering of the 
victims of history. These dangerous memories can become a corrective in the 
religious dimension precisely because it can so easily fall prey to reading history 
from the perspective of the victors and not the vanquished. We are, however, 
called always to surface these uncomfortable and dangerous memories during 
                                            
45 A Passion for God, “Theology as Theodicy,” 56. “There is a hint of something 
unreconciled in Christianity. To banish this would be an expression not of faith, but of smallness 
of faith.” 
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this discipleship period.46 It is here that we place position ourselves as “Hearers 
of the Word” so that we can remember and begin to learn the language of the 
Other.  
Recitation  
In the theological dimension what is revealed to us is what aspect of the 
Other’s Weltanschauung they ascribe ultimate authority. Remember that this 
recitiation period always has the twofold element of both reciting the worldview of 
the Other to the Other, and concurrently inviting critique and dialogue to see if we 
are in fact hearing their reality correctly. This gives a greater sense of authenticity 
to our theological claims, insights, and assertions.47It also allows us to be in the 
liminal space from which ongoing conversion is possible and from which the 
seduction of a reified, divinized order is less likely to occur.  
Resurrection 
The Resurrection sub-moment in the theological dimension is one that 
recalls the ‘house of many rooms’ spoken of in the Gospel of John. It allows for a 
religious vision in which pluralism is not merely ‘tolerated’ but rather understood 
as a more accurate reflection of the Reign of God. In this way it shares 
similarities to the insights brought forth from the cultural dimension. Like the 
cultural dimension, here we will seek to inhabit a world in which many worlds can 
coexist and in this way we will seek to create a world ‘as it is in heaven.’ Because 
                                            
46 Love’s Strategy: “In the Pluralism of Religious and Cultural Worlds,” 172: “ The 
Obedience cannot therefore be glossed over by the Church. Actually it can become a basis for a 
profound critique of the Church action itself…for me, therefore, this authority alone manifests the 
authority of the judging God in the world for all humanity. The moral conscience is formed by 
obedience to this authority, and what we call the voice of conscience is our reaction when the 
suffering of the other strikes home.” 
47 Love’s Strategy, 8. “ We must act and do theology while touching the victims.” 
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of this Eschatological Proviso48 we must always be conscious of how we will 
never have full access to all the “rooms.” Here again we will  recognize and 
appreciate the need for ongoing metanoia. This is even more true as we 
discharge the final moment of Emancipatory Praxis. 
Emancipatory Praxis 
The fundamental goal of this moment is to work in everything for the 
creation of the Reign of God and the embodiment of the love of neighbor 
command. This will always entail seeking the wisdom, insights, and experiences 
of the Other, and particularly of the poor. This moment is particularly difficult to 
inhabit because one has to tread a fine line between being a servant to the Other 
and not being a slave to the Other. We are not seeking to be held ‘hostage’ to the 
demands of the Other, in the Levinasian sense, but rather to understand the 
intimate relationship between our ultimate loyalty to God, and specifically the love 
command of the Lord Jesus Christ, and our provisional albeit essential loyalty to 
serving the Other in our midst.49 It is, however, important to note that this loyalty 
and love of God and neighbor has embedded in it a demand that calls us to 
continue in every situation to reduce unjust suffering and engage in emancipatory 
praxis.50 
                                            
48 This is a term used by Metz to indicate how we are truly living in an apocalyptic 
timeframe. He feels that an aspect of this vision was lost as we became beholden to the 
‘evolutionary vision’ found with modernity. See chapter three for the details.  
49 1 John 4:20: “Yes, we love him because he first loved us. If a man says, “I love God” 
and hates his brother, he is a liar. For if he does not love the brother before his eyes how can he 
love the one beyond his sight? And in any case it is his explicit command that the one who loves 
God must love his brother too.” New Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition. 
50 A Passion for God, “Theology as Theodicy,” 55. “The question immanent to this 
discourse about God is first and foremost the question about the salvation of those who suffer 
unjustly. The truth that guides it is known only in committed resistance against every form of 
injustice that creates suffering.” [italics added] 
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Conclusion: Ancient Text in Contemporary Context 
 The process of Agapic Discipleship begins with the ethical 
injunction made to all Christians: love your neighbor. This injunction must now be 
understood within a globalized, pluralistic social reality. In this new reality the 
neighbor is none other than the Other in our midst. The love of neighbor or the 
Other needs to contain two essential elements; that of honoring our deep 
interconnectedness that is so much a part of our current milieu,51 and also to 
honor the potency of particularity. Agapic Solidarity grew out of my desire to 
create a process which would allow a love of neighbor that did not fall into either 
one of the two common errors found in some contemporary ethical discourse. 
The first is the premature claim to universalism that is merely a particularity 
elevated to a false universal. This has the effect of blunting and silencing 
particularities and diminishing the dignity of the Other. The second error can be 
found in some of the most extreme forms of essentialist or post-modernist 
thinkers who speak of differences that are so profound as to be insurmountable. I 
believe that the process of Agapic Solidarity allows for the creation and revelation 
of deep interconnectedness between and among communities without 
surrendering the uniquely particular contribution that each would bring to all the 
dimensions of human experience.
                                            
51 Min 
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CONCLUSION  
AGAPIC SOLIDARITY: A KAIROS RESPONSE FOR A KAIROS MOMENT 
 
Agapic Solidarity:  A Kairos Reponse for a Kairos Moment 
This project began as an exploration of the love command found within 
Christian ethical discourse. Specifically, how are we called to love our neighbor 
within the contemporary world, which is necessarily a shifting, and therefore 
confusing, social/cultural/historical context.  
The process of Agapic Solidarity grew out of an appraisal of the current 
milieu of pluralism. The process attempts to navigate between the Charybidis of 
an inauthentic and premature sense of unity and the Scylla of an irremediably 
fragmented social reality. We are entering a Kairos moment in which the need to 
acknowledge our interdependence while at the same time maintaining our 
particularity has reached the level of species survival. Benjamin Franklin’s 
observation that “We must, indeed, all hang together or most assuredly we shall 
all hang separately” is apt.   The old models of how to engage communities that 
are different than us have become ineffective and perhaps even destructive.  We 
must find a way to construct a new vocabulary to deal with this new reality. 
Agapic Solidarity will help move this conversation forward. 
This conclusion has three sections. The first section is a brief re-
articulation of the situation in which we find ourselves. This will include some 
clarifications of the more extreme positions currently proposed as solutions to the 
situation of pluralism. The second section is a brief explanation of the project 
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itself and highlights the contribution made by both Johann Baptist Metz and 
Enrique Dussel to the creation of this process. The final section speaks to some 
of the ways and some of the places in which the process of Agapic Solidarity 
may be applied in the future.  
 
Solidaristic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century: Who is My Neighbor? 
In his seminal work “The Soul of Black Folk” W. E. B. Dubois asserted that 
“The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line.” Dubois 
was trying to focus attention on what he saw as the central quandary in the body 
politic of the United States, and the world. We can speak of the problem of the 
twenty-first century as the problem of the Other line. The Other in all his or her 
manifestations is now part of our world. This is, in part, due to what Gustavo 
Gutierrez called the ‘irruption of the poor onto the world stage.’ This irruption of 
not only the ‘materially’ poor but all marginalized voices is now part of our 
quotidian existence, as are its repercussions and causes. A by-product of this 
reality is an awareness of a new level of pluralism. Whether this pluralism is seen 
as a problem, a question, or as something worth celebrating varies; what is 
undeniable is that it is now part of all social reality. One could argue that the 
recent rise of some forms of fundamentalism is a reaction to this new pluralism. It 
seeks a misguided desire to ‘go back’ to a bygone era. Yet recent events have 
reminded us that we can no longer close our eyes to the Other in our midst. If we 
do those Others will insinuate themselves into our world in some form. The 
insinuation will be experienced by us as a disruption which awakens us from our 
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ontological slumber, though this pluralistic reality has not caught everyone 
unaware, particularly not the Others themselves. When we study history with the 
lens of the Other, we realize that  the voiceless were not without voice but rather 
that they were systematically silenced. One of the things that Agapic Solidarity 
calls us to do is to cultivate the skill of listening to the Other.1 For this to occur we 
                                            
1 I will cite two examples that suggest how we have been asleep to the 
Other.   
9/11: A Morning Wake Up Call 
While it is easy for many people in the United States to believe that our 
interaction with people in the Middle East in general and Muslim people in 
particular began on this tragic date it would be naïve to the point of negligence 
not to see how our remarkable history with the many communities involved in this 
incident extends back many, many years. It would also be naïve and simplistic to 
try to speak of one or even two ‘causes’ of this profound human tragedy. In the 
old model it would be easy to attempt to explain the event as caused by one 
conflict (i.e. Muslim Terrorist vs. Christian Nation-States, Modernity vs. Religious 
Fundamentalist etc.). In the reality of a pluralistic world we must look at multiple 
causes and multiple agents to understand this event. 
Illegal Immigrants in the South-West: “History repeats itself, first as 
tragedy, then as farce” 
 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger addressed the issue of the need 
for people in the United States to take seriously the question of language, and 
specifically the need to understand the importance of learning English in the 
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must create a process by which the various communities can have an encounter 
that does not lead to either premature unity or extreme postmodern 
fragmentation.  
Premature Unity  
In the premature unity position, the categories and paradigms that are 
used to explain and contend with reality gloss over real differences and divisions. 
We saw how the post-colonialist theorists spoke of this as an aspect of the 
colonial wound in general. When such theorists speak of the privileges of 
enunciation and epistemology, this is part of the issue they are addressing. Yet 
whether such speech is well intentioned or nefarious, we will never resolve the 
real conflicts and contradictions that are part of social reality if we allow our 
                                                                                                                                  
United States. What was most ironic about this event was that he was speaking 
in a city named Sacramento. He also said that he was going to speak to a 
different group on this important issue in the city of Los Angeles. When we speak 
of the issue of undocumented workers (particularly from Mexico) it is staggering 
to see how we allow ourselves to stay asleep to brute historical facts.  What is 
most problematic about this particular issue is that we are asking them to honor 
‘our past,’ especially the documents by the Founding Fathers, but to willfully 
ignore certain historical periods when the United States ‘interacted’ with Mexico.  
Not only do we not wish to wake up to the reality of the Other but we are asking 
them to join us in our dream state. Yet the reality is that for the most part our 
dream has been their nightmare. I hope that the Appendix helped illuminate this 
position. 
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discourse to be dictated by the fallacious reasoning and perceptions found in this 
paradigm that see all division and difference as divisive and places a premium on 
peace over justice. When this group speaks of seeking peace they frequently 
mistake a quietism in which all dissent is silenced for actual authentic peace. 
Such discourse seeks to create and maintain a universalism at all costs, 
specifically at the cost of recognizing the autonomous ontology of the Other. 
Postmodern Fragmentation 
Richard Rorty asserts that a fundamental feature of post-modernist 
thought is a deep suspicion of all ‘meta-narratives.’2 If the premature unity 
position suffers mostly from a misguided vision of how, when, and who is 
connected, then the Postmodern Fragmented position suffers from a vision which 
disallows all assertions of similarities or connection. When we speak of the 
Postmodern Fragmented position  we are not speaking of all postmodernist 
philosophies but rather some of the more extreme forms of ‘us/them’ thinking as 
well as any vision which sees all attempts at expressing a ‘universal’ reality as a 
hegemonic power play.3 This position posits that the chasm that separates the 
various communities is so large that all attempts at some larger, unifying ‘meta’ 
vision is doomed to failure. Agapic Solidarity opts for a different response. This  
more nuanced response can be constructed using the work of Enrique Dussel 
and Johann B. Metz. 
                                            
2 Seyla Benhabib notes this critique in her work Situating the Self: Gender, Community 
and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. 
3 I use the work of Samuel Huntington and Dinesh D’Souza as examples of this type of 
extreme us/them thinking. I believe that they would not self-identify as Postmodernist but 
nonetheless they speak in terms reminiscent of this ‘hardened post-modern’ position, particularly 
in the way they view ‘culture’ in a highly ‘essentialist’ and static manner.  
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Prophetic Voices: Johann B.  Metz and Enrique Dussel 
The Analectical Method of Enrique Dussel: “Justice can never be Just Us” 
Influenced by the work of Immanuel Levinas, Enrique Dussel confronts the 
question of how to respond to the Other by asserting that ethics is prior to 
ontology. Prior to any ‘beingness’ (including, and especially my own) comes the 
Other. This ethical demand posed by the Other is both disturbing and intriguing. 
To accept that the Other has an autonomous existence beyond my recognition of 
her is a powerful realization.  To know (and accept) that we will never be able to 
fully ‘capture’ the Ultimate Mystery which is an aspect of all Others is a 
challenge. It requires us to understand that an ethical response toward the Other 
requires, in part, an acknowledgement of the Other’s transcendent reality and 
also a defense of this reality when it is attacked. It is difficult for us to accept how 
actively acknowledging differences is, in part, a way to become closer to the 
Other. In the Analectical Method of Dussel we find a way of engaging the Other 
which allows us to honor the Otherness of the Other while also seeking common 
ground.  However, we are still left with a quandary: if in fact this Other was truly 
and completely other than myself, then where and how could we begin to create 
any connections? While this problem is most accurately and beneficially 
articulated in the writings of Dussel, part of the resolution would be found in the 
categories of Johann Baptist Metz.  
The Categories of Johann B. Metz: A Liberating Language 
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In Metz’s categories of Memory, Narrative, and Solidarity we find the 
necessary building blocks for constructing a ‘grammar’ that would facilitate the 
beginning of a language with which to communicate with the Other. We are able 
to see that the first step to doing this was by releasing all pretense of our 
understanding of reality. We begin by learning a new language.  This was 
particularly true in the area of historical reality. In dealing with Memory, first we 
are  again reminded of how frequently we have to look back to move forward. 
This looking back, however, was not with the lens of our understanding but rather 
with the lens of the Other. It was their history which we must study, not our 
history with/of the Other. The place of Narrative would entail seeing and, to the 
degree that one can, experiencing the world of the Other. Here it would be 
imperative to recall the distinction principle of which Dussel speaks. In simple 
terms the Distinction Principle states that no matter how close we get to the 
Other (in Solidarity) we will never be able to fully experience the world as the 
Other. The continued honoring of the transcendent otherness of the Other is 
actually a demonstration of love and an embodiment of deep connection and 
understanding.   Finally, Solidarity was about actively engaging in the Other’s 
struggles using some of their strategies and honoring their goals. In a real sense 
it meant that we, as a Christian, are bearing not my cross, but the cross for and 
with the Other.  
Accepting the Dusselian perspective which asserts a built-in limitation to 
Humans (as a species) which is always trapped within the horizon of our own 
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being and then using the Metzian Categories as a heuristic device to find ways to 
break free from this ignorance brought forth the process of Agapic Solidarity.  
 
New Language/New Lands: Agapic Discipleship as Counter-Hegemonic 
Discourse 
The Many Faces and Places of Agapic Discipleship 
Because of the novelty of the process, speaking of its ‘application’ has an 
intentionally vague quality. Agapic Solidarity could be used in many areas of life. 
This process has enough elasticity to allow for the application to have a highly 
improvisational quality. In this final section we will only hint at some possible 
places in which to apply this method.  
In exploring the many arenas that Agapic Solidarity could be applied, we 
can rely on the work of David Tracy. Tracy introduced the idea of the three 
Audiences which all theologians must address in doing theology; Academy, 
Society, and Church.4  
Academy: 
 We must broaden the category of the Academy to include all educational 
institutions, public and private. Some components of this process were originally 
developed as part of a curriculum to teach principles of social justice to high 
school students. It is in these types of settings that we could most actively 
address the question of Remembrance and Recitation.  To the degree that in 
these institutions we transmit a worldview to our ‘students’ we must ask 
                                            
4 Both of his works; The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of 
Pluralism, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology speaks to addressing these 
three audiences.  
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ourselves to whose worldview are we giving primacy? Whose stories are being 
told? Dussel’s “The Invention of the Americas” is a great example of how the 
Academy could ensure that Agapic Solidarity would be practiced in the 
Academy.5  As its title suggests, in this work Dussel reconfigures the ‘discovery’ 
of the Americas narrative so popular in modern discourse and allows the vision of 
the Other to create a more authentic narrative. It is only one example but there 
are many others.  
Society: 
Society includes all forms of cultural discourses. Part of what has occurred 
in recent times is what is sometimes termed the ‘commodification of culture.’ An 
element of this process is the privatizing (specifically for profit) of all aspects of 
social reality. We should resist this movement precisely because it occludes our 
ability to see the Other outside of the ‘for profit’ lens of the market. This 
resistance would entail making more public practices available. One way to 
ensure this is by making a conscious effort to publicly fund cultural and artistic 
practices rather than simply letting ‘market-forces’ dictate terms of engagement 
in this area. We saw one aspect of this issue debated in the recent presidential 
race, when Mitt Romney was counter-posed to Big Bird in terms of representing 
different ‘value systems.’  It is not as though Mitt Romney was ‘against’ Big Bird, 
but rather, he opposed a certain understanding of public cultural practices, that 
the values portrayed through Big Bird and his puppet colleagues merited public 
television funding. When Henry Ford said that, “What is good for Ford is good for 
                                            
5 I believe such tomes were always being written, so this project may necessitate a 
retrieval process as a creating process.  
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America” he was creating a ‘lens’ by which to view all notions of progress, 
development, and even success. We can no longer suggest that any ‘corporate 
entity’ or private individual speaks for all people. Rather, the Other will tell us 
what is good for them. Agapic Solidarity helps create a social space for this 
discussion to begin.  
Church: 
The Church as a possible repository and guardian of the “dangerous 
memories” of innocent suffering beginning with Jesus Christ would be the most 
natural place from which to practice the spirit of Agapic Solidarity. It must also be 
a place which creates ‘sacramental practices’ that embody the various ‘moments’ 
of Agapic Solidarity.  One of the things that must occur for this ideal to be 
realized is a reawakening of the Prophetic Voice within the Church. This may at 
times require the institutional Church to practice a much more militant, 
oppositional, and consciously counter-cultural stance.  
 
Conclusion  
 All theological reflection comes forth from the intersection of a faith 
that is gift and a specific historical context.6The gift of faith is made manifest in 
                                            
6 A Theology of Liberation, Gutierrez, Gustavo (New York: Orbis Books, 1985) 3 
“Theological reflection—that is, the understanding of the faith—arises spontaneously and 
inevitably in the believer, in all those who have accepted the gift of the Word of God. Theology is 
intrinsic to a life of faith seeking to be authentic and complete and is, therefore, essential to the 
common consideration of this faith in the ecclesial community. There is present in all believers—
and more so in every Christian community—a rough outline of a theology. There is present an 
effort to understand the faith, something like a pre-understanding of the faith which is manifested 
in life, action, and concrete attitude. It is on this foundation, and only because of it, that the edifice 
of theology—in the precise and technical sense of the term—can be erected. This foundation is 
not merely a jumping-off point, but the soil into which theological reflection stubbornly and 
permanently sinks its roots and from which it derives its strength.”  
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Jesus Christ; his life, ministry and message. One component of his life, ministry 
and message was the call to love our neighbor. This project as a form of 
theological ethical reflection seeks to articulate that command within a very 
specific historical context.  
The question that I began the project with was; what does love of neighbor 
look like in the 21st century? In order to address this question we first must 
analyze our contemporary context. Two qualities which are crucial to our 
grasping the current world we inhabit are the features of interdependence and 
the potency of particularity. We live in a world in which our growing 
interdependence is evident in every dimension (theological, economic, political 
etc.) and yet we are aware of how each community seeks to be recognized within 
its own terms.  If we are to learn to love our neighbor we must do it in a way that 
fully grasps these elements.  
The process of Agapic Solidarity attempts to create such a bridge. In 
accepting the otherness of the Other and beginning with their perspective we 
allow ourselves to be form (and informed) by a vision greater then ourselves. In 
the first moment of Agapic Solidarity; Disruption all our epistemological and 
enunciatory privileges are called into question. In the second moment; Agapic 
Discipleship we begin the long and arduous process of constructing a love ethic 
with the Other. The final moment; Emancipatory Praxis seeks to realize that the 
call of Christian ethic is not merely to transform individual relationships but to 
move towards what is now called structural change. It means we are called to 
change, challenge and affirm all communities, including to those which we 
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belong. The hope is that many will use this project to illuminate the face of the 
Other and bring us ever closer to the Reign of God.  
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APPENDIX  
METHODOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY 
 
In a project of this size it would be impossible to deal with all concerns, 
questions, or objections that the development of a new process engenders; 
however I would like to address some of these within this section. The three 
issues which I will address are:(1) A concern (and clarification) of the various 
terms involved in this project, particularly the Other, the poor, and the neighbor; 
(2) An objection to the absence of traditional ethical discourses (utilitarianism 
etc.) within the project; and finally (3) The question of how one can interrogate 
the worldview of the Other within the process of Agapic Solidarity.  
 
The Concern: Terms of Clarification 
The three terms which are used somewhat interchangeably in this project 
are the Other, the poor, and the neighbor.  Because this may lead to some 
confusion I would like to do a retracing of the terms within this project. I began 
this project with the question of what the ethical demand of love of neighbor look 
like within our current context. Because my initial entry into this question is the 
biblical text, I felt the need to utilize this term. I am conscious that there are many 
ways to conceptualize the neighbor. For me the best understanding of who is the 
neighbor within our midst, and how to best understand the demand made by this 
love, is found in the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. Through his understanding of 
the Torah and Talmudic traditions, Levinas helps cement a bond between the 
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neighbor and the Other.7Levinas’ understanding of the Other is a more precise 
conceptualization of both who the neighbor is and what Jesus asks of his 
disciples.  Levinas properly problematized the issues of identity and proximity. He 
realized that the love demand as articulated in the teachings of the Gospel must 
now engage the absolute questioning of all our totalities, including: Who is the 
neighbor? and, How is love to be understood?  However, Levinas’ understanding 
of the Other seemed to lack a properly political dimension. While he was very 
much opposed to the egocentric mode of discourse found in traditional 
philosophical ontology, he could not rid himself of an anthropology that focused 
too much on the individual. This anthropology does not do justice to the 
anthropologies found in non-European, non-Western discourses. I found some 
relief from this myopia in the writings of Enrique Dussel. He was able to articulate 
the proper responsibility we have to the Other and was able to cast this question 
in light of a more communal understanding of the self and the Other. Like most 
liberation thinkers he spoke of the Poor as a ‘collective’ identity. However, even 
Dussel realized that ‘the poor’ is a term that is in constant need of 
contextualization. Specifically by properly understanding how power is defined 
within any given context we can speak of the poor as those who lack ‘power.’ In 
my project the poor, the Other, and the neighbor are all understood from within 
the context of the dimensions.  
 
The Objection: Familiar Themes, Unfamiliar Visions 
                                            
7Of God Who Comes to Mind, Totality and Infinity, et al. 
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The objection that this project of creating a theological ethical process of 
how to love our neighbor does not draw upon many of the traditional resources 
for ethical discourse is one that operates at a more foundational level than mere 
word choice.  I will seek to address this issue by speaking of the intentional 
absence as stemming from a theoretical consideration that is crucial to my 
argument and position.  
The fundamental assertion that I make in my creation of Agapic Solidarity 
is that we cannot know how to love the neighbor or the Other without first 
consulting them on their terms. It would be very difficult to create an ethic of love 
that begins with any of my previous held ethical paradigms. I am conscious that I 
could have begun my project using some more traditional perspectives and 
schools of thought.  I am certain that traditional virtue ethics or a form of social 
ethics would have much to contribute to the discussion of love of neighbor.  
However, to begin to speak of the imperative quality of viewing the Other as 
other within their own Weltanschauung and then simply to retreat to our 
theoretical sources and conceptual frameworks seems to me misguided.  For this 
reason I found that I had to situate the origins of my reflections in other locations. 
The two locations that I found most promising as sources for beginning my 
theoretical framework were the liberationist tradition and the post-colonial theorist 
schools. I would like to speak a bit more about each of these traditions and 
particularly about how they do, in fact, intersect with some more traditional ethical 
perspectives.  
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Enrique Dussel has always critically engaged the traditional ethical 
positions of his time. 8 One of the insights that Dussel repeatedly demonstrates is 
how Modernity and particularly its claim to Rationality betrays a fundamental 
irrationality in its inability to confront its violent, exploitative history along with all 
its implications.9 This critique of rationality is part of why it would be difficult for 
me to begin with any of the traditional, mainstream, or rational perspectives on 
ethics (Virtue, Natural Law etc.). I, like Dussel, do not believe that one should 
reject modernity and all of its intellectual underpinnings wholesale but rather that 
one cannot begin from their perspective. I found this to be imperative in the 
creation of Agapic Solidarity precisely because of its focus on the love element in 
the Christian injunction. To me, an essential element of this love must be a true 
acknowledgement of the autonomous ethical authority of the Other.  
Post-Colonial theory is a broad and fruitful area of intellectual discourse. 
Because of the limits of this project, here I will focus only on the writings of 
Walter Mignolo. Like liberation philosophy, postcolonial studies seeks to situate 
all studies, disciplines, and projects within a framework that is reflective of a 
                                            
8 He has done this in virtually all of his works. However, some central texts are 
Philosophy of Liberation, Thinking from the Underside of History: Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of 
Liberation, Ethics and Community, and Etica de La Liberacion en La Edad de La Globalizacion y 
De La Exclusion. 
9 The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of ‘the other” and the Myth of Modernity, 12: “In 
this book, I will seek the origin of the “myth of modernity,” which justifies European violence and is 
distinct from modernity’s rational emancipative concept. Postmoderns, such as Lyotard, Vatimo, 
and Rorty, criticize modern rationality as an instrument of terror, but I criticize it for concealing it 
own irrational myth. I endeavor to overcome modernity through “transmodernity, a project of the 
future”—which could serve as an alternate title to this book.  The birthdate of modernity is 1492, 
even though its gestation, like that of a fetus, required a period of intrauterine growth. Whereas 
modernity gestated in the free creative medieval European cities, it came to birth in Europe’s 
confrontation with the Other. By controlling, conquering, and violating the Other, Europe defined 
itself as discoverer, conquistador, and colonizer of an alterity like-wise constitutive of modernity. 
Europe never discovered (des-cubierto) this Other as Other but covered over (encubierto) the 
Other as part of the Same: i.e. Europe. Modernity dawned in 142 and with it the myth of a special 
kind of sacrificial violence which eventually eclipsed whatever was non-European.”  
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different reality than what is sometimes referred to as the center (read: Western 
Europe and the United States). Like Dussel, it claims that the colonization project 
has not only occluded aspects of human history but also colonized inner space in 
terms of engaging in the creation of certain models of Subjectivy. If in some 
traditional ethics we speak of ‘human flourishing’ as the telos of ethical and moral 
discourse, post-colonial theory would begin by interrogating who gets to decide 
what constitutes humanness. Similar to the project of Levinas we can speak of 
an ethic that exists before ontology. Mignolo also has spoken extensively about 
one arena in which this contestation must occur, in part because the arena in 
which the subjugation occurred is in the creation of knowledge spaces.  
The desire to reflect in my intellectual praxis what I seek to explicate in all 
area of my life is in great part why I have intentionally moved away from citing 
more traditional school of thoughts found in contemporary ethical discourse. I 
wish again to state that this objection is not unimportant to me and I welcome 
further development in this area by being in dialogue with other traditions.  
 
The Question: The Privileged Other Dilemma 
The final question is posed by many who find that the process of Agapic 
Solidarity seems to leave no particular space where the Other’s assumptions, 
perspectives, conceptual frameworks, worldview etc. can be properly 
interrogated.  This objection or question is serious in that without a safeguard of 
some kind one could allow for the inadvertent reification of the Other that would 
merely replace one hegemonic pattern for another. In my understanding of the 
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process of Agapic Solidarity I see the sub-moment of Resurrection and the later 
moment of Emancipatory Praxis to be the locations in which this dialogue and 
interrogation aspect would be found. I also would agree with Anselm Min that we 
can to some degree speak of a world in which we are all Others to each other.10 
My concern with aspects of Min’s work is that he does not focus sufficiently on 
the historical implications of colonialism. This can lead to an inadvertent ‘leveling’ 
of responsibilities in terms of creating conditions of justice. By this I mean that we 
have to deal with issues of accountability and responsibility in a way which shows 
a clear preference for the poor within traditional historical discourse. This 
nuanced thought is found in the authors from the post-colonialist traditions, 
among others. However, even with this caution vocalized, I still believe that we 
have always to be cautious not merely to replace one Same or Totality with 
another. 
                                            
10 The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World: A Postmodern Theology after 
Postmodernism, Min. 
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CASE STUDY  
THE UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
AN APPLICATION OF THE METHOD OF AGAPIC SOLIDARITY 
 
Undocumented Migration within the Economic Dimension 
In this case study I provide a practical illustration of Agapic Solidarity,1 
with the United States representing the Same, or the Totality, and the 
undocumented migrant of Latin America representing the Other or the Neighbor.2 
The case study will focus on the economic dimension. My fundamental assertion 
is that all other dimensions are ultimately mediated through the economic 
dimension.3 Roberto S. Goizueta has made a similar argument, drawing on the 
example of the Eucharist:   
Before these physical objects are religious symbols, they are economic 
products. Their religious meaning is mediated not only by their physicality 
in general, but by the specifically economic character of that physicality. 
                                            
1 Please see footnote # 1 in the Introduction. 
2 Latin America is a term that needs some unpacking and clarification. This is true for 
several reasons: the first is because some parts of the American continent were Latin American 
long before they were the United States of America. The second reason is that many of the 
people in Central and South America feel a deep connection with one another, particularly in their 
historical relation to the United States of America, and this creates a sense of common identity. 
The former President of Mexico, Porfirio Diaz, famously said, “Pity poor Mexico, so far from God 
and so close to the United States.” The sentiment expressed in this saying is felt by many people 
throughout Latin America. This is particularly true when it comes to how the capitalist class of the 
United States has had similar economic policies towards all of Latin America. This is, in part, why 
throughout this chapter as we go through the process of Agapic Solidarity in the economic 
dimension I will use examples from various historical periods and countries of Latin America. This 
identification of themselves as one unity entitled ‘Latin America’ rather than solely individual 
nation-states more clearly reflects their experience of the economic dimension.   
3 Much of my argument in this section is based on the writings of Roberto S. Goizueta 
and Enrique Dussel.  
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The bread is not merely a physical object like any other; it is ‘fruit of the 
earth and work of human hands.”4  
Precisely because we are human, even this dimension of our existence — 
the religious, that is, the most transcendent— must be mediated by a “material” 
dimension: the economic. Precisely as “sacrament,” the eucharist is the material 
mediation of the transcendent.  The sacramental character of all human 
existence is particularly important in an ethical method that takes seriously the 
incarnational character of the Gospel.  What can be said about the theological or 
religious dimension can be said with equal force about all other dimensions.  
 
The Economic Dimension: The Invisible Hand of “Living Labor” 
In chapter two I claim that the economic system that has asserted 
hegemonic status is an advanced (globalized) capitalist system. There are many 
peripheral features within this specific historical epoch of Capitalism that do make 
it unique; however, the central features remain the same.5 Within the current 
version of Capitalism, as with all previous versions, the Other appears as the 
invisible ‘living labor’ of the human person. This means that within the relations 
between the United States of America and the countries of Latin America the 
                                            
4 Goizueta, S. Roberto, Caminamos Con Jesus: Toward a Hispanic/Latino Theology of 
Accompaniment, 121-22. 
5 While there are many forms of capitalism, we can sketch out some basic characteristics 
that many aspects of capitalist economies share: a belief that the private sector is the best arena 
(or indeed the only arena) in which the human person thrives; a belief that the government has a 
limited role in the economic dimension of life, specifically that of protecting private property and 
rights; a belief in the autonomous existence of capital as apart from labor; a belief that the means 
of production are best administered through private ownership; and finally the capitalist 
understanding that the primary ‘value’ of a product is its ‘surplus value’ rather then its ‘exchange’ 
or ‘use value.’ Clearly, this is a very general portrait of capitalism and would need to be greatly 
nuanced within each particular context. 
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undocumented migrant becomes one of the embodiments of this ‘living labor’ 
which is consciously and systemically occluded in all discourse. This conscious 
and systemic occlusion precludes any authentic encounter between the Totality 
and the Other. This exclusionary quality, which is endemic to this type of 
Capitalism (and maybe even intrinsic to Capitalism?), disallows any type of 
authentic love of neighbor to occur. Solidaristic Engagement makes it possible 
for us to break free from this hegemonic ‘slumber.’ In explicit terms, any United 
States citizen who claims to want to love, in a Christian fashion, the 
undocumented migrant in an authentic encounter must first break free from the 
stranglehold which limits their ethical horizon. Agapic Solidarity is one of the 
ways in which this break can occur.    
 
Agapic Solidarity: A Method of Encounter with the Other 
Before we begin with the case study, a very brief review of each of the 
moments of the method is in order. This method honors and takes seriously 
distinction, diversity, and difference while also taking equally seriously the 
common ground of human experience. The method of Agapic Solidarity is 
composed of three separate but interconnected ‘moments.’ The first moment is 
entitled Disruption, which indicates how we experience our coming to 
consciousness about the presence of the Other in our midst. The second 
moment, which is called Agapic Discipleship and is composed of three discreet 
sub-moments entitled Remembrance, Recitation, and Resurrection, is the 
moment in which we begin to fully engage and learn from (and about) the Other. 
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The final moment, entitled Emancipatory Praxis, is the moment which speaks to 
our return to the communities of our origin with a new more enlarged vision.  
With this brief summary of Agapic Solidarity behind us, we can now move 
to an actual application of the method. We will walk through each of the moments 
of Agapic Solidarity as it pertains to the Other within the economic dimension. 
More specifically, we will look at the issue of the undocumented migrant of Latin 
American origin within the United States of America. How does one encounter 
and have authentic discourse with and about this particular issue? Even more 
specifically, how can one love the Neighbor in our midst? What specifically is the 
content of this love? How can one apply the method of Agapic Solidarity in order 
to create conditions for an appropriate ethical response? In more specific terms, 
how might one use the method of Agapic Solidarity to love the Neighbor, in this 
case the undocumented migrant from Latin America who finds himself (or 
herself) in the United States? 
 
The Economic Other—The Undocumented Migrant in the United States 
Disruption: “Do You See What I See?”  
The moment of Disruption begins when one realizes that the American 
way of life has been created at the cost of massive misery for many people in 
Latin America.  The American way of life has been produced, created, and 
maintained by the labor and resources of many “non” Americans.  
The tin can is, after all, as much the emblem of the United States as the 
eagle or apple pie. But the can is not merely a “pop” symbol; it is also, if 
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unwittingly, a symbol of silicosis in the Siglo XX and Huanuni mines: 
Bolivians die with rotted lungs so that the world may consume cheap 
tin…Most of the tin refined in the world is consumed in the United States: 
according to Food and Agricultural Organizations figures, the average 
U.S. citizen consumes five times more meat and milk and twenty times 
more eggs than the inhabitant of Bolivia. And the miners are well below 
the national average.6 
This disruption takes on even more force when we recall the actual lived 
experiences of the workers that have made our way of life so convenient and 
pleasurable.7 This understanding of the real cost of the “American way of life” 
must be fully grasped before we can begin any authentic discourse with the 
                                            
6 Open Veins of Latin America, 165. The ‘tin can’ symbol was used by Andy Warhol as a 
way of creating an indigenous symbol of the American Way of Life.  
7 Open Veins of Latin America, 166-67. 
“We were deep down inside the Juan del Valle mountain. Hours earlier the siren that 
shrilly summoned workers of the first shift had resounded through the camp. Going from gallery to 
gallery inside the mine, we had passed from tropical heat to polar cold and back again to the 
heat, always—for hours—in the same poisoned air; humid, gas filled, dusty, smoky. Breathing it 
we could understand why miners lose their sense of smell and taste in a few years. They all chew 
coca-leaf and ash as they work, and this too is part of the annihilation process, for coca, by 
deadening hunger and masking fatigue, turns off the alarm system which helps the organism stay 
alive. But the worst of it was the dust: circles of light from the minders’ helmets danced dimly in 
the gloom, showing thick white curtains of deadly silica. It does not take long to do its work. The 
first symptoms are felt within a year, and in ten years one enters the cemetery. Late-model 
Swedish drills are used in the mine, but the ventilation system and work conditions have not 
improved over time. Up on the surface, independent workers use twelve-pound wooden 
sledgehammers to conquer the rock, just as they did a century ago, as well as antique pumping 
devices and sifters to collect the mineral. They work like dogs and are paid in pennies, but they 
have the advantage of fresh air over the underground workers, prisoners sentenced without 
appeal to death by asphyxiation…Death in the mine can also be quick and thunderous: it is 
enough to miscount the number of detonations or to leave a wick burning longer than it should. Or 
a loose rock, a tojo, may crash on your head. Another form of death is by bullet: St. John’s Night 
of 1967 was the latest bead in a long rosary of massacres. At dawn soldiers took kneeling 
positions on the hillsides and fired volley after volley into mining camps lit by bonfires for the 
fiesta. But slow, silent death is the mine’s speciality [sic]. Vomiting blood, coughing, the sensation 
of a leaden weight on the back and acute chest pains are the first signs that herald it. After the 
medical diagnosis, pilgrimages to an endless chain of bureaucrats. You are allowed three months 
before eviction from your house.” 
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migrants from Latin America. Such a disruption in our economic understanding of 
life comes from the transformed historical perspective that is part of engaging the 
Other. The different perspective allows us to reconfigure the manner in which we 
view the creation of that “American Dream” so central to the current discourse 
surrounding immigration.  
One of the enduring conventions of the literature of Mexican migration to 
the United States is the tendency to equate European and Mexican 
migrations. Indeed, virtually every study of Mexican migration since the 
theme first appeared in the early twentieth century has interpreted that 
migration to be an example of various European peoples escaping harsh 
economic conditions particular to their homelands and moving to the 
United States to enjoy its benefits—in the mythical “American Dream.” 
While some scholars contend that Latinos may not be as successful as 
their European counterparts, the majority argue that Mexican migration 
largely replicates the critical features of European migrations.8 
The standard understanding of undocumented migration from Latin 
America to the United States sees it as a continuation (albeit with some 
significant difference) of the ongoing immigration journey that has been part of 
the history of the United States since its inception.9 A new, and more accurate, 
understanding of exactly how this American Dream of endless opportunity and 
untold wealth was created leads one to view the ‘desire’ for it in a very different 
                                            
8 Guest Worker or Colonized Labor?: Mexican Labor Migration to the United States, 
Gilbert G. Gonzalez (Paradigm Publishers: Boulder/London, 2006), 15.  
9 Samuel Huntington speaks of this, including the distinct qualities of the new influx of 
immigrants, in his book. Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity. 
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light. The myth of the United States as a ‘nation of immigrants’ all seeking a 
better life is characterized by a remembrance and a recitation that allows for the 
citizens of the United States to discount entire historical events. Specifically, the 
myth discounts economic arrangements that have disrupted the lives of the Other 
in a way which continues to have a powerful impact on their current economic 
reality, as well as our own.  The myth makes it possible for us in the United 
States to live in a state of epistemological slumber that ignores imperialistic 
actions of the United States. The Disruption of this myth would require that we 
revisit the history of Latin America and the United States in order to understand 
how this history continues to influence present day reality.10  Such a 
Remembrance is necessary not to impute guilt but rather to make possible an 
authentic conversation about what we (United States) are ‘obligated’ to do for 
them (undocumented Latin Americans), since such a conversation is not possible 
without first coming to terms with what they have done for us. We must also 
come to grips with what we have done and continue to do to them. 
The disruptive ‘awakening’ by the Same (i.e., the United States citizen) 
towards our Neighbor (i.e., the undocumented migrant) at the economic level 
must also contain a more authentic understanding of the profound reliance on 
invisible labor which is still part of all people living in the United States.  
Contemplating a day in Los Angeles without the labor of Latino immigrants 
taxes the imagination, for an array of consumer products and services 
would disappear (poof!) or become prohibitively expensive...Both 
                                            
10 There are many, many books that deal with this issue. I cite only a few in this project.  
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figuratively and literally, the work performed by Latino and Latina 
immigrants gives Los Angeles much of its famed gloss. The Los Angeles 
economy, landscape, and lifestyle have been transformed in ways that 
rely on low-wage, Latino immigrant labor.11 
What Pierette Hondagneu-Sotelo states about Los Angeles could be said 
about virtually every large city in the United States. It is not an exaggeration to 
say that, in any given day, one will come in contact with some aspect of this 
invisible labor. The contact occurs not only in the ‘public’ arena of work but also 
at increased rates in the ‘private’ arena of home life.12  
There are many implications to this labor but the first is our ability to live in 
a manner that we all too frequently take for granted. 
The proliferation of such labor-intensive services, coupled with inflated 
real estate values and booming mutual funds portfolios, has given many 
people the illusion of affluence and socioeconomic mobility. When 
Angelenos, accustomed to employing a full time nanny/housekeeper for 
about $150 or $200 a week, move to Seattle or Durham, they are startled 
to discover how “the cost of living that way” quickly escalates. Only then 
do they realize the extent to which their affluent lifestyle and smoothly 
                                            
11 Domestica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadows of Affluence, 
Pierette Hondagneu-Sotello (University of California Press, 2001), 3. 
12 Ibid. Part One: “Suburban homes are increasingly replacing inner-city factories as the 
places of economic incorporation for new immigrants. While leafy streets and suburban homes 
are easier on the eyes than poorly lit sweatshops, it takes a lot of sweat to produce and maintain 
carefully groomed lawns, homes and children…In the United States and elsewhere, the “new 
economy” not only runs on high-tech information services but also depends on the reorganization 
of how cleaning and care work are performed”  
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running household depended on one Latina immigrant woman.13 (Italics 
added) 
This lifestyle is the very lifestyle that must be disrupted in order to begin a 
process of engagement with the Other. A disrupted life is rooted in the 
acknowledgement that our quotidian existence is deeply connected with, and 
indebted to, the Other. Our point of departure would no longer be what we are 
obligated to do for them but, rather, how we can forge a truly just relationship in 
light of what they have done and continue to do for us. It would also ask how we 
can forge a just relationship in light of what we have done too them.  
This disruption demands, in turn, that we become loving disciples of the 
history and stories of the Other. In doing so, the disruption leads to the second 
moment of Agapic Solidarity, the moment of Agapic Discipleship.  
Agapic Discipleship: Submitting to the Tutelage of the Other 
In this second moment we become disciples of the Other. A disciple is 
someone who ‘is a pupil or ‘an adherent of the doctrines of another.’14 The 
disciple not only learns from but also adheres to the Other. To adhere is ‘to stay 
attached; stick fast; cleave; cling…to hold closely or firmly…to be devoted in 
support or allegiance; be attached as a follower or upholder’15 In Agapic 
Discipleship we connect all our ethical questions, answers and concerns with 
those of our Neighbor. This would mean that we would not be able to speak of 
that which is ‘good,’ ‘right,’ ‘just,’ or even ‘natural,’ without first consulting the 
                                            
13 Ibid., 4.  
14 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Disciple 
15 Ibid.  
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reality of the Other. This discipleship ‘awakens’ (in the Levinasian sense) 
ourselves to how our realities are already deeply connected. This moment entails 
the tripartite process of remembrance, recitation, and resurrection. Each of the 
‘sub-moments’ is inseparable but not identical, and as such must be treated in a 
discreet manner. 
Remembrance 
One way that capitalism occludes the sources of wealth and poverty is 
through the systemic cultivation of ‘forgetfulness’ that covers (cubrir) the Other. 
Specifically, this forgetfulness unfolds in a dialectical fashion. The first strand of 
this forgetfulness is the role played by Latin America in general, and Mexico 
specifically in the creation of wealth for the United States. The second strand is 
the way in which this very same history concurrently produced poverty for the 
Other. This dialectical vision is central to fully grasp the one history which is 
being ‘remembered’ from the perspective of the Other.16  Remembrance is, 
among many things, a process of ‘dis’-covering (descubrir) the Other, especially 
this occluded history. We must acknowledge that this history is occluded from 
most United States citizens but is, at the same time, all too familiar to the Other. 
Although there are many examples of how this dialectical historical movement of 
wealth creation/poverty creation has worked out between the United States and 
Latin America we will use only one event as an exemplar. The historical event 
which we will use as a way of understanding how Remembrance will reconfigure 
                                            
16 This insight is best expressed in the dictum of Walter Benjamin that “Every great work 
of civilization is at the same time a work of barbarism.” 
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our understanding of the economic Other is the so-called “Mexican/American 
War”17 and more specifically, the ensuing peace treaty.18  
This example has two facets and these demand some clarification. The 
history of the relationship between Mexico and the United States, like all histories 
between countries, is unique unto itself. At the same time, the interaction 
between these two countries has features which are all too common from the 
perspective of many in Latin America. We will see that this juxtaposition is played 
out troughout much of the history of U.S./Latin America relations.  
The unique interaction has to do with the particulars of how much of the 
Mexican country is now part of the United States. In this sense we can say that 
the vast majority of the ‘power’ and economic wealth of the United States has 
been uniquely contributed by (this is a benign term; more aptly it might be spoken 
of as having been forcibly wrested from) the people of Mexico. This is not only a 
contemporary reality as noted above in the Disruption moment, but also a fact of 
history. The feature which this Remembrance moment will try to contradict is the 
almost pathological denial by many in the United States of the history of 
interaction between the United States and all of Latin-America. One of the areas 
in which this is especially true is the way in which the United States sees itself as 
a land in which the Law is so central to our identity.19 
                                            
17 It is important to note that even to speak of it as a ‘war’ is to betray a certain bias in the 
remembrance of the event. It is clear that for many historians this was more precisely a case of 
invasion. 
18 There are now many wonderful histories of Latin America that are more authentic and 
entail viewing history from the perspective of the Other. 
19 Who Are We? Samuel Huntington sees this respect for law as a central feature of the 
U.S. character.  
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The use of this particular historical period is important because it holds a 
special place within the contemporary discourse of ‘undocumented migrants’ in 
the United States. One of the common complaints lodged against undocumented 
migrants is that they seem to show an utter contempt for ‘the law’ and this is 
frequently cited as the reason for why they should not be treated with respect or 
care. In fact it is not uncommon to speak of the undocumented migrant as 
‘illegal.’ This is an acceptable position only if one is willing to ‘bracket off’ entire 
decades of United States history. This is not merely a matter of being politically 
correct. It is important to understand that for many Mexican people (and their 
descendents) as well as many United States citizens20 their lived experience is 
that of a country (in this case, the United States) and its citizens who have shown 
utter contempt for all law. Our (undocumented migrant and more generally Latin 
American) Neighbor’s remembrance is of a United States and its citizens 
practicing a ‘selective’ remembrance that borders on the pathological.  
Mexican/U.S. History from the eyes of the Other: The “Real” Illegal 
Immigrants: 
It is not uncommon for us in the United States to speak of ‘illegal 
immigration’ as a contemporary phenomenon. The reality is that migration, both 
legal and illegal, has been a part of this geographical area for many years. A 
central feature of Remembrance is that it is the history of the Other. It is not ‘our’ 
history with the Other, but rather their history, and so any remembrance of ‘illegal 
                                            
20 A wonderful summary of the various United States ‘voices’ of resistance to this 
invasion may be found in the work of Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States.  
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immigration’ in this continent must begin not with our historical horizon but rather 
theirs. There are many places we might begin for the purposes of this project, but 
because so much of the focus of illegal immigration is on the Mexican illegal 
immigrant we will begin with an analysis of U.S. economic development in the 
early nineteenth century. “In the early 1800s many Anglos entered Texas as 
economic refugees from the depression of 1819.”21 These immigrants were 
welcomed with open arms by the Mexican government because the Mexican 
government wanted that part of Mexico to become more densely populated. It is 
important to understand that this is not simply a case of the Americans being 
‘greedy’ expansionists or the Mexican government being ‘friendly.’ As is typical, 
both parties had a multitude of motives for their conduct.  
Settlers agreed to obey the conditions set by the Mexican government—
that all immigrants be Catholics and that they take an oath of allegiance 
to Mexico. However, Anglo-Americans became resentful when Mexico 
tried to enforce the agreements. Mexico, in turn, became increasingly 
alarmed at the flood of immigrants from the U.S.22  
What is important to note is how quickly these ‘law abiding’ Americans 
ignored the Mexican laws. It is easy to see why this contempt for national laws 
seems to be easily (and conveniently) forgotten among current citizens of 
                                            
21 Occupied America: A History of Chicanos, Rudolfo Acuna (New York:  Harper Collins, 
1988), 7. 
22 Ibid. 7.  
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America. It is not easily forgotten among many Mexicans.23 This ongoing tension 
eventually precipitated a war between the two countries.24 The sources of the 
tension were manifold.25 The ensuing military invasion on the part of the United 
States to protect these illegal immigrants ended with a treaty that would have 
remarkable implications for the economic state of both countries. These 
implications are still central to understanding the economic Other in general and 
the Mexican undocumented migrant in particular.  
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Occlusion of History: 
On February 2, 1848 the Mexican government ratified the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo. This treaty would end open hostilities between the United 
States and Mexico. It was a treaty that, from the outset, was riddled with 
problems.26 
During the treaty talks Mexican negotiators, concerned about Mexicans 
left behind, expressed great reservations about these people being forced 
to “merge or blend” into Anglo-American culture. They protested the 
                                            
23 This is particularly troubling when you have a scholar on the level of Samuel 
Huntington speak of the American ethos as being characterized for a ‘respect for the law.’ This is 
seen as a travesty among many people who have a more accurate ‘remembrance.’  
24 Obviously what is seen by the United States as a ‘war’ is seen by the majority of 
Mexicans (and Latin Americans) as an‘invasion’ by the United States. It is central to any 
engagement to learn the history of this time period. This disruption would be most experienced in 
the Cultural Dimension…it would challenge the privilege of enunciation and the epistemic 
privilege that are part of ‘colonial wound.’  
25 Chapter 2 of Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality by Mario 
Barrera gives a wonderful summary of each of the motives for the ‘conquest.’ 
26 For a more detailed account of the history of this document, see Rudolfo Acuna’s 
Occupied America.  
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exclusion of provisions that protected American citizens’ rights, land titles, 
and religion. They wanted to protect their rights by treaty.27 
There were many articles in the treaty that allowed for protection for those 
Mexican people who chose to stay behind.  
Article IX of the treaty guaranteed Mexicans “the enjoyment of all the 
rights of citizens of the United States according to the principles of the 
Constitution; and in the meantime shall be maintained and protected in the 
free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in the free 
exercise of their religion without restriction.28 
Article X had ‘comprehensive guarantees’ which would protect “all prior 
and pending titles of property of every description.” In the final draft of the treaty 
this Article was omitted and the Mexican government protested. To reassure the 
Mexican government of no ill intent by this deletion the United States drafted a 
“Statement of Protocol” which read: 
The American government by suppressing the Xth article of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo did not in any way intend to annul the grants of lands 
made by Mexico in the ceded territories. These grants…preserve the legal 
value which they may possess, and the grantees may cause their 
legitimate (titles) to be acknowledged before the American tribunals.  
Comformable to the law of the United States, legitimate titles to 
every description of property, personal and real, existing in the ceded 
                                            
27 Occupied America: A History of Chicanos, 19.  
28 Ibid. 19. 
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territories, are those which were legitimate titles under the Mexican law of 
California and New Mexico up to the 13th of May, 1846, and in Texas up to 
the 2nd of March 1836.29 
This good faith assumption made on the part of the Mexican Congress 
made it possible for the Treaty to be accepted by both parties. Further 
assurances were also granted: “The Statement of Protocol was strengthened by 
Articles VIII and IX, which guaranteed Mexican rights of property and protection 
under the law. In addition, court decisions have generally interpreted the treaty 
as protecting land titles and water rights.”30 In time, “nearly every one of the 
obligations discussed above was to be violated.”31 Historian Leonard Pitt notes 
that many means—some legal and some illegal-- were used to steal land from 
Mexicans: 
No set pattern emerges in these land transformations, but the eroded 
claims of the original claimants washed away steadily and flowed into the 
hands of the newcomers—financiers, railroad developers, town promoters, 
cooperative colonizers, and irrigation companies.32 
Pitt is not the only historian who notes this transference of rights, property, 
and privilege, nor was this an exclusively Californian phenomenon. What Pitt 
                                            
29 Ibid. 20. Acuna states; “Considering the Mexican opposition to the treaty, it is doubtful 
whether the Mexican Congress would have ratified the treaty without this clarification. The vote 
was close.” 
30 Ibid. 20.  
31 Occupied America, 20. 
32 The Decline of the Californios, Leonard Pitt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1970), 275. 
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shows as occurring in California was also occurring in Texas and throughout the 
Southwest.  
There is some truth that many Mexican landowners, especially the small 
ones, were robbed in south Texas by force, intimidation, or chicanery. But 
what is usually ignored is the fact that the hacendado class, as a class, 
was stripped of property perfectly legally, according to the highest 
traditions of U.S. law.33 
A Mexican diplomat who commented after the ratification articulated this 
growing disappointment: 
Our race, our unfortunate people will have to wander in search of 
hospitality in a strange land, only to be ejected later. Descendents of the 
Indians that we are, the North Americans hate us, their spokesmen 
depreciate us, even if they recognize the justice of our cause, and they 
consider us unworthy to form with them one nation and one society, they 
clearly manifest that their future expansion begins with the territory that 
they have take from us and pushing [sic] aside our citizens who inhabit the 
land.34 
The penetration of the United States into the various parts of the 
Southwest resulted in an astounding increase in wealth on the part of United 
States. This wealth was evidenced in numerous aspects of life, among them, in 
agriculture, railroads, mining, and finally slavery.  
                                            
33 Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans, T. R. Fehrenbacher (New York: 
Macmillan, 1968), 510.  
34 Ibid. 20. 
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The agricultural component took many forms; some of them are the 
beautiful lands of California which created (and continue to create) remarkable 
wealth through the production of fruits and vegetables. Texan cotton was also an 
incredible source of wealth for the new Republic. Inseparable from but not 
identical to this enterprise was the need for slave labor to pick cotton. This 
became increasingly important given the rising industrial demands that the new 
technology (read: Cotton Gin) generated. When Mexico outlawed slavery, the 
class conflicts became even more pronounced. Finally, there was the 
sheepherding on the lands of New Mexico. This sheepherding land was held in 
‘Common’ under Mexican law, so it could not be used for private gain (which was 
necessary for the needs of the new capitalist class).35 The displacement of many 
small farmers all over the Southwest the U.S. deemed necessary so that the land 
could be used for many other ‘ventures.’  Central among them was the creation 
of the nascent railroad system.  
Virtually all the railroad that was laid down in the Southwest and all the 
natural resources that became part of the United States came from a form of 
‘thievery.’36  The economic interests of some in the United States became 
                                            
35 Much of this information is gleaned from various sources including: Race and Class in 
the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality by Mario Barrera; Occupied America: A History of 
Chicanos by Rudolfo Acuna; A People’s History of the United States by Howard Zinn; Empire’s 
Workshop by Greg Grandin; and Guest Workers or Colonized Labor: Mexican Labor Migration to 
the United States by Gilbert G. Gonzalez. 
36 Empire’s Workshop, 20. Most of the fortune building was done legally, with the 
collaboration of the government and the courts. Sometimes the collaboration had to be paid for. 
Thomas Edison promised New Jersey politicians $1000 each in return for favorable legislation. 
Daniel Drew and Jay Gould spent $1 million to bribe the New York legislature to legalize their 
issue of $8 million in “watered stock” (stock not representing real value) on the Erie 
Railroad…The first transcontinental railroad was built with blood, sweat, politics and thievery, out 
of the meeting of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads. The Central Pacific started on 
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intimately connected with an expansionist mindset. This expansionist mindset 
included almost all of Central and South America, along with other parts of the 
hemisphere.37  
Another interesting aspect of this expansionist history is not only how it 
demonstrated a very fundamental disregard for the ‘law of the land’ (albeit, in 
many cases, the law of the Other) but also the astounding amount of government 
‘aid’ that was given to the newly developing wealthy class.38 This moment of 
remembrance has in its own way a profoundly ironic character when we speak of 
how the ‘illegals’ are draining the system given all of the ‘help’ they are receiving 
from the United States government. Though common, this myth is fallacious at 
                                                                                                                                  
the West Coast going east; it spent $200,000 in Washington on bribes to get 9 million acres of 
free land and $24 million in bonds, and paid $79 million, an overpayment of $36 million to a 
construction company which really was its own. The construction was done by three thousand 
Irish and ten thousand Chinese, over a period of four years, working for one or two dollars a day. 
37 Ibid. “By the mid-nineteenth century, the United States had incorporated nearly half of 
Mexico into its territory. It had sent warships into Latin America ports a staggering 5, 980 times 
between 1869 and 1897 to protect American commercial interests and, increasingly, to flex its 
muscles to Europe. In 1893, the United States quietly backed both a revolution in Hawaii 
instigated by American sugar barons that eventually led to the annexation of those islands and, 
with more bluster, a counterrevolution in Brazil, when at the behest of Standard Oil’s William 
Rockefeller, Washington man-o’-wars steaming into Rio de Janeiro’s harbor to defeat rebels 
believed to be hostile to U. S. economic [read Capitalist] interests. In 1898, the United States took 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines as colonies and Cuba as a protectorate and established a series 
of coaling stations and naval bases throughout the Caribbean. In 1903, Theodore Roosevelt 
teamed up with J. P. Morgan to shave the province of Panama off of Colombia, turning the new 
nation into an important global transit route and, as the eventual home of Southcom 
headquarters, the forecastle of America’s hemispheric might…Over the course of the next thirty 
years, U.S. troops invaded Caribbean nations at least thirty-four times, occupied Honduras, 
Mexico, Guatemala, and Costa Rica for short periods, and remained in Haiti, Cuba, Nicaragua, 
Panama, and the Dominican Republic for longer stays. Military campaigns in the Caribbean and 
Central America during these decades not only gave shape to the command and bureaucratic 
structure of the American’s modern army (what eventually became known as the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, for example, was put into place soon after the 1898 Spanish-American War) but allowed 
soldiers to test their prowess, to sharpen their senses and skills for larger battles to come in 
Europe and Asia.” 
38 An extraordinary examination of this aspect of United States history can be found in 
Passionate Declarations: Essays on War and Justice by Howard Zinn. 
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many levels.39 The point is not merely too note the ‘bad behavior’ of the United 
States or the ‘good behavior’ of the Latin American countries. To create a 
Manichean worldview filled with characters or communities that are “all good” or 
“all bad” is not to see the complexity of the historical reality. None of these 
actions could have taken place without the collaboration of communities in both 
the United States and Latin America. What is of equal importance in this moment 
of remembrance is that there was much resistance to this imperialist action and 
subsequent injustices from within the United States as well as Mexico.40 This is 
also part of the remembrance that the Other can share with us. 
Recitation 
In the recitation stage we begin to rehearse the ‘stories’ of the Other. We 
learn to articulate their significant moments of remembrance. The profound effect 
of this part of Agapic Discipleship is that it dislodges us from our place of 
privilege. This is especially true in terms of the two privileges which were 
discussed earlier; the privilege of enunciation, and the epistemic privilege. As we 
‘voice’ our grasp of the remembrance of the Other (under their watchful tutelage) 
we once again affirm, in dialectical fashion, how we are “not” the Other (it is their 
remembrances we are articulating) and concurrently what we have in 
common. What we create, and awaken to, is that our lives and the lives of the 
Other are intimately intertwined. They have been intertwined for much longer 
                                            
39 Sojourners Magazine has done some wonderful work in this area.  
40 There are many examples of resistance to imperialist goals of the United States from 
within the United States. Some can be found in the writings of the Henry David Thoreau, Mark 
Twain, and the other is the interesting history of San Patricio (St. Patrick’s) Battalion. In more 
recent times we might hear of the heroic efforts of Benjamin Yellin M.D or Henry P. Anderson and 
his struggle against the University of California and the ruling elite in the agribusiness industry.  
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then we sometimes wish to acknowledge and in ways that both surprise and 
disturb us.   With this new knowledge we can begin to create a different reality 
that allows both the United States and Undocumented Migrants to inhabit a 
different world. We can begin to reconfigure the world of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in new 
terms.41 
It is important to recall that this expansionist program of the United States 
was replicated beyond Mexico42 and, as such, influenced other migrations from 
Latin America. This pattern continues into our current economic reality. The other 
aspect of this new recitation is that we can begin to critically interrogate any 
simplistic version which sees this reality in the categories of “evil U.S’ and 
‘virtuous Latin America’, or even more commonly in today’s discourse “evil” 
immigrants who do not respect the law and ‘virtuous’ law-abiding citizens of the 
United States. We can see both the imperialistic motives of some in the United 
States and the accommodation practiced by some members within the 
community of the Other. In this way, we cultivate further the vision so central to 
authentic connection and engagement, the vision of distinction. We are not the 
other; but we are connected. In the economic sphere, this will be manifested 
                                            
41 Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality, p. 29.   
“One of the more interesting aspects of this process stands out clearly in the Santa Fe 
Ring, which was able to exercise power effectively because of the alliances it forged with the 
wealthy Hispano elite, the ricos (McWilliams, 948, p. 122; Knowlton, 1967, p. 5; Larson, 1968, p. 
144). In effect there was an interethnic class alliance, which however, was dominated by the 
Anglos. Actually, such an alliance had long been in existence. Brayer has described the manner 
in which Cornelio Vigil and Ceran St. Vrain, prominent residents in Taos, combined to petition 
Governor Armijo for a substantial land grant in 1843. The grant was made in that same year. 
Within two months, the two recipients of the grant had deeded a one-sixth interest to Armijo, to 
Donanciano Vigil (Armijo’s territorial secretary), and to Charles Bent and Eugene Leitensdorfer, 
important merchants and traders (Brayer, 1974, pp.127-29).” 
42 One of the most incredible works documenting this history can be found in Open Veins 
of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent by Eduardo Galeano. 
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especially in our understanding of the various inter-connected communities 
beyond the traditional nation-states.  
This recitation version does not consist in merely replacing a nation-state 
or racial ‘lens’ with one that privileges class interest (though it does place a 
certain privilege to this heretofore neglected understanding).  The new 
understanding allows for a more complicated, ‘thicker’, and more accurate telling 
of the history of the Other (from the perspective of the Other), and also of our 
own history. We begin to see that both the Other and Ourselves have members 
of our respective countries who resisted and continue to resist the injustice being 
done to the Other.43 
The moment of recitation includes not only a grasp of the history of the 
Other but also some understanding of the present reality of the undocumented 
migrant.44 This contemporary understanding would allow one to live the 
experience encapsulated in the phrase used frequently by the Zapatista 
                                            
43 There are many examples of this resistance but one that is particularly powerful is 
found in A People’s History of the United States by Howard Zinn, 158.  
“Posters appealed for volunteers in Massachusetss: “Men of old Essex! Men of Newbury! 
Rally around the bold, gallant and lion hearted Cushing. He will lead you to victory and to glory!” 
The promised pay of $7 to $10 a month, and spoke of a federal bounty of $24 and 160 acres of 
land. But one young man wrote anonymously to the Cambridge Chronicle: 
“Neither have I the least idea of “joining” you, or in any way assisting the unjust war 
waging against Mexico. I have no wish to participate in such “glorious” butcheries of women and 
children as were displayed in the capture of Monterey, etc.  Neither have I any desire to place 
myself under the dictation of a petty military tyrant, to every caprice of whose I will I must yield 
implicit obedience. No sir-ee! As long as I can work, beg, or go to the poor house, I won’t go to 
Mexico, to be lodged on the damp ground, half starved, half roasted, bitten by mosquitoes and 
centipedes, stung by scorpions and tarantula –marched, drilled, and flogged, and then stuck up to 
be shot at, for eight dollars a month and putrid rations. Well, I won’t…Human butchery has had its 
day…And the time is rapidly approaching when the professional soldier will be placed on the 
same level as a bandit, the Bedouin, and the Thug.” 
44 There are many wonderful documentaries and examples of literature which give us a 
‘peek’ into the world of the immigrant. Two documentaries which are excellent in portraying this 
experience are El Norte and Alambrista. There are others which also show some of the 
imperialist actions of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. The Panama Deception is an excellent 
example of this.  
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movement, that of a ‘world where many worlds co-exist.’ Our experience of this 
new world is that of living a new life. This new life would, with some accuracy, be 
called a life of Resurrection. 
Resurrection 
Resurrection implies new life, a life in continuity with the past that 
embraces a new, expanded reality. But this Resurrected life also embraces a 
radical discontinuity. This new life has both a quantitative and qualitative 
element. The quantitative element is that it now must always include the Other. 
The qualitative element is that we can no longer identify ourselves, in the same 
manner, with our previous communities. In this ‘moment’ of agapic discipleship 
we experience both continuity with our previous economic reality and a radical 
discontinuity.  However, our inability to occlude the real and imperative element 
of human labor of the Other, in this case the undocumented migrant, brings to 
our life a radical discontinuity. In time, this new life will affect our patterns of 
production and consumption; this change appears as a byproduct of 
remembrance and recitation. We will continue to live in the United States, though 
in a United States intimately connected to the world of the Other, now understood 
and known as a fully human person within the economic order—as more than the 
invisible labor of a Capitalistic regime that we have euphemistically termed ‘The 
American Way of Life.’  The economic dimension of our life has now been 
enlarged to include the economic life of the Other. This economic dimension has 
both a temporal aspect and a spatial aspect.  
The Temporal Aspect: 
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The temporal aspect allows us to see that much of what allowed (and 
continues to allow) the United States to have a hegemonic status in the world 
economy is the direct result of massive violent, coercive, and illegal activity. 
Acknowledging this would completely reframe the responsibility that the United 
States has to share ‘their’ current wealth with Latin America in particular and the 
world in general.  This reconfiguring would have implications at every level of 
society.45 
The Spatial Aspect: 
 The spatial aspect would allow us to see how the Other has been an 
important part of our economic reality, in terms of the space we have used and 
continue to use (their space). In this sense the ‘spatial’ dimension of migrants 
cannot just be reduced to any contemporary context which obfuscates and 
obliterates entire historical epochs for the ‘convenience’ of United States 
discourse on undocumented migration. It can no longer be assumed that the 
present  ‘space’ occupied by the United States came down ‘ready made’ from 
some Deity which had a Manifest Destiny design for its people. We must live in a 
                                            
45 One evening after a night out with some friends I went to my local bank to take money 
out of my account. It was very late at night and as I pulled money out of the ATM I noticed there 
were some people in the bank. I thought it a bit strange that people were in the bank at this hour, 
I then realized it was the cleaning crew. These were the people that cleaned the bank 
(vacuuming, emptying trash cans etc.). I cannot say for sure if any of them were ‘undocumented’ 
but I did realize that throughout all of the United States there are many people who do this type of 
work; and some are undocumented. It also occurred to me that this was the ‘invisible labor’ that is 
so much a part of our lives as United States citizens. It is important to note here that I was in a 
very wealthy area of town. It is highly probable that many of the clients of this bank would not see 
the people cleaning the bank in their quotidian existence. In a Resurrected existence we can no 
longer pretend that our capacity to create wealth is, in great part, made possible by the ‘invisible 
labor’ of the Other. It is also ironic that I was in a city named San Francisco after a man who 
quite explicitly turned his back on his inherited wealth. In my Resurrected existence, I can no 
longer speak of the ‘riches’ of the United States without acknowledging the history of exploitation 
that was part and parcel of its creation. 
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world where the ‘place’ occupied by the United States of America is brought into 
a very different perspective. 
Emancipatory Praxis: From Migrant to Pilgrim 
In its most basic form, the final moment of Agapic Solidarity, Emancipatory 
Praxis, entails a return to our communities of origin, so that we can share withour 
community our newly resurrected existence that has been created through our 
period of agapic discipleship. We return to our various United State ‘audiences’ in 
order to speak with the new knowledge gained from going through the previous 
‘moments’ of Agapic Solidarity.  
This reverse evangelization requires, however, that we maintain contact 
with the Other. Although we are finished, in some form, with the second ‘moment’ 
of Agapic Discipleship, we cannot return to our parochial view of the world; our 
work is not done.  The need for ongoing metanoia is always part of the ethical 
journey. Metz speaks to this need of being in ongoing contact with the Other 
when he states; “We must act and do theology while touching victims.”46  
Likewise, we must always be sensitive to the danger of speaking ‘for’ the Other in 
a manner that evacuates their agency. We must honor the ‘distinction principle’ 
that is so central to Agapic Solidarity. No matter how close we get to the Other 
we will never be the Other.  No matter how large our world becomes in this new 
resurrected reality, we will never fully inhabit the world of the Other. This is not 
because we are inadequate, defective, or morally inept. Rather, it is because we 
are never ‘omniscient’ about any aspect of reality, including the world of the 
                                            
46 Love’s Strategy, “Risking Memory”, 8.  
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Other, and we will never fully grasp the Other in his/her totality.47 This distinction 
is important because it will allow us to love the Other as Other without subsuming 
them into any Totality. Even our noblest aspirations could become oppressive: 
The ethos of liberation is structured around an axis that is not compassion 
(as for Schopenhauer) or sympathy (as for Scheler)—given that both are 
positions of functional parts toward other parts (to suffer-with one’s 
equal)—but commiseration: placing oneself with (cum) someone in misery 
(miser). The ethos of liberation is other-directed pulsion or metaphysical 
justice; it is love of the other as other, as exteriority; love of the 
oppressed—not, however, as oppressed but as subject of exteriority. The 
traumatic condition of the human being endowed with freedom, the other 
reduced to being an instrument in a system [or Dimension] is rightly called 
misery. To discover the other as other and place-oneself-together-with 
that person’s misery, to experience as one’s own the contradiction 
between being free and having to endure slavery, being distinct and 
someone and at the same time only a different internal part; to hurt from 
the pain of this cleavage is the first attitude of the ethos of liberation. It is 
not friendship or fellowship (among equals) but love of the oppressed 
because of their real dignity as exteriority.48 
This love of the Other is predicated upon seeing the Other as Other. This 
is one of the more radical aspects of Agapic Solidarity because it seeks to 
                                            
47 “Now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see fact to face. Now I 
know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known” (1 Corinthians 13:12). 
48 Philosophy of Liberation, 64-65. 
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subvert the current discourse of love. The current understanding of love 
imagines love as moving towards some ‘abstract’ notion of Universal Oneness. 
Instead, we acknowledge that authentic Love ends with a clear sense of 
Distinction. Such an understanding of love is much more Trinitarian in structure, 
acknowledging the difference within the various communities.  
In this last moment we ask the question, “What will Emancipatory Praxis 
look like with respect to the undocumented migrant as ‘living labor’”? Because 
this moment requires that we know the specific context of our praxis, we are 
unable to give a definitive answer that would do justice to all of the unique 
conditions of every situation. Simply put, we can never give a ‘one size fits all’ 
answer to the question of what Emancipatory Praxis will look like or what love of 
neighbor looks like. We can only give a broad outline or approximation that may 
help to create a trajectory or direction for our praxis. The specifics would be 
contingent on which ‘audience’ is being addressed.  Emancipatory Praxis is 
always concrete and particular: 
If there is such a virtue, we must know how to distinguish it from the vices 
masquerading as virtues in the prevailing totality. The ethos of liberation is 
not just the habit of repeating the same thing. On the contrary, it is an 
aptitude or capacity, become character, for innovation and creation. 
Inasmuch as it emerges from serving the other (2.6.7.3), and the other is 
always a concrete person in a unique situation of oppression and 
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exteriority; only someone who is responsible and faithful to someone 
else’s uniqueness can be a liberator.49 
Conscious of how all Emancipatory Praxis is configured and implemented 
based on context, we now understand how we can never give a full description of 
what this would look like ‘in action.’ What we can do, as Catholics, is to suggest 
at least three arenas in which we might engage in Emancipatory Praxis. I believe 
the work of David Tracy enables one way to speak of how and where 
Emancipatory Praxis would occur can be found.  Tracy asserts that all 
theologians, and I would argue all people of faith, must be conscious of 
addressing three communities: Academy, Church, and Society. I believe that we 
can use this three audience paradigm to help us discern the areas in which 
Emancipatory Praxis would occur.  
Academy 
In the academy we must be cognizant of surfacing the invisible labor 
found within the academy. This ought to be done at every level of the institution; 
curricular, administrative, faculty and staff training, even the manner in which the 
‘business’ of the school is conducted. What is especially important here is to ask 
ourselves whose Remembrance and Recitation are we privileging? This would 
be especially important in the broad area of the Humanities (Economics, 
Sociology, Political Science etc.). I would like to give just two examples. The first 
is in the arena of history I believe that we should privilege in a particular way the 
period of colonialism (and neo-colonialism) from the perspectives of its ‘victims.’  
                                            
49 Ibid., 64. 
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This should include hearing their voices, visions, perspective of those most 
deeply impacted by colonialist patterns.  We need to move away from thinking 
that there is ‘a’ U.S. history and then that there is concurrently a history of U.S. 
colonialism. Each country has periods and people who were engaged in aspects 
of exploitation of the Other and those that resisted this exploitation. I think we 
should also privilege the voices among our own (What we have termed the Same 
or the Totality) that resisted the seduction of power; these would be what Dussel 
calls the Prophets.50 A second example is to view all economic development 
from within a World Systems perspective.51 This would allow us to have a more 
accurate understanding of capitalism and specifically a more accurate read on its 
true benefits and costs. As mentioned above this is not to be done in a way 
which replicates a binary reality that reverses the roles of the exploiter and the 
exploited but rather seeks to show the multi-layered quality to all relationships.  
Church 
In the church we must ask ourselves: Are we in ongoing, intimate contact 
with the ‘victims’ of Capitalism in general and the undocumented migrant humans 
that make up the ‘invisible labor’ matrix of our collective existence? In this area it 
is especially important that we not fall into the familiar pattern of what we can do 
for ‘them’ but rather fully live with the implications of living with all they have done 
for us. In more simplistic terms we move from Charity to Justice.  
                                            
50 Ethics and Community, chapter 9. 
51 There are many authors who could be used: Immanuel Wallerstein, Enrique Dussel, 
Walter Mignolo, Samir Amin, Arundathi Roy, Tariq Ali, and Greg Grandin among others 
mentioned in this project.  
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In parallel fashion, Metz speaks of the Catholic Church coming to grips 
with the reality not of being a Church which has a presence in the Third World 
but rather of being a Third World Church. This shift must be accounted for in the 
economic dimension. I believe that this shift will be as profound as the shift which 
occurred when the church became a Vatican II church. I the terms of this project 
we are not longer a church who must engage the Other but rather a Church of 
Others.52 
Society  
In society we must be willing to reconfigure the discussion on the 
undocumented migrant away from an ahistorical narrative, which simply 
perpetuates the colonial wound in general, and the enunciatory and epistemic 
privileges spoken of earlier in particular. We must be willing to subvert these 
privileges and allow Emancipatory Praxis to eventually dislodge and discard 
these privileges. This will entail speaking from a perspective that is not popular in 
much of the common discourse on this subject.53  
 
 
 
                                            
52 Anselm Min does a beautiful explication of how we must now live in a world in which 
we are all “others” to some communities. Hence for him we must engage in ‘Solidarity of Others’ 
not merely with Others. 
53 Along with many authors mentioned earlier I would add that the entire history of U.S. 
Imperialism is never spoken of within ‘popular’ discourse. I mean specifically in relation to the 
issue of undocumented migration in what is now the United States. We speak of ‘illegal’ migration 
with a very skewed historical understanding. We also speak of the wealth of the United States as 
though it ‘fell from the sky.’ This creates an incomplete understanding of the issue of migration in 
the United States. It intentionally occludes the place of the Other within the economic dimension. 
This is precisely what the method of Agapic Solidarity is attempting to subvert.  
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Conclusion: Making the Invisible Visible….New Eyes and New Ears 
The hearts of these people have no feeling. They do not hear well with 
their ears. And they have shut their eyes. They do not want to see with 
their eyes. They do not want to hear with their ears. They do not want to 
understand in their hearts. They do not want to turn to me. If they did turn, 
I would heal them."  
 16God is blessing your eyes because they see. God is blessing your ears 
because they hear.  
 17I tell you the truth. Many prophets and good men wanted to see what 
you see, but they did not see them. They wanted to hear what you hear, 
but they did not hear them. (Matthew 13:15-17)54 
We can speak of the gift of Faith as granting us the capacity to see and 
hear the Other. This is a gift which should not be taken for granted, but rather 
must be cultivated. It is my belief that we are called, as a people, to see the 
Other in our midst, specifically to awaken to the Other in our midst through all 
dimensions of our humanity. This would include the economic. 
In discussing the economic dimension of life we spoke of how capitalism 
in its present form occludes the invisible labor which creates our material 
existence. In doing this it systemically occludes the bearer of that labor. In the 
                                            
54www.biblegateway.com/ 
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discourse of the Undocumented Migrant in the United States this has a specific 
configuration. I believe that Solidarisitic Engagement allows us to see and hear 
the Other, including the invisible labor which has always been, and continues to 
be, a part of the United States. This encounter with historical reality is an a priori 
demand that must be met before any authentic claim to ‘love of neighbor’ is 
properly fulfilled.  
   In discussing a volatile issue such as undocumented migrants in the 
United States of America it is easy to move in one of two directions. The first is to 
speak of the incommensurability of the two communities involved; the United 
States of America and the Latin American Migrant. This incommensurability can 
be seen as so insurmountable that all attempts at creating any form of unity or 
commonality between them seems futile. This perspective is made manifest in 
such movements as the building of the fence between United States and Mexico. 
It is also seen in the rise of vigilante groups at the border. This is not seeing the 
Other, but rather, projecting our worst fears and bigoted perceptions onto the 
Other. It also prevents us from seeing how many people in both countries 
economically benefit from fanning the flames of this ignorance and fear. It may 
also show up in extreme forms of overly essentialized multi-cultural discourses 
that reify the concept of culture in celebration. The second mistaken direction is 
to frame the discourse in terms of seeing us all as being in the same boat. This 
perspective obscures the manner in which the construction of ‘the boat’ has both 
historical roots and present day implications. This is seen in many well-meaning, 
 215 
 
 
but misguided programs and documents.55 This does not allow us to see the 
Other but only a projection of our ‘past’ as being the past of the Other. What 
Solidaristic Engagement demands is that we fully ‘see and hear’ the Other, for it 
is only like this that we can begin to have a true encounter with the other, which 
in turn allows us the possibility of loving the Other. This Love, like all authentic 
Christian Love (Agape), will call us to surrender all privilege and power, including 
economic power. We are called to live with this Cross precisely because we 
know that it is only through living the pain of Good Friday that will we arrive, with 
the Other, at the Glory of Easter Sunday.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
55 One that comes to mind is the Bishops’ Encyclical, “Strangers No More.” The 
document seeks to create a meta-narrative that shows how much we have in common. While this 
is noble and has its place it can also, inadvertently, negate the particular and varied historical 
details of the people involved in the United States; to speak of an African Slave, an Indigenous 
person, a Chinese Coolie, a Mexican farmer in the Southwest, and a Anglo who came invited by 
Mexico to certain parts of the United States all as ‘immigrants’ is to create a similarity of 
experience that does violence to the particulars of each community.  
